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Hazards and risks are currently identified in generic risk silos using top-down
tools and methods which are incorporated into whole system risk management
frameworks such as enterprise risk management. The current methods of
identification and documentation are linear in approach and presentation.
However, the world is multi-dimensional requiring a method of identification
which responds to complex non-linear relationships. A method is required to
identify cross- disciplinary hazards and formulate a register method to evidence
the identified hazards. This study uses expert elicitation, web, survey and case
studies to develop a method for cross-disciplinary hazard identification by
application of the dimensions of generic, interface, causation and accumulation.
The results of the study found many of the tools and methods used for hazard
and risk identification such as hazard and operability studies took a top down
approach commencing with a known failure and establishing cause and effect.
The starting position of a known failure or event precludes identification of new
types of failure or events and perpetuates a linear approach to hazard
identification. Additionally the linear design of a risk register does not facilitate
the presentation of multidimensional hazards. The current methods do not
accommodate multiple lifecycles and components within cross discipline
relationships. The method was applied to three case studies. The first case
study had an existing risk register of 50 risks, post method application an
additional 531 hazards were identified; case study (2) a register of 49 hazards
and post method application additional hazards of 261; case study (3) an initial
register of 45 hazards and an additional 384 hazards after method application.
The impact of the method application highlights inconsistencies in the initial risk
register and provides a tool which will aid the identification understanding and
communication of hazards. Additionally it documents previously unidentified
cross-disciplinary hazards and provides a proactive register method for
identification and documentation by application of the dimensions of interface,
causation and accumulation.
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11 THESIS INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction
Globalisation and the exponential proliferation of access to a plethora of new
technological developments have resulted in a complex web of interconnections
and dependency. Additionally this scenario has to operate within the constraints
of an increasing demand for the earth’s scarce resources (Stern, 2006) and an
escalation of the population of 6.5bn in 2005 to 8.5bn in 2030 (IEA, WEO,
2008).This has changed the risk profile and exposures of the current world. At
the same time there has also been a move from hazard identification to risk
identification and quantification.
The methods and tools to identify hazards and risks have not kept pace with
this change and are not able to identify the multidimensional exposures that
result from complex interactions in the current environment (Beck and Kropp,
2011). There is recognition of the need for cross-disciplinary risk management
which is not focused on quantification or control (Rasmussen, 1997). Hazards
are a risk source (Aven, 2011) and if not identified; these hazards and potential
risks remain unidentified, un-quantified, unmanaged and unregulated. The
result is significant cost to insurers as well as governments as the reinsurer of
last resort.
1.2 Aim
The aim of this research project is to identify and investigate (using case
studies) why robust and encompassing hazard identification does not occur,
particularly in areas where multiple fields overlap; and to design a framework
that will address these deficiencies.
The value of this research will be the formulation of a method for cross
disciplinary hazard identification and documentation. The resulting identified
hazards will provide risk practitioners, insurers and regulators with a repository
of cross-disciplinary hazards which can be incorporated into existing risk
identification modules of risk management. As a result quantification,
management and regulation will benefit from cross-disciplinary identification.
21.3 Research objectives
The objectives for this research are:
 Critically evaluate current approaches to hazard identification and risk
management to identify their suitability for the identification of hazards
in an interconnected world.
 Define the dimensions of generic, interface, causation and
accumulation risk and critically evaluate their application to the
identification of hazards.
 Develop and evaluate a model for the identification and
documentation of multidimensional attributes of hazards.
1.4 Research rational
Hazards are currently identified in their generic risk silos (Rasmussen, 1997; Ai
et al., 2012). While whole system frameworks have been developed with the
aim of integrating generic risks for example using enterprise risk management
(ERM) (COSO, 2004), this integration at the stage of identification has not
occurred (Ai et al., 2012).The development of an understanding of dependency
has commenced but this is focused on already identified risk’s which is the case
with Allen and Yin (2010). To ascertain the unidentified hazards, a method will
be developed to embrace the multidimensional attributes of hazards in a
number of descriptors. This requires the introduction of new dimensions and the
development of an appropriate medium for documenting the identified hazards.
The choice of documentation has to be capable of embedding the existing risk
management regime within organisations. The method will be developed for the
use of organisations concerned with the identification of hazards within the risk
management of large infrastructure. The result will be a portfolio of hazards
which are multidimensional providing risk professionals with a more holistic
overview of their risk profile.
1.5 Thesis structure
The thesis structure and alignment of research objectives are illustrated in
Figure 1-1. The figure shows the development of the rationale and evidence for
3the model in Chapters 1, 2 and 3. The research methodology is outlined in
Chapter 4 and the initial results from surveys and questionnaires analysed to
support the formulation of the method for hazard identification in Chapter 5. The
method for cross-disciplinary hazard identification is presented in Chapter 6,
tested and developed by application to three case studies which are presented
in Chapters 7, 8 and 9. Each of the case studies test the robustness of the
method and adds to its development.
































































The world is increasingly complex and interconnected and there is a need to
identify and manage the resulting hazards and risks (WEF, 2011). Many of the
increasing unanticipated commercial costs of risk are related to incomplete
hazard identification (Goh and Chua, 2010). Historically hazards have been
identified in generic disciplines such; as health, safety, legal and environmental,
however seldom are they identified across disciplines. Technical hazards are
identified as part of a process and are usually focused on a single point in time.
Methods of identification have not developed to replicate the cross-disciplinary
relationships of hazards or the changing profile of a hazard over a lifecycle
(Beck and Kropp, 2011).
This chapter delineates the significant factors of hazard identification by
investigating the current knowledge surrounding the relationship between
hazard, risk and uncertainty. It then explores the landscape of risk identification,
within generic risk identification, risk assessment and risk management
frameworks.
2.2 Key concepts
This research project aims to develop a methodology to improve the
identification of hazards across multiple disciplines. Clarity of the term hazard
and its relationship with risk and uncertainty is essential to the identification of
hazards.
2.2.1 Hazard
A hazard is defined as a source or cause of; adverse effects, danger, harm,
loss, injury, damage, disruption, and degradation (Kaplan and Garrick, 1981;
Royal Society, 1992; Sutton, 1992; Fairman et al., 1998; IPCS, 2004; Smith,
2005; IPCS, 2008; HSE, 2011). The diversity of definitions creates uncertainty
and does not facilitate effective hazard identification. The following definition will
apply in this research:
6hazard is defined as a source of danger, damage, harm or loss. Hazards can
result from natural phenomena such as, hydrological meteorological, geological,
biological or human activity (HSE, 2001; UNISDR, 2009).
Hazards can be latent or immediate, chronic or acute and result from the use,
development and decommissioning of technology. Hazards can be identified
and characterised; whereas risks are often quantified (Aven, 2010).
2.2.2 Risk
Risks are assessed and managed in numerous contexts and applied to many
different aspects of life by various disciplines and professions on a daily basis
(Fairman et al., 1998). Risk is a phenomena and concept that requires
awareness and management, but risk does not have a commonly accepted
definition (Renn, 2011). This is evidenced by the number of harmonisation
projects that have taken place and have not resulted in an agreed definition of
the phenomena of risk (IPCS, 2004; Aven and Renn, 2009; Redmill, 2002).
Risks are identifiable and measurable (Van der Elst and Van Daelen, 2007).The
quantifiable characteristic of risk is a common theme and is expressed as a
probability, expected frequency, likelihood, severity, possibility, magnitude or
chance (Smith, 1981; March and Shapira, 1987; HSE, 2011).
Risk is defined as the probability of a specific hazard. Risks can be
characterised by qualitative descriptions such as significance, severity and
magnitude. Qualitative descriptions of risk can be expressed as the potential for
danger, damage, or harm and where the likelihood, probability, frequency,
severity or deviation can be quantified. Risks can have both positive and
negative impacts. Hillson (2002) describes upside risks as opportunities and
downside risks as threats. This research focuses on the negative aspects of
risk. Uncertainty, exposure and hazard are essential elements of risk (Bedford
and Cooke, 2001).
72.2.3 Uncertainty
Uncertainty is identifiable but not measurable (Knight, 2002). Uncertainty can be
categorised as aleatory, (systems) uncertainty and epistemic (knowledge
based) uncertainty (Bedford and Cook, 2001; Bowden, 2004). The origins of
uncertainty can be human, scientific, institutional or policy based (IPCC, 2010).
Uncertainty can arise from incomplete and imperfect knowledge resulting from
corrupt data, incomplete information, inconsistency, or information that is
complex and misunderstood (Van der Sluijs et al., 2005; Defra, 2011). It may
also result from variability in parameters and structural issues with extrapolation
(Gallegos and Bonano, 1993) such as the incomplete knowledge of a model,
process or system. It can arise from the quality and interpretation of data; result
from conflicting evidence, lack of evidence, and validity of evidence. Uncertainty
can be the consequence of the balance between objectivity and subjectivity
(Bowden, 2004) where uncertainty is the variability of possible outcomes (Hertz
and Thomas, 1984; March and Shapira, 1987).
Uncertainty is accommodated in risk analysis and can be expressed as
probability distributions, percentages and confidence levels. It is dealt with in
two ways by: (1) qualitative methods such as social/ legal assessment with the
use of expert opinion; or (2) statistical methods for example probability analysis
(Finnveden et al., 2009). Knight (2002) stated that uncertainty cannot be
measured but judgments can be made on the probability. However a statistical
approach does not remove or reduce uncertainty but formally includes it in the
process facilitating uncertainty management (Stenhouse et al, 2009).
2.2.4 Relationship between hazard, risk and uncertainty
Risk is the relationship of uncertain outcomes and incomplete knowledge
(Hansson, 2011). It is the product of uncertainty and hazard where the resulting
impact may be reduced by mitigation (Kaplan and Garrick, 1981). A hazard is
the source of a risk and has to be identified prior to risk identification (Carter
and Smith, 2006). The management of risk requires characterisation of hazard,
an understanding of the potential variability of outcomes which is expressed
8either explicitly or implicitly as a probability or likelihood of adverse effect. Risk
requires the attributes of hazard, probability exposure and consequence, where
all elements have an inherent level of uncertainty.
Figure 2-1 Risk attributes matrix which allows the visual positioning of risk
(adapted from IPCC, 2000 and Stirling, 2007)
The relationship between risk, hazard and uncertainty is depicted in Figure 2-1.
If a hazard is not identified, risks remain unassessed and mitigation cannot be
focused to control the unidentified hazard (Carter and Smith, 2006). The result
is unmanaged risks. New technologies and increasingly dynamic and
interconnected environments require hazard identification methods to evolve
reducing uncertainty and improving the management of risk.
2.3 Hazard and risk identification
2.3.1 Hazard identification
Hazard identification involves the identification of the relevant properties that
cause adverse effects such as loss, danger, damage or harm and is usually
incorporated as part of the risk management framework of generic risks such as
health and safety and the environment. There has been a move away from
hazard-based management to risk-based management (Fairman et al.,
91998).This approach may not facilitate a holistic vision of the dynamic profile of
hazards and risks in the current world (Beck and Kropp, 2011). This is due to
the underlying source of risk not being identified. Risk management
frameworks are comprised of a number of stages; risk identification, risk
assessment, risk analysis and risk treatment (ISO 31000, 2009).
2.3.2 Risk identification
2.3.2.1 Linear risk identification
Risk identification developed initially from characterising a risk and defining the
qualitative attributes, for example categorisation in generic silos such as safety
risk and market risk (Kaplan and Garrick, 1981). The qualitative characteristics
of risk are based on what is intended, the current information and the gaps in
knowledge about what is intended (Kaplan and Garrick, 1981). This translates
as the context, attributes and impact of a risk. As a result the unknown element
or gap in knowledge equates to the uncertainty element of risk.
2.3.2.2 Quantitative attributes of risk
The characterisation of risk has developed to include the quantification of risk.
This development resulted in what is commonly called the “triplet idea” (Kaplan
and Garrick, 1981). The triplet idea was expressed as Risk = (Si Pi, Xi) and
required identifying the different outcomes or sources of harm (Si), the likelihood
of the outcomes occurring (Pi) and the resulting consequences (Xi) (Kaplan and
Garrick, 1981). This quantification of a hazard can only occur if qualitative
identification takes place (Fairman et al., 1998). It is the identification of Si which
is the focus of this research.
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2.3.2.3 Third development of risk identification
Figure 2-2 Interconnectivity of world events (after World Economic Forum 2011)
Recent events in the world have shown that the interaction of different risks
brings a third stage to the development of risk which should take into account
risk connectivity (Allan and Yin, 2010), the complexity of these interactions are
illustrated in Figure 2-2. The different interactions across disciplines result in
hazards which are not identified by current generic risk methods. For example
in Figure 2-2 the orange box shows the immediate interconnections of climate
11
change which include; biodiversity loss, flooding, storm and cyclones, air
pollution, water security and food security. The figure shows that each of these
factors are themselves linked to a number of other factors. These linkages may
be the result of different risk relationships which are not silo based or fully
characterised and require further investigation.
2.3.3 Risk assessment
Risk assessment is an essential part of any risk management process
positioned after problem definition and before the appraisal of options (ISO
31000, 2009; Defra, 2011).
There is significant inconsistency as to where and when hazard identification
takes place (Aven, 2011). For example the ISO 31000 risk management
process incorporates risk assessment which is comprised of three components;
risk identification, analysis and evaluation (ISO31000, 2009). It does not
explicitly state where or if hazard identification takes place and the guidance for
ISO 31000 Clause 5.4.2 states that if a risk is not identified it cannot be
managed. Within the ISO31000 framework it would seem that hazard
identification should take place prior to a risk being identified and therefore it
must take place as part of the risk identification process. However Aven (2011)
has questioned whether risks are identified suggesting that hazards are
identified as risk sources and that risks are analysed and characterised in the
risk analysis module of risk assessment.
The lack of clarity as to where hazard identification takes place is further
confused by the view of Redmill (2002), who suggests that the process of risk
analysis consists of three processes: hazard identification, hazard analysis,
and risk assessment. Greater emphasis is placed on ensuring that hazard
identification is rigorous and robust. Inconsistency results from the fact that the
terms ‘risk assessment’ and ‘risk analysis’ are not clearly and consistently
applied (Redmill, 2002; Aven, 2011). Further uncertainty results from the US
National Research Council report (2009) which suggests that risk assessment
includes: problem formulation and scoping; risk assessment planning and
conduct; and risk management. Whereas conventional risk assessment
12
comprises hazard identification, dose response assessment, exposure
assessment and risk characterisation (Defra, 2011). Beck and Kropp (2011)
state that it is not uncommon for incidents to result from risk relationships
excluded in previous risk assessments. Fundamentally the risk assessment
process is only as robust as the identification of hazards.
2.4 Generic risk identification
Generic risk identification is concerned with the identification of risks within a
specific generic framework, such as health and safety. These generic
frameworks have specific approaches and frameworks for the characterisation
of risks and the identification of hazards which are unique to their discipline.
This section critically reviews the risk identification for environmental, health and
safety, financial, legal and technical generic risks.
2.4.1 Environmental
The identification of environmental hazards is the initial step after problem
formulation in the process of environmental risk management and takes place
as part of the risk assessment process at a number of different levels. Recent
guidelines for environmental risk assessment and management define hazards
as:
a situation or biological, chemical or physical agent that may lead to harm or
cause adverse effects (Defra, 2011).
The guidance does not stipulate the media to which harm is caused although it
is assumed to be land, water, flora, fauna and humans as defined in the EU
Environmental Liability Directive for Environmental Damage (200/35/CE). Air is
not explicitly included in the Directive but implicitly included by way of the term
“emissions”. The pollution linkage model or S-P-R paradigm includes three
parts; a source, pathway and receptor and is a means of visualising the
relationship between environmental hazard and risk. Linkage between the three
parts of the model has to occur for a risk to exist (Pollard, 2008).
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The initial purpose of environmental risk assessment is to evaluate harm
(Pollard et al., 2006) and this underpins the need to identify and characterise
hazards. The evaluation of harm is determined by severity and the potential to
exceed regulatory or accepted standards when set in context of problem
definition and potential for detrimental impact. The breaching of a standard
alone is not necessarily sufficient to indicate an environmental hazard (Pollard
et al., 2004)
Figure 2-3 Environmental regimes (adapted from BLG, 2008)
Each of the environmental liability regimes in Figure 2-3 has parameters that
provide guidance as to whether there is the potential for an environmental
hazard. The management of the environment within the European Union is
determined by the ‘precautionary principle’, the ‘polluter pays’, and ‘preventative
action’ which are enshrined in National and European environmental law. These
principles provide boundaries for the identification of known hazards. For
example, the pollution linkage model is used for the identification of hazards
and assessment of contaminated land (Luo et al. 2009). The assessment of risk
in respect of contaminated land requires there to be significant harm being
caused, or significant possibility of significant harm being caused, for the land to
14
be designated “contaminated land” (Part IIA Environmental Protection Act
1990). The fact that harm needs to occur means that the source of the harm,
has to be identified. The UK Contaminated Land Regime encapsulates the
principles of ‘the polluter pays’ and ‘proportionality’ and puts forward a statutory
risk based definition of contaminated land (Nathanail. and Bardos, 2004 Luo, et
al., 2009)
The initial UK Government guidance stated that hazards are associated with
substances, operations, processes, organisms and location (DOE, 1995). This
definition has been replaced with “a situation or biological, chemical or physical
agent that may lead to harm or cause adverse effects” (Defra, 2011). It also
suggests that questions, such as those highlighted in Figure 2-4, should be
used as a checklist to facilitate the identification of hazards.
Figure 2-4 Questions and considerations for hazard identification (adapted from
DOE, 1995; Defra, 2011)
Where there is insufficient information and or uncertainty, the precautionary
principle will prevail (Defra, 2011). The next stage of hazard identification will
require responding to the questions “how”, “when” and “where” might an
environmental event, operation, process or phase of operation (either through
normal operations or failure) result in harm to the environment. Techniques to
identify failure have been adapted for use in the identification of environmental
15
hazards and include event tree analysis, fault tree analysis, hazard and
operation studies (HAZOP) and reliability and failure analysis (DOE, 1995;
Defra, 2011). These techniques are similar to those used for hazard
identification in health and safety (see Section 2.4.2).
Although there are many different risk assessment methodologies for
environmental exposure there does not seem to be an agreed set of tools for
hazard identification across the environmental disciplines. There are methods
for identifying hazards for the different media which seem to focus on breaching
generally accepted statutory limits and concepts such as contaminated land, air
and water quality. Additionally it would seem that the focus is on determining
the dose exposure response relationship of pollutants and contaminants to
humans and the impact on the quality of land, water, air and biodiversity (EU
Liability Directive, 2004). This shows a focus on risk based management and
regulation rather than on hazard identification.
The impacts of pollutants are not the only hazards. There are hazards with
respect to numerous impacts from climate change, stability of land, changes in
river direction, these are clearly environmental and should all be accommodated
in environmental hazard identification. Additionally the environment does not
function in isolation; it interfaces and has interconnecting and dependency
relationships with legal exposures, health and safety, technology, finance and
economic factors. These relationships should be explored to identify currently
unidentified hazards.
2.4.2 Health and safety
The management of health and safety risk requires an understanding of three
concepts, hazard, harm and risk. Hazard is defined by the United Kingdom
Health and Safety Executive (HSE) as anything that might cause harm (HSE,
2006). Risk is defined as the likelihood that harm may be caused (HSE, 2005).
Harm is the physical or emotional disease or injury that may be caused as a
result of an accident, operations or the environment. There is no single all-
encompassing definition of harm within the health and safety framework (HSE,
16
2003). There is an accepted interrelationship between hazards, harm and risks
illustrated in Figure 2-5.
HAZARD HARMRISK
Figure 2-5 The health and safety hazard, harm risk relationship
The HSE (2006) propose a five step framework for health and safety risk
assessments which include the following:-
Step 1 Hazard identification by characterisation.
Step 2 Establish the circumstances in which the target is likely to be
harmed.
Step 3 Evaluation of the risk - (severity and frequency) identifying options
for mitigation, assess adequacy and prioritise.
Step 4 Record and mitigate.
Step 5 Audit, review and update risk assessment protocol.
Hazards are identified by establishing that harm results from them. Regulations
are in place to highlight liability and additional hazard by application of concepts
such as “So Far as Is Reasonably Practicable” (SFAIRP) and “As Low as
Reasonably Practicable” (ALARP) (HSE, 2001). Site owners and operators
need to ensure that mitigation is as far as “reasonably practicable” which is
incorporated in the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974.
Risks are evaluated by physical observation of the site, accurate reporting and
collecting of data, actual and expected cost of injury, disease and damage,
areas for improvement, methods of mitigation identified, and the production of a
risk register (HSE, 2005).
The Health and Safety Laboratory (HSL) have conducted an extensive study
into hazard identification for control of major accident hazards (COMAH)
regulated installations commenting on 40 techniques and classifying techniques
into four groups: (1) process hazards; (2) hardware hazards; (3) control
hazards; and (4) human hazards (HSL, 2005). The techniques were evaluated
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based on their effectiveness to identify hazards at different times in a process
lifecycle.
Process hazard identification techniques evaluate the failure of an operation
and attempt to detect latent hazards. These techniques concentrate on the
identification of hazards highlighted by deviations from expected performance
and exposure to harmful elements. Hardware hazard identification methods
focus on the failure of hardware and the resulting impact of that failure. Control
hazard identification tools are concerned with the hazards that result from mal-
operation of safety systems including computer systems. The fourth category of
hazard identification, human hazard identification, identifies hazards that result
from the interface between humans and the process, the focus being hazards
that result from exposure to human error. Table 2.1 provides details of the
different tools that apply to the four categories of hazard identification.
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The majority of the hazard identification techniques produce qualitative results
which are applicable across a broad range of industry sectors and sizes of
organisation. The different hazard identification techniques are not applicable to
all stages of the infrastructure or process lifecycle (HSL, 2005). The hazard
analysis stage is the first and most important part of the risk management
process as mitigation cannot be used to manage unidentified hazards (HSL,
2005). Additionally, with the exception of HAZOP, there was little formal
guidance as to the application of these methods of hazard identification.
2.4.3 Financial
Crockford (1986), states that financial risk management is the activity of
generating economic value by the application of tools and methods to control
identified hazards (Verbano and Venturini, 2011). The hazard identification of
financial risk is based on the source of financial harm which can result from
financial and non-financial sources. This includes the inability to obtain credit,
liquidity, interest rate volatility, overtrading, unidentified liabilities, fraud, misuse
of resources, misstatement of financial information, accounting system
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breakdown and unreliable management information (Dunne and Morris, 2008).
In corporate finance, financial risk is the difference between the equity and
business risk (Brealey et al., 2006). The greater an organisations level of debt,
the greater its exposure to financial harm (Brealey et al., 2006). Financial risk
results from third party transactions, fluctuations in markets and the calibration
of debt, equity and negative variability in revenue and asset values (Verbano
and Venturini, 2011). Financial risk is managed by a number of different
financial specialists who are reliant on other parts of the organisation to provide
data to help identify financial exposures (Verbano and Venturini, 2011). There
are many facets to financial risk, a few of these are presented in Figure 2-6.
Figure 2-6 Composition of financial risk (adapted from Verbano and Venturini,
2011)
Financial risk management has a framework which is not dissimilar to the other
generic frameworks as it includes the stages risk identification, risk assessment,
risk response and risk finance. Risk identification involves analysing financial
data using generally accepted metrics such as ratio analysis, comparative
Financial risk






analysis, value at risk (VaR), gearing, benchmarking for identifying deviations
from expected performance and strategic objectives (Asaf, 2004).
An organisation is said to have risks which can be categorised as strategic,
financial, operational, commercial and technical (Asaf, 2004). These risks all
have the potential to interact in different combinations and create hazards which
are not identified. It is not unusual for the threatening risk to be the hazard that
has not been identified (Culp, 2001). This has proven to be the case in respect
of the systemic risk of large financial institutions such as AIG, Lehman Brothers
and Bear Stearns (Rosenberg, 2009). The focus on quantifiable risk, rather than
the identification of hazards, facilitated the blindness to moral hazards as they
were not part of the audit procedure. Dowd, (2009) states that financial hazards
can result from:
1. erroneously applied assumptions (not everything follows a normal
distribution);
2. the exclusion of interconnectivity from many financial risk models,
3. valuation models that are inappropriate for economic climate;
4. inexperienced practitioners of the downside risk of complex financial
instrument; and
5. traders speculating not just with the instrument or commodity but with
the risk management system.
These sources of financial hazards illustrate that, although periodic evaluation
of financial performance takes place in the form of reports and accounts, these
will not take into account the strategic, operational and regulatory hazards and
risks that may hamper an organisations ability to remain as a going concern and
achieve its strategic financial objectives. Financial hazards are the hazards that
jeopardise an organisation’s ability to remaining as a going concern. The tools
for financial hazard identification need to identify those factors that impact the
ability to remain a going concern and include elements such, as supply chain
management, choice of technology marketing, employee talent pool and
reputation (Asaf, 2004). As a result most hazards have a financial impact.
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2.4.4 Legal
Definitions for legal risk fall into two groups: legal uncertainty and uncertainty
about factual elements (Mahler, 2007). Legal risks differ from other risks as they
are usually identified from an ex post perspective after the event by a judge
(Burnett, 2005). Whereas the majority of generic risks would be identified and
risk managed from an ex ante position, for example values at risk (VaR) in
financial risk, the source-pathway-receptor in environmental risk, or the 5 steps
used by the UK HSE in health and safety.
The main factor differentiating legal risk from other risks is the impact of time on
the identification and crystallisation of a legal risk. Lawyers do not look at the
probability of a risk. Lawyers focus on the allocation of risk/ liability or the
chance of winning a case. This is especially true with respect to the
identification of risk in a contract and the resulting negative impact of loss to the
parties of the contract. The definition of legal risk is not consistent (Mahler,
2007). Legal risk management deals with two aspects of legal risk which
lawyers purport to manage: firstly legal risks and secondly the management of
risk with the use of legal instruments (Mahler, 2007).
Legal risks result from a hazard emanating from a legal source. If there is no
legal source, a legal risk is absent (Mahler, 2007). The source for legal risks can
derive from two types of norm. Firstly, hazards which result from prescriptive
norms requiring adherence to legislation, regulations and societal obligations
and secondly hazards which originate from deterministic norms requiring
qualifying a set of facts based on competence and validity (McCormick, 2011).
Maher (2007) states that a solid basis for a general theory for legal risk does not
exist and suggests the following methodology for the identification of risk which
has three stages:
Stage 1.The identification of legal risk resulting from the consequences
of an event and the subsequent application of legal norms to a set of
facts, the ex-post position.
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Stage 2. An ex-ante position should be adopted to examine the potential
for future liability, damage or loss to property or objective from expected
future events.
Stage 3. The identification of uncertainty in respect of the unknown
outcome of future events, and uncertainty resulting from how the law
would regulate a set of facts. Mahler makes no reference to legal hazard
in his methodology for the identification of legal risk (Maher, 2007).
The evaluation of legal risk is based on the type of legislative system being
applied. In the UK, legislation, judicial precedent, local custom, legal books as
well as European custom and community law will be used to evaluate the legal
risk. Legal risk is a term widely used in the public and private sectors and it is
identified as a risk to be managed in the majority of transactions that take place.
The lack of definition may be due to the fact that it is multifaceted. Law has a
number of specialisms including health and safety, environmental and
employment, property, company, international, and marine.
Prior to the recent financial crisis the focus has been on governance and
compliance with existing regulations rather than the identification of hazards
such as moral hazards in the financial sector (Dowd, 2009). The legal risks
associated with the protection of assets and mitigation of liability requires formal
inclusion in the risk management process. The focus in the last 10 years has
been on the implementation of compliance and regulatory risk frameworks.
These result from the development of integrated frameworks such as the
implementation of enterprise wide risk management, corporate governance
codes of conduct, e.g. the UK Corporate Governance Code 2012 and the 2002
US Federal Regulation for public companies, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002
(SOX), the Model Business Corporation Act 2005 (MBCA),and Basel Capital
Accord II (Ai et al., 2012).
In Europe, the Transparency Directive 2004/109/EG obliges companies to
install a risk and uncertainty detection system. It is assumed that this Directive
applies to all risks including legal risks and as such there should be a
mechanism for legal hazard identification at all stages of the lifecycle for a
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process, project or organisation. As legal risks cross the boundaries of all
disciplines and operations, hazard identification should be multidimensional and
not silo focused. It is not clear if legal hazards or risks get the attention they
should within the individual generic silos or if cross-disciplinary hazards are
identified. There is a need for comprehensive legal risk assessment, in addition
to compliance, in order to provide auditable and tangible evidence that hazard
identification supports the resulting risks and evaluation of legal liabilities
associated with a project, private or public sector entity not just at the point of
sale or ex-post.
There are three components of risk; the hazard, the consequence of the hazard,
and the probability of occurrence. Table 2.2 provides a summary of the legal
response to the components of risk. With respect to legal risk, the hazards are
not identified ex-ante so the incident may have already occurred.
Table 2.2 Summary of legal response to components of risk
Component of risk Legal response
Source The hazard Hazards are not identified ex-ante and if
ex-post they relate to the outcome of legal
action.
Effect The consequence Legal analysis looks at the effect and the
potential for harm resulting from the
situation or the legal implication (Maher,
2007).
Risk The probability of occurrence The probability occurrence is concerned
with the probability of liability based on
the facts of the case and past case law.
(Burnett, 2005).
Burnett, (2005) has stated that the legal risk management of information
technology takes a proactive position due to the continuous operation of e-
commerce (commercial transaction which takes place on the internet).
Therefore proactive identification of legal hazards which reflects complexity
should be applied to projects and organisations.
24
2.4.5 Technical
For the purpose of this research a technical hazard is defined as originating
from manmade technological or industrial conditions such as design,
engineering, manufacturing and processes. It includes the technical hazards
and associated uncertainties of systems engineering required to meet key
performance targets (Verbano and Venturini, 2011). Technical risks are the
focus of engineering risk management and concentrate on the malfunction of a
system (Verbano and Venturini, 2011). The impact of these technical hazards
result in harm, that is evidenced by loss of life, injury, illness, property damage,
loss of livelihoods and services, social and economic disruption and / or
environmental damage (UNISDR, 2009). Technological hazards can result in
disasters such as industrial pollution, nuclear radiation, toxic wastes, dam
failures, transport accidents, factory explosions, fires, and chemical spills
(UNISDR, 2009).
Hazards may arise directly as a result of the impacts on technology of a natural
hazard event (Natech) accident (Ozunu et al., 2011). Technical hazard
identification methods have to consider the hazards that result from the physical
process, infrastructure and chemicals being used, and adhere to applicable
codes and regulations. Hazard identification of technology involves a plethora of
different methodologies and tools which are either qualitative, quantitative or
both. The selection of hazard identification methods is dependent on the
particular process and the stage in the process lifecycle (HSL, 2005). At the
initial stage of the lifecycle, methods such as checklists, indices, and preliminary
hazard analysis will be used as there may be minimal information. Where there
is more information (such as technical drawings of the site, the pipe, utility
networks and technical infrastructure) comprehensive methods such as ‘what-if’
analysis, hazard and operability studies, fault tree analysis, failure modes and
effect analysis can be integrated within scenario analysis to establish the
outcome of failure on different parts of the process (Greenberg et, al., 1991 ;
Sutton, 1992).
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The engineering element of a technical risk is defined using quantitative
parameters such as probability and severity, and the application of methods
such as probabilistic risk analysis (Verbano and Venturini, 2011). Although the
integration of different methods of identification in technical hazard identification
takes place, for example the inclusion of environmental impacts and safety
within engineering risk management, the focus is on the different ways
malfunction evolves from known failures, not on the interaction of cross-
disciplinary hazards within the system or process. One of the main challenges
of an engineering risk management system is the identification and
characterisation of the risks of malfunction and the acquisition of data for
dynamic decision making (Verbano and Venturini, 2011).
2.4.6 Comparison of generic risk identification
The previous section illustrated that generic risk frameworks have very different
metrics specific to the idiosyncrasies of their risks. They all require the presence
of harm for the characterisation of a hazard. With the exception of legal risks,
they are unified in the use of similar qualitative hazard identification techniques
such as checklists, brainstorming, what if techniques and scenario analysis.
Technical, environmental, health and safety risk management frameworks all
use similar hazard identification techniques, for example fault trees, preliminary
hazard analysis, cause and effect analysis, hazard and operability studies and
variations such as hazard analysis and critical control point, failure mode and
effect analysis, bow tie and the ‘Swiss cheese model’ (Greenberg, et al.,
1991;Sutton, 1992; HSL, 2005; Defra, 2011) .
2.4.6.1 Silo risk identification
The traditional method of risk identification is the result of identification within
generic risk management frameworks such as health and safety, environmental,
financial, legal and technical. Each of these generic frameworks commences
with the problem definition for their own generic risk and the generic risk experts
identify risks according to the metric and philosophy of their respective
discipline. Silo hazard and risk identification does not facilitate the identification
of hazards and risk in a multi-dimensional world which requires a
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multidisciplinary approach and recognises interconnectivity and dependence
(Hatfield and Hipel, 2002). Fundamentally these individual generic methods of
risk identification do not fully embrace cross-disciplinary hazard identification.
They have attempted to include other generic disciplines, but this has been at
the fringe of the specific silo, for example environmental law within the
environment or the impact to human health in respect of a pollution impact.
2.5 Tools and techniques of hazard identification
Hazard identification tools and studies have predominately been developed for
identification of hazards in systems and processes at various stages of the
lifecycle but are not necessarily applicable to all phase of a process or every
stage of a system or process lifecycle (HSL, 2005). There are a plethora of
techniques for hazard identification. These tools focus on the identification of
harm, loss, damage, failure or injury and depend on human interpretation of
observations (Redmill, 2002).
Generic tools have developed from disciplines such as health and safety,
engineering, reliability analysis and the social sciences. Hazard identification
techniques are categorised according to their application to the identification
process into look-up methods, scenario analysis, support techniques and
functional analysis (BS EN 31010, 2010). These categories and the resulting
methods are presented in Figure 2-7.































Look-up methods are straightforward methods that have a broad application
and are not process, system, activity or event specific. They include checklists
and preliminary hazard analysis.
2.5.1.1 Checklists
Checklists are a qualitative hazard identification methods which are widely used
but are only effective if there is a solid understanding of the process, system or
circumstances in which a hazard may occur (Redmill, 2002). The breadth of
knowledge required applies not only to compilation of the checklist but also the
person administering the checklist (HSL, 2005).
Checklists are classified as a look-up method in BS EN 31010 (2010) and a
process hazard identification method (HSL, 2005). They do not encourage
independent thought or creativity as they are predominately structured to be
observational and focused on addressing the absence or existence of known
hazards. As a result they are unlikely to identify new or emerging risks (HSL,
2005). Redmill (2002) suggests that use of checklists should take into account
historical hazard, fault and failure experiences. However the past is not
necessarily a good indicator of the future (Harris et al., 2006) as has been
illustrated with the 2008 /2009 financial recession and the resulting contagion
(Dowd, 2009).
2.5.1.2 Preliminary hazard analysis
Preliminary hazard analysis requires a checklist of hazard groups and
identification of potential areas of failure. It is easy to perform, requires a low
level of detail and is flexible enough to accommodate risks at the concept stage
(Greenberg et, al., 1991). It is often used as means of obtaining initial data for
more complex hazard identification tools, such as fault and event trees. As it
tends to focus on identification of high level hazards it is unlikely to provide the
most comprehensive identification of all hazards or causes.
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2.5.2 Supporting techniques
The main objective of support techniques is to facilitate the application of expert
opinion on pre-existing and collected data. Techniques such as ‘Brainstorming’
and ‘what if’ are included in this category.
2.5.2.1 Brainstorming
Brainstorming is defined as a creative group technique used to elicit the
spontaneous information from group participants as they try to find a solution to
a specific problem (BS EN 31010I, 2010). Brainstorming may be formal or
informal (Scarvarda et al., 2006). When used for hazard identification it needs to
be structured and it is crucial to the quality of the output that the members of the
group are knowledgeable about the process, system, organisation or application
being brainstormed (BS EN 31010I, 2010). The success of the brainstorm is a
function of the quality of the facilitator’s cues. The value of this method may be
undermined by group dynamics (Stroebe et al., 1992). The more unstructured
the process, the more unlikely there will be a comprehensive outcome. This
method has been used in conjunction with other methods of hazard
identification such as Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points (HACCP) in
the food sector (Sperber, 2001). It has most recently been used to support the
identification of hazards in Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) with hazard
identification studies (Wilday, et al., 2011).
2.5.2.2 What if Technique
This method is a structured form of brainstorming which relies on the
knowledge and experience of the facilitator. The facilitator develops prompt
words for a preselected group of experts to discuss by responding to ‘what if’
scenarios with respect to a process, procedure or theme which is being
investigated.
A variation of this technique is the ‘Structured What If Technique’ (SWIFT)
which was originally developed as a systematic and efficient substitute to
HAZOP and incorporates supporting tools such as checklists (Aarnes et al.,
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2009). This method has broad application but is limited by the quality of the
facilitator’s preparation and knowledge of the subject matter. Fundamentally
application of the right prompt words / phrases and management are critical.
The workshop team needs to have a broad and deep pool of experience. Lack
of experience could result in risks and hazards not being identified (HSL, 2005).
The methodology has a top-down approach to hazard identification which
focuses on checklist systems and operations rather than features and events. It
also facilitates mapping uncertainties, risk and the positioning of barriers
(Aarnes et al., 2009).
2.5.3 Scenario analysis
Techniques are used to prompt the identification of hazards by consideration of
different scenarios (HSL, 2005). The different techniques include ‘cause and
effect analysis’, ‘cause and consequence analysis’, ‘fault tree analysis’ and ‘root
cause analysis’.
2.5.3.1 Cause and effect analysis
This method was developed initially in the 1960s and is a structured method for
deriving the initial causes for a specific effect by harnessing the response of a
brainstorming exercise diagrammatically in a fishbone or Ishikawa diagram
(Scarvarda et al., 2006). The resulting diagrams, known as causal maps, can
take numerous forms and include: cause and effect diagrams, risk-assessment
mapping, impact wheels, and issue trees (Scarvarda et al., 2006).
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Figure 2-8 Example of a fishbone diagram (Jayswal et al., 2006)
The diagram in Figure 2-8 shows the generic risks which impact sustainability,
defined as the end effect. The diagram confirms the inclusion of silos which
have a uniting intention but does not facilitate the identification of the
interrelationship of sub-branches of each generic classification. This technique
of ‘cause and effect’ is hierarchical with causes resulting in one effect. It is not a
complete process and needs to be used with other methods, such as root
cause, if recommendations are required (BS EN 31010, 2010). This method
segregates causal elements into significant categories. It is a method for visual
representation of brainstorming output rather than an analytical technique
where recommendations are required at the hazard identification stage (BS EN
31010, 2010).
2.5.3.2 Cause and consequence analysis
This method combines the identification of hazards with quantification in fault
tree and event tree analysis. The method incorporates the following steps:
identification of the initial event, the subsequent events that result from the initial
event, the accident path, using fault tree analysis determine the originating
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event and the cause of the potential failures of the initiating event; and establish
shortest sequence events for the originating event to occur. A diagram is
produced which facilitates the quantification of the risk, and the results are
documented. The advantages of this method are its ability to combine
quantitative results with both cause and consequence. Its disadvantage is that it
is highly dependent on the experience of the team involved and can be costly in
terms of time and resource (HSL, 2005).
2.5.3.3 Fault tree analysis
Fault tree analysis (FTA) is an analytical method that provides a graphical
illustration of events or contributing factors that result in a defined outcome, for
example success or failure. The defined outcome is the “top event" (EN61025,
2007) such as an explosion or fire. FTA can be qualitative and/or quantitative. It
can be used independently or in conjunction with other hazard identification
techniques, such as ‘failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) or event tree
analysis (ETA). When combined with ETA it is sometimes known as ‘cause and
consequence’ analysis (BS EN31010, 2010).
Figure 2-9 Example of a fault tree for substation failure (Volkanovski et al., 2009),
A fundamental issue of FTA is that the outcome needs to be known before the
analysis occurs and the logic is focused on how this outcome can occur. This
Top known failure event
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linear approach does not look at how the causes interact with each other and
the potential for hazards from these relationships and encounters. Accuracy of
the end probability is questionable where the probabilities of base events are
not known or may not be accurate. Care needs to be taken when causal events
are not highlighted as there is no control in the method to ensure that all
pathways are identified. FTA is a static model that does not accommodate time
dependencies and human error is not easily accommodated (ISO 31010, 2009;
HSL, 2005).
2.5.4 Functional analysis
These methods focus on the identification of hazards resulting from the
functional aspects of a system or process. They include techniques such as
FMEA of which there are a number of variations such as: HAZOP and HACCP.
2.5.4.1 Failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA)
FMEA is an engineering technique initially developed by the US military in 1949.
It is widely applied in the manufacturing, automotive and aerospace sectors to
characterise failures. It is a tool that is used to evaluate produce and process
reliability at the pre-commissioning stage (Bowles, 1998, Braaksma et al.,
2013). FMEA has three phases which include;
1. Identifying failures, their cause and effect;
2. Establishing how likely the failures are to occur and the likely
consequences which results in risk characterisation and prioritisation;
and
3. The actions that need to be taken to mitigate the impact.
With these three phases the most critical task is the identification of failures
(Steven et. al., 1999). From an applied prospective a list of components failure
modes is compiled and analysts strive to establish the effects on the system or
process.
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Figure 2-10 Example of an entry of a component using failure mode effects
analysis (Devadasan et al., 2003).
A criticism of FMEA is its inability to deal with complexity as it is time consuming
and takes more time to complete than the design and development phases
(Steven et al., 1999; Papadopoulos et al., 2004). Classic FMEA can only be
used for a single event/or failure mode as it does not facilitate combinations of
failure modes and can be complicated and difficult to check for multilayer
systems. FMEA is also unlikely to detect failure that results from the interaction
of components (Redmill, 2002).
FMEA has evolved with different variations such as the Advanced Failure Mode
and Effect Analysis (AFMEA) which introduces a structured behavioural
approach to failure identification (Steven et al., 1999). This variation uses FMEA
approach which focuses on the function of the process or system. The analysis
then focuses on the failure of the functions. Failure mode effects and criticality
analysis (FMEAC) includes quantitative attributes by establishing frequency and
severity. These variations do not reduce the liability of resources in data
requirements or time and they do not necessarily identify failures in respect of
new technologies or unknown risks. This is due to the need for the process of
this method to commence with a known malfunction. This technique has no
checks or prompts that force analysts to identify unknown failures. The failure is
known from the start and as a result this method helps to characterise what is
already known (HSL, 2005). A recent study by Braaksma et al. (2013) found
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that FMEA was selectively applied to specific assets which were perceived to
be critical; there was insufficient evidence to confirm that failure modes and
effects were accurately or consistently identified. Braaksma et al. (2013) also
found FMEA was applied as a one off exercise and not a method for the
application of continuous improvement; there was an over reliance on expert
judgement which was not available for the different stages of the lifecycle and
inadequate quality information and knowledge management which led to a
questionable robustness of the results.
2.5.4.2 Hazard and operability studies (HAZOP)
Hazard and operability studies are the most extensively used hazard
identification techniques and have broad industry application having initially
being developed for the chemical sector. HAZOP can be used at any time
during the lifecycle of a process (BS IEC 61882, 2001). This method requires a
multidisciplinary team approach to ensure the comprehensive hazard
identification. Guidewords are used to ensure systematic application to each
parameter and process. The steps of the process are illustrated in Figure 2-11.
Figure 2-11 The stages of the HAZOP process( HSL, 2010)
The effectiveness of this technique is dependent on team dynamics, quality of
participant knowledge, experience, planning, leadership and clarity of the
process (BS IEC61882, 2001). This method requires detailed analysis which
Select Equipment Node
Choose Deviation or Parameters or Guidewords
Monitor Actions For Completion





can be resource and data hungry. Its focus on finding detailed solutions can
detract from the identification process, and a preoccupation with design issues
can result in externalities being ignored. A narrow focus on the scope at the
early stage of the identification process may impede the identification of new or
emerging risks that may not be identified or noted for further investigation.
HAZOP is an expensive identification technique and its ability to provide
comprehensive identification may be curtailed by cost cutting which would result
in a compromised identification study (Redmill, 2002).
The most concerning fact is that HAZOPs tend to focus on one event as a
cause for deviation. This method of identification does not facilitate the
identification of hazards from more than one deviation (HSL, 2005). Additional
concern results from the heavy reliance on designers who have a vested
interest and therefore create bias in the identification process (BS EN 31010,
2010).
There is a requirement for the development of existing methods and new
approaches that respond to hazard relationships which are multidimensional,
cross-disciplinary and facilitate a broad identification of hazards (Redmill,
2002).
2.5.4.3 Hazard analysis and critical control points (HACCP)
HACCP is a systematic method that attempts to identify hazards. It is designed
to facilitate proactive control by focusing on prevention by assuring safety,
quality and reliability. It is widely used in the food industry. Its main limitations,
are that it only identifies known hazards and not unknown or unidentified
hazards (Sperber, 2001). In order to mitigate these limitations open ended
brainstorming has been integrated into the HACCP process to facilitate
identification of new and unknown hazards (Sperber, 2001).
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2.5.4.4 Bow tie analysis
Bow tie analysis is a diagrammatic representation of the pathways of a top
event (hazard) from cause to consequence. Figure 2-12 shows that causes can
be identified using fault tree analysis and the consequence event tree.
Figure 2-12 Example of Bow tie method (after Diaous and Fieves 2006; Suardin et
al. 2008).
This tool can incorporate barriers and controls. Its advantage is that it is simple
to use and does not require a high level of expertise to view. The ‘bow tie’
method is not able to depict multiple causes which occur simultaneously
(Wilday et al., 2011) and can over simplify complex events.
2.6 Whole system risk management frameworks
The term ‘whole system risk management’ for the purposes of this research,
includes integrated systems whose aim is the management of risk for an entire
entity, project, product or event. The reason for critically reviewing whole
system risk management frameworks are that they aim to manage the risk of a
whole system and therefore should have methods for the identification of
hazards in the entire system. These methods may be different to those used in
the generic risk silos (identified in Section 2.5). Examples of whole system
generic risk management frameworks include: ISO 31000:2009; enterprise risks
management (ERM); project management and lifecycle assessment (LCA).









ISO 31000:(2009) was chosen for further investigation as it is an internationally
accepted standard for risk management and therefore the reference point for
comprehensive risk management incorporating identification. ERM is a new
framework which aims to integrate the management of risks in an enterprise;
therefore the identification of hazards in an integrated framework may provide
an insight into cross-disciplinary identification. Project management is a
framework whose objective is the successful management of a project. LCA is a
framework which identifies environmental impacts from the sourcing of
resources, the beginning of the lifecycle; to the end of life. These different
frameworks incorporate the identification of risks and hazards and an evaluation
may provide insight to the inclusion of cross-disciplinary hazard identification.
2.6.1 ISO31000
ISO 31000 (2009) is a whole system risk management framework which
superseded the Australian and New Zealand standard AZ/NZS 4360 of 2004
(Purdy, 2010).
2.6.1.1 ISO31000 framework overview
The new framework is illustrated in Figure 2-13 and is comprised of three
components; (1) the principles, (2) framework and (3) process for managing
risk.
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Figure 2-13 ISO 31000 Main principles, framework and process for managing risk
(ISO 31000, 2009)
The ISO31000 framework involves the identification of risk in Clause 5.4.2.
However the identification process begins in Clause 5.3 “establish the context”,
which is concerned with setting the context and defining the risk criteria by
looking at the types of causes and consequences that occur. At this stage there
is no mention of hazard or harm. Clause 5.4.2 states that identification of the
source of risk should take place and include knock on effects, cascade and
cumulative effects (ISO 31000, 2009). The standard also states that the
identification tools should be suitable for accommodating the objectives of the
organisation, but does not suggest which tools could be used. It would seem
that the focus of ISO31000 is on safeguarding the objectives of the organisation
and not on minimising harm unless that harm is to the organisation.
As risk identification is the first stage of the risk management process, and risks
need to be quantified, this may result in only those hazards which are capable
of quantification being taken through the risk management process. This could
result in excluding uncharacterised hazards and unidentified risks. Although the
ISO 31000 risk management framework is iterative unlike the environmental risk
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management framework it does not explicitly request the inclusion of hazard
identification. As a result it may not be capable of identifying known and
uncharacterised hazards or unknown hazards.
2.6.2 Project management
2.6.2.1 Definition of project management
Project management is defined as the process by which the completion of a set
of tasks for a given specification within the constraints of time, cost and
resources are achieved (Turner, 1992).
2.6.2.2 The project lifecycle
There are a number of different project management methodologies. The two
most widely used are Project Management Body of Knowledge developed by
the Project Management Institute and the Project in Controlled Environments
(Prince2) which was developed by the Office of Government Commerce (OGC)
(Mcmanus and Wood-Harper, 2002; McHugh and Hogan, 2011). The Project
lifecycle can be broken down into 5 stages as highlighted in Figure 2-14.
The aim of the process is to ensure that the project is completed on time, within
budget and delivers the benefits agreed at project commencement (OGC,
2007). However these aims which are rarely met (White and Fortune, 2002).
2.6.2.3 Overview of framework and integration with risk management
Risk management is an integral part of the project management lifecycle. Figure
2 14 shows that each stage of the entire risk management framework should be
included in each stage of the project lifecycle. For example during the
“conceive” stage all the stages of risk management and the associated activities
will take place.
40
Figure 2-14 Alignment of the stages of the project lifecycle with the stages of risk
management (adapted from Chapman and Ward 1998 and OGC, 2007)
The management of risk is critical to the “systematic identification, appraisal and
management of project related risk” (Chapman and Ward, 1998). Chapman and
Ward, (1998) showed that the nine stages of risk management were applied to
each of the eight stages of the project lifecycle; a more detailed lifecycle than
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the OGC project lifecycle. This shows that the application of risk management
within project management is cyclical and iterative as it follows the lifecycle of
the project Figure 2-14.
The identification of risk is central to the decision to proceed or terminate a
project, as well as sustaining the on-going viability of a project (Chapman and
Ward, 1998). The identification of risks in the project management process is
evidenced in a number of different documents including the project brief, project
initiation, progress report, risk register change control, lessons learnt and post
project review.
Risk identification commences at project commencement in project governance
where monitoring and control regimes are set up to help manage uncertainties,
problems and changes. At this stage risks are identified and reported in the
project brief. In the scoping stage (conceive and design) the concern is the risk
of not achieving the project objectives and defined benefits and this is the focus
of risk identification. This is evidenced in the production of a Gantt chart and an
updated risk assessment that may include quantification of risks in the form of
probabilities. Workshops may take place which will highlight the risks that need
to be considered. A business case is developed which should state the risks to
the project an how these should be addressed.
If the planning stage produces a successful business plan, planning of the
project commences in stage 2 project initiation (allocation) and this is where for
the first time in the process there is a distinct task to identify risks and design
controls. The focus is to identify risks that may prevent the execution of the
project plan and jeopardise the delivery of the project on time, within budget and
with the required benefits. The guidelines clearly state that the focus should be
project related and not constant risk issues (OGC, 2007).
The guidelines go onto state that the risk register is positioned during stage 3
“the running of the project” (execution and delivery) and risks should be
managed as they occur. This would seem to use the risk register as a log of
risks as they arise, this is reactive rather than proactive. At each of the following
stages of the project lifecycle the project decision makers will review risk to
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ensure they are managed and acceptable. The risk assessment tools used in
the project management process include; checklists and templates.
In a recent study to establish empirical evidence on project management using
Prince2R the researchers identified;
“no formal risk planning – risks not properly managed or quantified thus
unforeseen issues during the project execution(UST,2010)”
This finding was one of the highest framework issues in Prince2R project
management (UST, 2010). Additional comments relating to risk included the
identification of a need for adequate contingency for unknown unknowns, a
formalised risk management process and the adoption of a one size fits all to
project management was identified (Shenhar, 2001; UST, 2010). This research,
and the review of literature, found little if any reference to the identification of
hazards in project management.
The focus on integrating risk management into the project management
lifecycle is concerned with risks which are known to impact projects according
to set guidelines. These guidelines may constrain the identification of
unidentified hazards and unknown risks and there is an assumption that the
generic risks have been identified earlier prior to project management. As a
result, the project management framework is solely focused on the identification
of risks which may jeopardise the delivery of the project on time, within budget
and with the benefits set out at commencement (OGC, 2007).
Project management incorporates risk management and risk identification. It
does not look at the hazards that result from the combination of numerous
generic risks and the hazards that result from a dynamic project portfolio. It is a
reactive framework as evidenced by the position of the risk register in stage 3
and its work in progress compilation.
However there would seem to be a miss-match as industry specific project
management, such as construction projects, include hazards (Carter and Smith,
2006). What is unclear is whether this focus is at contractor level or project
management as a whole system framework. A study of 45 method statements
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for three United Kingdom construction projects (railway, nuclear and general
construction) found that only 6.7% identified all known hazards (Carter and
Smith, 2006). This shows that an improvement is required in the methods and
tools currently used to identify hazards. Additionally project management
requires a methodology which facilitates proactive integrated hazard
identification.
2.6.3 Enterprise risk management
Enterprise risk management (ERM) is an inclusive risk management framework
with organisation-wide application and a portfolio approach to risk. It is designed
to improve corporate governance and risk management (Beasley et al., 2005).
The objective of ERM is to increase value to all stakeholders (Liebenberg and
Hoyt, 2003; Beasley et al., 2010) by providing an integrated approach to risk
management that contrasts with traditional silo based risk management. ERM is
described as a discipline that applies to all industries exploiting risk where all
sources of risk are accommodated (Ai et al., 2012).
ERM is a strategic decision support framework (CAS, 2003) comprised of seven
steps which are comparable to those found in AS/NZS 4360:2004 and include
the following stages: (1) establish the context; (2) identify the risks; (3) analyse
and quantify; (4) integrate; (5) assess and prioritise; (6) treat and exploit and (7)
monitor and review. The risks are then categorised as hazard, financial,
operational and strategic. In the ERM framework hazards are defined as
relating to natural perils, injury, harm or damage within the organisation for
example to employees and third parties via public liability and product liability
(CAS, 2003).
The framework for ERM is illustrated in Figure 2-15 and shows the collection of
silos on which the framework is based includes: facets of objectives,
components and level of the enterprise which are comprised of silos.
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Figure 2-15 Enterprise risk management framework of silos (COSO, 2004).
The identification of hazards within ERM lacks clarity as there are no guidelines
for hazard identification. The term hazard is used and interpreted by risk
professionals such as actuaries and accountants with a bias towards
quantification. This is evidenced by the application of ERM as a whole system
risk management framework which was initially embraced by the financial
sector (Verbano and Venturini, 2011). The largest industry sector to embed
ERM has been the financial sector (Protiviti, 2010).
ERM supports a statement of intent to enterprise-wide risk management as it
can be applied to different enterprises across a broad range of industry sectors
as well as to public sector organisation (Protiviti, 2010). However there is little
consistency in how it is implemented. This may be due to the fact that it is a
whole system framework which is embedded in a myriad of different
organisations and therefore has to be flexible. However guidance states that
after the identification of risk, a shortlist of the most significant risks should be
compiled (Frigo and Anderson, 2011). The tools used for identification include
methods for assessing the impact of risks on capital, registers of risks, risk





The ERM guidance suggests that a top down approach is adopted by obtaining
the most important risk exposures from the leading executives (Frigo and
Anderson, 2011). This identification process results from a discussion of risks
which could impact the organisation’s ability to achieve its strategic goals. The
guidance suggests that experts are included as the process matures (Frigo and
Anderson, 2011). A more structured approach to risk identification includes
documenting conditions and events that represent a significant threat to the
organisation achieving its objectives (CAS, 2003).
The tools to aid risk identification include surveys, internal workshops,
brainstorming sessions and internal audit. No mention is made of hazard
identification or the identification of unknown risks (CAS, 2003; COSO, 2004).
Within the specific broad categories of hazard, financial, operational and
strategic risk there is no agreed approach to identify risks other than within the
pre-existing generic silos.
Within the “analyse and quantification stage”, the existing risks are analysed
and quantified which involves allocating probability distributions to individual
risks even though the guidance states that not all risks lend themselves to
quantification. Further focus on quantification is evidenced with the addition of a
new quantitative metric, velocity (Frigo and Anderson, 2011). It is unclear how
qualitative risks are dealt with in the ERM framework.
The section” integrates risk” does not observe or analyse the interconnection,
dependency or identifying new or latent risk; it is concerned with the
aggregation of existing risk distributions and their cumulative impact on the key
performance indicators of the organisation (CAS, 2003). ERM is focused on the
aggregation and integration of existing identified significant high level risks from
existing generic risk silos, therefore it is not structured to facilitate the
identification of risks outside the existing silos. Its current form does not have




Lifecycle assessment (LCA) is a whole system environmental assessment tool
which aims to assess environmental impacts throughout the product lifecycle
(Finnveden et al., 2009). International standardisation of LCA has taken place in
the last 10 years with the ISO standards (ISO 14040 and 14044 in 2006).
LCA is a methodical process involving four stages as shown in Table 2.3. LCA
is unique in assessing environmental impacts along the process and supply
chain and it has been applied to many different industry sectors and value
chains including CCS (Idrissova, 2004; Hendel, 2006).





Goal setting boundaries by precise definition of the project taking
account of functional units, system parameters, and time frame the




Identification and qualification of inputs, processes and outputs
involves the development of a Lifecycle Inventory (LCI) where
environmental inflows and outflows of the investigated systems are
collected, calculated and analysed. New technology requires clear





Assess the ecological and human impacts of resource usage, water,
air, energy and raw materials through inflows and outflows.
Assessment involves selection, classification, characterisation,
normalisation, grouping weight, evaluation and reporting (Pehnt




The objective of interpretation of the results is to facilitate making
recommendations and conclusions and should incorporate a critical
review of the result (SAIC, 2006; ISO14040:2006).
LCA is an integrated framework of concepts and techniques to address,
environmental, economic, technological and social aspects of products,
services and organisations (SAIC, 2006). LCA models are based on accepted
risk assessment frameworks for the various inputs, processes, outputs and use
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the assumptions and values from the underlying risk assessments as defaults
(Finnveden et al., 2009).
This framework is time and resource intensive (Finnveden et al., 2009). The
quality of the output is a function of the access to quality data. LCA does not
result in a solution, instead it provides data to support the decision making
process. The diversity of stressors being evaluated makes control of rigor
difficult when compared to traditional risk assessment (SAIC, 2006; Finnveden
et al., 2009). As a framework for hazard identification it is suitable for relative
comparisons but not sufficient for absolute predictions of risk (Finnveden et al.
2009). It is unlikely to facilitate hazard identification and is used in conjunction
with other methods and tools. LCA is not a solution but it is an important tool
when looking to identify emerging hazards and risks which have environmental
impacts it is limited by the lack of data that exists on emerging risks (Wilday et
al., 2011).
2.6.5 Critical evaluation of hazard and risk identification in whole
system risk management frameworks
The whole system risk management frameworks (ISO 31000 and ERM), with
respect to hazard identification, are focused on hazards that result in harm to
the organisation which is defined as the inability to meet corporate ‘Key
Performance Indicators’. Project management is focused on the attainment of
the project objectives which relate to cost, time and pre-agreed benefits. In
contrast generic frameworks focus on harm caused to humans, tangible and
intangible property, and the wider environment; this is likely to result in an
insular approach to risk management in an increasingly interconnected world.
Although the frameworks (ERM, ISO 31000, project management and LCA) are
very different the base data and process of hazard identification are arrived at
via the generic silo risk frameworks. Using the same methods of hazard
identification, they are subject to the same limitation of the generic risks and
tools used to identify hazard and risk (White and Fortune, 2002; ISO 31000,
2009; Ai et a l, 2012). ERM takes a top down approach to risk identification only
focusing on significant risk (see Section 2.6.3). Although all frameworks wish to
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include qualitative and quantitative data the emphasis is on quantitative data of
existing identified hazards and risks. The structures do not currently facilitate
interconnectivity or identification of new risks, as their focus is the aggregation
of existing risks not integration. LCA is concerned only with the impact of its
value chain and not of the impact of externalities. It is not a framework that
includes risk identification but the product of LCA can provide information to
support hazard identification in the supply chain and its inputs and output could
be used to identify latent hazard.
Further work is required to introduce an inclusive approach to cross-disciplinary
multifunctional hazard identification. This methodology for hazard identification
needs to prompt identification of yet-to-be identified hazards and risks which are
not included in generic or whole system risk management frameworks. Both
ISO 31000 and ERM state that their objective is to provide more comprehensive
risk identification and integrated risk management but neither state how this
should take place. Project management attempts to integrate risk management
throughout its lifecycle but does not identify hazards. Therefore an integrated
method of hazard identification is required to provide a more comprehensive
portfolio of known hazards and risks for whole systems risk management
frameworks.
2.6.6 Limitations of current hazard identification techniques
The majority of the generic risks are identified using the same hazard
identification tools as a result they have the same advantages and limitations.
The majority of these tools start with known outcomes and then proceed to
identify cause and effect. Their approach is linear and they are unable to
accommodate consecutive or simultaneous events or failures. This is especially
true of fault trees, preliminary hazard analysis, cause and effect analysis,
hazard and operability studies and variations such as hazard analysis and
critical control point, failure mode and effect analysis, bow tie and the Swiss
cheese model (Greenberg et al., 1991; Sutton, 1992; HSL, 2005). The issue is
highlighted in the methodology used for evaluating the hazards of carbon
dioxide by Wilday et al. (2011) where the approach was a “structured top down
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hazard identification study” (HAZID) followed by a “top down knot in a bow tie
diagram”.
The Health and Safety Laboratories review of hazard identification tools and
ISO 31010 (HSE 2005; BS EN 31010, 2010) found that the methods used in
Table 2.4 had top-down approaches to hazard identification. The different
hazard identification techniques are not appropriate for all stages of the
process, product or infrastructure lifecycle (HSL, 2005); and there does not
seem to be a prescribed method for a specific stage of the lifecycle or for a
specific process. Additional limitations specific to these methods and tools are
stated in Table 2.4.
Table 2.4 Limitations of tools which take a top-down approach to hazard





HAZOP Focuses on deviation from one event (HSL, 2005).
HACCP Requires characterisation of hazards and resulting risks. Doesnot work well with incomplete knowledge (BS EN31010, 2010).
FMEA Does not facilitate interdependency and interconnections(Greenberg et, al., 1991).
FTA
Requires the known top event to be identified in order to
commence the process of establishing how the subsequent event
can occur (Greenberg et, al., 1991; HSL, 2005).
ETA
The initiating event has to be identified. It is concerned only with
success or failure options. It accommodates events which are
conditional on previous event but is not structured to ensure





A method for visual representation of brainstorming output rather
than an analytical technique. This method segregates causal
elements into significant categories at the commencement of the
analysis and subsequently may not adequately include interaction
between the categories.
Bow tie Not able to depict multiple causes which occur simultaneously(BS EN31010, 2010).
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With the limitations highlighted in Table 2.4, it is not uncommon for
combinations of methods and tools to be used in the identification process
(Arvanitoyannis and Varzakas, 2007; Jayswal et al., 2011; Scavarda et al.,
2006). For example preliminary hazard analysis has been used for the initial
identification of failure modes, cause and effect analysis was used with HACCP
to identify the critical control point for a process and, for the same process,
FMEA was used with Pareto diagrams to optimise the application of FMEA. All
of these methods build on the initial identification of a known failure of a
process.
In summary, the tools used to identify hazards do not specifically facilitate the
identification of the unknown hazards. They are focused on the outcomes of a
known failure, whether that failure is of a part or whole system, process or
event.
2.7 Current issues with hazard and risk identification
2.7.1 Risk identification versus risk analysis
One of the fundamental problems with risk management is the absence of the
explicit inclusion of hazard identification within the standard risk management
process (ISO31000, 2009; Aven, 2011). A study of fatal accidents in the Finnish
manufacturing sector during 1999-2008 found that insufficient hazard
identification was among the most frequently quoted factors that result in
accidents (Nenonen, 2011).
Whole system and generic risk frameworks show that a significant amount of
time is spent analysing existing known risks rather than improving the
identification of hazards and pushing the boundaries to identify new, emerging
and unknown hazards. Tixier et al. (2002) in a study of industrial companies
found that risk analysis tools concentrated on the main sources of hazards and
the risk analysis methodologies had three phases: identification; evaluation, and
prioritisation. Risk identification is critical to risk analysis as the result of the
identification phase contributes to the evaluation and prioritisation phases
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(Tixier et al., 2002). Risk identification is dependent on robust hazard
identification.
2.7.2 Consistency of application
There is no consistency as to how the identification of hazards takes place and
no consensus as to whether hazard identification is incorporated in the risk
identification process or risk analysis. If hazard identification is part of risk
analysis the process has already excluded potential risks which are not
quantifiable and these are excluded from the risk management process (Aven,
2011).
Once silo risk analysis has taken place these risks are presented to
management boards as proof of risk identification and subsequently become
the basis of strategic decision making in whole system frameworks such as
ERM (Frigo and Anderson, 2011; Allan and Yin, 2010). No further cross-
disciplinary hazard or risk identification takes place, and as a result cross-
disciplinary hazards are unlikely to be identified. The inconsistency of
application does not provide a robust and consistent basis for concluding that
there is evidence of comprehensive hazard identification.
2.7.3 Interconnectivity of risk
The environment, systems and infrastructure in which hazards and risk exist is
complex, multidisciplinary and requires identification tools which are able to
provide comprehensive identification mirroring that world (Sage and White,
1980; Hoffmann, 2011). There is a need to acknowledge the interconnectivity of
risk and seek the means to understand the profile of these interconnections
(WEF, 2011). Methodologies that profile the relationship between existing risks
are being developed but do not facilitate the identification of new or emerging
hazards as they are based on silo identification (Allan and Yin, 2010). Current
methods of hazard and risk identification are driven by the components of a
process where there are two outcomes, success or failure. The focus of
methods for the identification of hazards is the failure of a component and the
numerous impacts that result from that failure. The focus is on linear
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relationships with a known failure, not on cross-disciplinary or multidimensional
relationships. Tools and methods used have not evolved to tackle identification
in complexity.
Risk connectivity (Allan and Yin, 2010) advances the identification of risk by
recognising the connectivity of existing identified risks and provides a
framework for systematic visualisation of the relationships using graph theory
which is a mathematical method for expressing the interconnectivity. The
resulting additional dimension to risk is then documented in an adapted risk
register. The result is a third stage in the development of risk, that of
connectivity and the introduction of the concept of a risk system. Allan and Yin
(2010) have not looked to identify hazards, new or emerging, neither has the
objective been to establish whether the risks in the system resulted in more
comprehensive identification of risk. The initial data is still based on hazards
identified in generic risk management silos arrived at by linear hazard and risk
identification.
2.7.4 Adequacy of risk and hazard identification tools
The current qualitative tools for hazard and risk identification are similar and
open to subjectivity (see Section 2.6). This is especially true of FMEA, FTA and
HAZOP which are not able to deal with the outcome of multiple simultaneous
events and connectivity which may not result in the initial failure or event.
However, these tools do not embrace a multidisciplinary hazard identification
process (Hatfield and Hipel, 2002; Hoffmann, 2011). Beck and Kropp, (2001)
suggest that the focus on new product development to lead to a better
understanding of risk is fundamentally floored, what is required is an
examination of the complex web of connections of existing risks and hazards
which are currently unknown and yet to be identified.
2.7.5 Cross-disciplinary hazard identification
There is a gap in knowledge as existing methods of hazard identification do not
accommodate cross-disciplinary hazard identification (see Section 2.5.5).
Rasmussen (1997) acknowledged the inadequacy of models of risk in the
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1990s and suggested that cross-disciplinary models were required using a
systems approach. Allan and Yin (2010) provide a contribution to reducing this
gap in knowledge as they suggest that interconnectivity and dependency
relationships should be incorporated in risk identification but their proposition is
the quantification of existing risks and identification based on the sum of the
resulting probabilities. It does not necessarily follow that the sum of the parts
are either realistic or correct. 1+1 may not with respect to risk, result in 2. It
could result in 0 or 10 and the context of the risk could change the way that it
behaves.
2.7.6 Documentation of risk
The current risk register approach (see Section 3.5) accommodates the linear
identification of risk and does not prompt the identification of new hazards, risk
or facilitate interconnectivity (Allan and Yin, 2010). A review of risk analysis by
Tixier et al. (2002) examined the inputs and outputs of 62 risk analysis methods
for industrial operations and not one included the output contributing to a risk
register. Many different lists were produced as outputs but none included a risk
register. Tixier et al. (2002) concluded that no individual model would provide a
solution, what was required was a combination of methods, such as ‘what if’
and ‘safety analysis’. The evidence from the risk analysis should also be
combined and evidenced in a central repository, such as a risk register.
Allan and Yin (2010) suggested a methodology to accommodate the
interconnectivity of risk which helped facilitate the identification of existing risks
at the risk analysis stage where probabilities have been assigned but additional
hazards which result from interconnectivity were not characterised. Prior to
assigning probabilities the identification, characterisation of cross-disciplinary
hazard relationships is required. Although contributing to the presentation of
interconnectivity in a register, Allan and Yin’s proposed methodology does not
accommodate a truly multidimensional documentation of hazards and risks. A
risk register which is dynamic and accommodates multidisciplinary and
multidimensional hazard and risk identification is required to meet the needs of
complexity.
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2.7.7 Quantification versus characterisation
One of the greatest errors in risk management is the failure to identify and
characterise hazards (Redmill, 2002). This results from the focus on the
quantification of known hazards, and is borne out by the methodology of risk
identification in ERM (Frigo and Anderson, 2011). The rush to quantify risk,
resulting from Kaplan and Garrick’s introduction of risk triplets into the
quantitative definition of risk (Kaplan and Garrick, 1981), has meant that there
has been significant research to fine tune the quantitative attributes of known
risks and less development has taken place on characterising and prioritising
hazards and risks (Haimes et al., 2002). Many of the methods used in risk
analysis are deterministic because; “historically organisations have initially tried
to quantify damages and consequences of potential accidents, before
understanding why and how they could occur” (Tixier, et al., 2002).
The quantifiable attributes of a hazard in the form of frequency and severity can
only be established if the hazard has been identified. Characterisation has to
occur prior to quantification. As a result the identification of currently unidentified
cross-disciplinary hazards needs to be evidenced by characterisation prior to
quantification. The quantitative attribute of a hazard are not within the scope of
this research project instead the focus is on the identification and
characterisation of cross-disciplinary hazards.
The prioritisation of hazards requires comprehensive characterisation and the
identification of systematic scenarios to highlight what can go wrong (Haimes et
al., 2002). This does not currently take place with respect to hazard
identification.
2.7.8 Proportionality of hazard identification
Proportionality, within risk management, is one of the five principles of better
regulation (Hampton, 2005) and refers to the idea that effort should be
appropriate to the risk posed. The concept of proportionality was initially applied
in Article 5 European treaty of Rome 1957 which stated “Any action by the
Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of
55
this Treaty”. Proportionality was employed in the pursuit of better regulation in
the Hampton Report 2005 and has been applied across disciplines. It is
demonstrated in the application of the Contaminated Land Regime Environment
Protection Act 1990 Part IIA where the UK took a pragmatic position on the
management of contaminated land where land is remediated to a standard with
respect to its proposed use as set out in planning regulations. The principle of
proportionality should be applied to the application of the proposed method
development.
Hazard identification is the foundation of risk identification and, although the
objective is to be through and robust, this approach has to be tempered by
proportionality which requires taking account of size, scale of impact, type of
activities, complexity and resources of the entity for which hazard identification
is taking place.
2.7.9 Temporal attributes of hazard identification
Hazard attributes may change over time and as such the identification of a
hazard and its development to a risk requires examination over its lifecycle. For
example, toxic effects can decrease or increase over time and impacts will vary
between receptors at different points in time. It is important for the
decomposition and aftercare requirements of waste over numerous years and
should be considered as part of hazard identification accommodated in the form
of phases of the lifecycle. This is the case for nuclear waste and the geological
storage of CO2 (Wilday et al., 2011).
2.8 Summary
Although there has been significant research into risk assessment this has not
improved the identification of cross-disciplinary hazards and risks. The
preoccupation with the quantification and management of existing risks results
in new risks going undetected leading to complexity in risk portfolios and the
inability to identify systemic risks because we have not identified the potential
hazards that result from the interconnection of systems. This is characterised by
the complexity of our world and requires a multidimensional approach to hazard
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and risk identification (Allan and Yin, 2010; Hoffmann, 2011; World Economic
Forum, 2011; Campbell and Currie, 2006).
Current methods of hazard identification are not necessarily applicable to all
stages of a process, system or infrastructure lifecycle (HSL, 2005). Hazards are
predominantly identified in generic silos whereas the world is increasingly
becoming interconnected and multidimensional in nature. A hazard identification
method which replicates these attributes of the real world is absent.
The qualitative tools and techniques for hazard identification focus on a top
down approach where the failure or event must be known, and it is the cause of
the failure which is identified. The existing hazard and risk identification tools
are linear in their approach and do not accommodate simultaneous events or
interconnectivity. There is a need to understand the interrelationship of hazards
and risks.
Although whole system risk management frameworks have stated that their
intention is to provide a broader approach to risk identification to include ‘knock
on’ effects, cascade and cumulative effects, little guidance as to how this is to
be accomplished is provided. One of the benefits stated by ERM is its
integrated approach to risk which is based on existing silo risk management and
the aggregation of risks already identified in the existing generic silos. This
highlights a need for a methodology which identifies cross-disciplinary hazards
from a multidimensional prospective.
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3 EXPLORING THE KNOWLEDGE GAP
3.1 Introduction
This chapter explores the existing position with respect to the status of applied
knowledge on hazard identification. It builds on the gaps identified in Chapter 2
which include the following;
1. Identifying the different dimensions of hazard used in the applied world.
2. Ascertaining the different modes of documenting multiple dimensions of
risk.
3. Evaluating the research methods that should be considered in the
development of the research methodology for this project.
The identification of appropriate dimensions, modes of documentation and
methodologies available to formulate the research will facilitate greater
precision in the research aim, questions and objectives and the further
development of a method for hazard identification.
3.2 Multidimensional approach to hazard identification
Previously it was established that current methods of hazard identification did
not facilitate cross-disciplinary identification as the methods were linear in their
approach (see Section 2.7.5). The majority displayed a top-down approach to
hazard identification ignoring the potential hazards that exists as a result of
interrelationship across the disciplines. The identification of these hazards
requires an approach which incorporates different types of cross-disciplinary
interrelationships. These different interrelationships could include:
 silo hazards from a generic family of risks (generic );
 hazards which interface with each other (interface);
 hazards that are dependent on a prior hazard and relationships which
are not necessarily from the same generic silo (causation); and
 Inter-portfolio hazards which have the possibility of interconnectivity
(accumulation).
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If all were incorporated in a method, the result would be the identification of
multiple dimensions of a pre-existing group of identified hazards. These
dimensions may not be conclusive but would provide a starting point for basic
types of interrelationship.
3.3 Dimensions of identification
The most recent literature on hazard and risk identification recognises that the
world is not linear and tools need to be developed to reflect the
multidimensional attributes of an interconnected world which is exposed to
contagion (Hatfield and Hipel, 2002; Beck and Kropp, 2011). In response this
section introduces four dimensions of hazards which are used in the applied
world; generic, interface, causation and accumulation
3.3.1 Generic
In Section 2.2.2 the timeline for the identification and development of generic
risks was explored. It commenced with qualitative characterisation (hazard
identification) and was further characterised by quantification and most recently
the realisation of inter-risk relationships, such as dependency and
interconnectivity.
Spatial approach to hazard and risk identification are not explored in this
research project as this aspect is implicitly included in each generic discipline.
For example the dispersion of pollution would be considered in environmental,
health and safety and technical generic classifications. The temporal aspect
was commented on in Section 2.7.8 as a stage of the lifecycle and is highlighted
as an area requiring further investigation. This is based on responding to the
requirement to know the cross-disciplinary relationships over the lifecycle of a




An interface is defined as: “a point where two systems, subjects, organizations,
etc. meet and interact” (Oxford, 2010).
It is a term which is widely used across the disciplines. In geology it refers to the
layer between two geological structures; in physics it is the area or gap between
two types of matter and in chemistry the layer between two phases in a varied
mixture; for example the layer between oil and water. Interface is also used in
technology to explain the interaction that takes place between different actors,
sections of a process or structure. It has a wide application in computer
technology where the interfaces of user, hardware and software facilitate the
operating of computer technology.
Interface management was highlighted as an exposure to safety management
systems when operations in the oil and gas sector required a number of parties
to operate safely within different interfaces (Thom, 2000). The interfaces in
operation were on two levels: (1) the client, contractor interface; and (2) the
operator-contractor interface (Thom, 2000). However, there were more than two
interfaces in this scenario which included; contractual, environmental,
geological, technical, regulatory and operational interfaces; this is not an
exhaustive list.
Industry guidance for the management of interfacing health and safety
management systems was produced for the HSE (Spencer and Davies, 2001).
The guiding principles included:
 Individual actors should be in control and accountable for the risks of
their own activities;
 When a third party may be exposed to another’s risks a mutual interface
agreement through consultation should be agreed;
 This agreement should be communicated to all involved;
 The interface arrangements should be audited for effectiveness; and
 The interface agreement should be a working reference and guidance
document.
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The outline format of an interface agreement includes the process and structure
of the interfaces. The risks are assessed, organised and documented but there
is no explicit identification of the interfaces. The identification of interfaces was
one of eight factors where Identification of interfaces was one of eight factors
which should be covered in an interface document (HSE, 2001). This is an
obvious gap in methodology for the identification of interface hazards. The
guidance was published in 2003 by Step Change but there has been no further
update to the guidance.
With respect to the communication of interface management in process safety
Kelly and Berger, (2006) propose a method which asks for the identification and
evaluation of interfaces. These interfaces are the process and organisational
interfaces that need to be involved in the communication of interface exposures.
These exposures are assessed according to the criticality of the designated
interfaces; environment, reputation, quality and process safety. The identified
interfaces are focused on system failure; not on the identification of interfaces of
the portfolio of risks and hazards that result from the operations of an
organisation, project or process. The focus is on safety which is only one of
many generic risks in the portfolio.
Human machine interface (HMI) is a risk which has most recently had a higher
profile and subject to greater investigation, as a result of the consequence of
increased strain on workers from evolving work practices interfacing with
complex and new technology (Flaspoleret et al., 2006). This illustrates the
evolution of a change in the identification of risks from two distinct and separate
actors; the machinery and the human bringing an additional dimension to the
interaction of the human and the machinery.
There are many interfaces which should be investigated as part of hazard
identification (Pasquale et al 2003). The following were suggested for a railway
system: (1) interfaces between subsystems of the network; (2) system interface
with the environment; and (3) equipment operability interfaces (Pasquale et al.,
2003). The process of interface identification for the railway network involved
the use of HAZOP techniques and expert elicitation where both internal and
61
external interfaces were identified. The resulting interface hazards were
presented in a hazard log (Pasquale et al., 2003).
Hazard identification for patient safety is a complex web of internal and external
interfaces (Wiig and Lindoe, 2009). This complexity is not translated into the
current understanding of patient safety which takes a silo approach with two
actors; the hospital and the doctors (Wiig and Lindoe, 2009). This is similar to
the silo identification within the individual generic risks (see Section 2.4) and
shows the immature stage of interface hazard identification in patient safety.
Although there are many interfaces these can be categorised into two types of
interface; generic interfaces hazards and system interface hazards. Generic
interface hazards are generic hazards that act in combination to result in an
additional hazard.
In medicine causality was developed as a concept to understand the evolution
of disease. Multi-causality occurs when more than one cause could contribute
to an event (Dekkers and Rikkert, 2006). The same term is used in law when
there are multiple causes but it is not possible to point to one cause (Knutsen,
2010). Following this logic it is not inconceivable that two or more risks could
interface and result in a previously unidentified hazard as expressed in Figure
3-1 .
Figure 3-1 Diagram to illustrate the evolution of an environmental interface
hazard which results from financial and technical impacts.
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In this research this will be known as Interface Level I, hazards that occur
concurrently with two or more generic risks and result in an additional hazard
(multi-causality).
System interfaces include organisational, process and value chains. Interface
identification is evolving at different levels of maturity dependent on the industry
sector. Organisational hazard identification seems to rely on the assumption
that hazard identification of generic interfaces has taken place. The absence of
this in the literature shows that this is not the case. In fact the interfaces that are
identified are those that relate to safety, the process, organisation and
regulation and this is confirmed across the industry sectors of medicine,
transport, oil and gas (Thom, 2000; EOR, 2006; Pasquale et al., 2003; Dekkers
and Rikkert, 2006; Wigg and Lindoe, 2009).
In this research Interface II are hazards which result from the need to integrate
consecutive modules in order for the entire process, value chain or system to
function (systems interface).
An essential part of managing risk is the identification of hazards at the interface
of a complex web of interactions (Beck and Kropp, 2011). Too often it is the
hazards that result in the failure of a component that is identified not the
unidentified and unmanaged hazards at the interface.
3.3.3 Causation
Causation has been defined by the Scottish philosopher Hume in the 18th
Century as the situation where if the initial object did not exist the second object
could never have come into existence (Hume, 1739 cited in Lorkowski, 2010).
The concept of causation is used in law and is a critical factor required to
establish criminal and civil liability. In both cases a causal link between the
claimant’s loss and negligent behaviour has to exist (Honore, 2010). There are
two tests which are applied in respect of legal causation. The first is referred to
as “causation in fact” where the question is asked “but for what the defendant
did would the consequence have occurred.” The second is called imputable
causation or causation in law and this requires that the defendant’s actions
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were an operative and substantial cause of the consequence and that there was
no other intervening event (Honore, 2010).
Causation is also used as a means of apportioning liability in European
Directives (e.g. the Environmental Liability Directive (2004/35/CE). LCA also
uses physical and chemical causation for the apportionment of environmental
impacts (Finnveden et al., 2009). The concept of causation is also used in the
provision of insurance and determines the breath of coverage provided by
insurance and the application of exclusions and warrantees as well as the
trigger for the insurance of a potential loss (Knutsen, 2010). In the provision of
insurance the concept of causation is used to establish the link between events
and impact, damage, loss or injury so that the insured can be placed in no
better or worst position than they were prior to the loss or damage.
The concept of causation was applied in the medical profession when disease
was believed to be the result of a single cause (Broadbent, 2009). Most recently
this view has changed to consider that disease is not the result of mono-
causality but multi-causality and probability (Dekkers and Rikkert, 2006). Risks
at the preliminary level can be managed by breaking causation linkages for their




Figure 3-2 Example of causation linkages
It is also possible that the resulting effect, response, and target could be the
tipping point for another hazard. If the linkage is not broken it has simply
changed. Reason (2000) uses the Swiss cheese model to show that an event
can break through defences, barrier’s and safeguards. As a result accurate and
comprehensive hazard identification across the generic risks is critical to ensure
the correct calibration of mitigation and tolerance.
64
The concept of causation is used in a number of risk and hazard identification
tools, where the objective is usually to establish what has caused; a failure or
the impact of a specific failure. Tools and methods include those highlighted in
Section 2.5 such as FMEA, cause and effect, fishbone diagrams and HAZOP.
Causation can also be accommodated in checklists, structured brainstorming,
horizon planning and scenario setting. These methods and tools do not
currently accommodate cross-disciplinary application and this is required to
establish if there is chain reaction.
Many major accidents are the result of a chain of events known as the domino
effect (Khan and Abbasi, 2001).These events are some of the most serious and
significant accidents for example Buncefield in 2005 (Buncefield Major Incident
Investigation Board, 2008), and the Vishakhpatnam disaster (Khan and Abbasi,
2001). Cozzani et al., (2007) state that an accident displays the domino effect if
it possesses the following characteristics:
1. a primary incident that acts as the tipping point for the domino
phenomenon;
2. the dissemination outcome that results from the primary incident on the
subsequent targets;
3. subsequent targets involving a different part of the same structure or
other plant in the same vicinity; and
4. escalation phenomena which result in exponential severity of the initial
primary incident.
Industrial sites that fall within the regulations of Seveso-II Directive
(2012/18/EU; Seveso II Directive) are obliged to identify and assess domino
effects both on and off-site (Antonioni et al., 2009). Recent literature shows that
the focus of the domino effect has been on determining the physical impact to
plant of specific escalation vectors (heat, load, radiation, overpressure, loss of
containment), and known outcomes such as damage to equipment, fire and
explosion. Additionally methods have been developed to establish the likely
impact to units using probabilistic analysis to assess the possibility of domino
effect scenarios and their impact (Khan and Abbasi, 2001; Cozzani et al., 2006;
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Abdolhamidzadeh et al., 2009; Antonioni et al 2009). The hazard identification
that results from the domino effect should not be limited to industrial sites that
are required to adhere to the Seveso II Directive it should be applied to generic
risks and not just technical and safety risks. Application of causation to a
portfolio of existing hazards establishing whether interconnectivity within the
portfolio results in currently unknown hazards and risks materialising should be
explored. Causation is an accepted concept which may be applied differently
across the generic disciplines of law, safety, the environment, technology and
health: it can be documented within its generic risk with existing risk and hazard
identification tools.
The identification of causal relationships from the starting point of a failure is
already possible. Identified risks maybe part of an existing portfolio of risks, but
could result in a chain of causal hazards previously unidentified. This
unidentified chain of causation could have a significant impact on human health,
the environment or the ability of a corporation to operate as a going concern
(Figure 3-3).
Figure 3-3 Development of a chain of causation
Causation exposures are currently not consistently identified and therefore not
reported and remain unmanaged as the final hazard is not initially connected
with the primary failure of a process. Time is a critical component of the












The insurance sector in the United Kingdom has since the 17th Century
identified, assessed and managed risk through various insurance and
reinsurance entities and products. It is an efficient market whose purpose is the
carrying and distribution of risk. One of the dimensions of risk that insurers and
reinsurers both observe and manage is accumulation risk (IAIS, 2012).
Accumulation risk refers to a combination of hazards from property and casualty
risks which occur from one or more perils (IRMI, 2012). Accumulation results
from a concentration of risk in a portfolio of business resulting in a severely
impaired financial position for the insurer (IAIS, 2012). The Swedish financial
services authority states that accumulation risk; “…involving risk concentration,
e.g. via multiple insurance objects being so closely correlated that the insurance
provider risks incurring a loss on all or more than one of these objects as the
result of a single event” (Finansinspektionens, 2012).
Niehaus (1986) suggests that insurers should know the individual risks that
comprise their portfolio, as well as the accumulations. The reinsurer needs to
make sure that he does not unknowingly assume uncontrolled accumulation risk
(Niehaus, 1986) and there is no reason why this approach should not be
incorporated in the identification of hazards across descriptor outside the
insurance sector.
Catastrophe Risk Evaluating and Standardizing Target Accumulation (CRESTA)
was founded by the insurance and reinsurance sector in 1977 to provide
technical management of natural hazard coverage. Its main goal is to provide a
consistent system to transfer aggregated exposure data for accumulation risk.
The accumulation risks relate to natural hazards, terrorism and comprise a
number of property and casualty exposures (CRESTA, 2009). CRESTA
provides a framework for reporting accumulation risk which comprise a portfolio
of risks across geographical zones, perils covered and lines of insurance, to
design insurance solutions for accumulation risks a register is formulated
(CRESTA, 2009). This portfolio approach to hazards is driven by the protection
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of the insurer’s capital. This should be the approach taken by private and public
institutions to protect physical, social and financial equity.
There are a number of different scenarios in which the insurance sector
encounters accumulation risk. Most recently these have included:
 Natural catastrophes which commence with a natural peril for example
the Great Eastern Japanese’s Earthquake of 2011 and may result in the
inclusion of other secondary risks such as flooding, and damage to major
infrastructures such as nuclear plant (Munich Re, 2012);
 Interconnectivity (WEF, 2011);
 Latent disease such as asbestosis which impacts subsequent
generations as well as the original recipient (HSE, 2010);
 Longevity of life which has an exponential impact on life related policies
such as pensions (Munich Re, 2012); and
 Terrorism: a large single event which includes a number of secondary
events (Bugmann, 1997) such as 9/11 (Liedtke and Schaz, 2011).
The events of 11th September 2001 (9/11) illustrate not only the complexity and
interdependency of risks worldwide but the resulting accumulation exposure as
shown in Figure 3-4.
Figure 3-4 Percentage of insured losses from the different lines of property and
casualty insurance for the September 11 2001 World Trade Centre accumulation






















The World Trade Centre 9/11 event was the result of an accumulation of
hazards and risks that resulted in losses across every class of insurance. The
total claims cost US$ 23.1bn included 33% of business interruption losses
which caused economic impacts when the stock markets undermined the
financial stability of insurers, and major companies worldwide (Ortolani et al.,
2011). A post event evaluation of 9/11 hazards and risks shows that
accumulation includes a plethora of risks and hazards Figure 3-4 (III, 2010).
Accumulation risk is not something that only insurers should be concerned with
identifying but it should be embedded in hazard identification. If a proactive
stance is taken to identify the generic risks that comprise accumulation hazards
(such as those in Figure 3-5) there is a greater opportunity to manage currently
unidentified accumulation exposures.
Figure 3-5 Diagrammatic representation of the composition of an accumulation
hazard
The accumulation portfolios should reflect the phases of a lifecycle, the
concentration of risk in specific parts of a process or the scenario where a
number of generic risks occur within a short time frame similar to a 9/11 event.
Accumulation exposures may be categorised as ‘black swan’ events (Taleb,
2007) but with increased concentrations and interdependency globally it would
seem appropriate to include accumulation exposure as a dimension of hazard
identification.
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A summary of feedback from the Turner Review (a regulatory review of the
global financial crisis) suggested that enhanced data capture should also be
introduced to increase transparency and supervisory monitoring of risk
accumulation in specific areas (FSA, 2010). If insurers, as expert risk
managers, identify accumulation exposure to protect their capital and provide
insurance capacity then this dimension of hazard identification should be
included in the identification of risk for the protection of capital and social equity
for both public and private entities.
3.4 Characterisation of the dimensions
Having established the use of the generic, interface, causation and
accumulation dimensions in the previous section, this section confirms the
definitions which will be used in this research project.
3.4.1 Generic
A predefined classification of risks which are associated with a specific widely
accepted discipline, such as environmental, legal, financial, health and safety.
3.4.2 Interface
This type of hazard arises when two or more generic risks interface and result in
an additional hazard. This dimension can manifest in two ways:
Interface Level I: Generic interface hazards; and
Interface Level II: System interface hazards.
3.4.3 Causation
A causation hazard is dependent on a prior hazard occurring. If the prior hazard
does not occur then causation will not take place. This is monocausality
(Dekkers and Rikkert, 2006).
3.4.4 Accumulation
Accumulation hazards occur when the cumulative impact of a portfolio of
hazards result in a negative outcome.
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The four dimensions result from different inter-hazard relationships. The
resulting unique dimensions require a repository that characterises the hazard
within a risk register format. The inclusion of these four dimensions will provide
an improved repository of hazard data which can be used by risk managers as
part of the risk management processes. It will address the requirement for
comprehensive identification and provide auditable evidence.
3.5 Repository for evidencing the identification of hazards and
risk
3.5.1 Risk report
Risks are reported in organisations on two levels internal reporting and external
reporting.
External reports include the risk report which is audited as part of the annual
accounts in accordance with UK Corporate Governance Code September 2012
(UKCGC). This code requires that the board of a corporation should be “…..
Responsible for determining the nature and extent of the significant risks it is
willing to take in achieving its strategic objectives. The board should maintain
sound risk management and internal control systems” (UKCGC, 2012).
There is no formally agreed format for a risk report. The reports are specific to
the organisations or regulators requesting the report. The attributes for reporting
have been stated but not what should be reported. The focus is on the
aggregation of data, governance and integrity, transparency and completeness
(BIS, 2012).
A recent risk report (ThyssenKrupp AG 2010/11) was structured such that it
included information on the risk management philosophy for the organisation,
methods used to mitigate risks followed by sections providing details on risks
which impact the business. The generic risk practitioner will provide reports
specific to the generic risk for example environmental risk assessments, health
and safety audits, compliance reviews and insurance schedules. The
departmental manager and project manager will provide bespoke status reports.
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Reports have a tendency to have a short shelf life and provide a snapshot of a
risk profile. They are not interactive dynamic methods of providing, analysing or
receiving data.
3.5.2 Hazard log (Issue log)
A hazard log is used in project management frameworks such as Prince2R and
is the precursor to the development of a risk register for the documentation of
hazards Table 3.1 provides an outline of the descriptors for a hazard log.
Table 3.1 Outline of the descriptors used in a hazard log (adapted from Pasquale,
et al., 2003.)
Fields Purpose
Identification number To facilitate an audit trail
Description Description of the hazard
Cause Details of the cause of the hazard
Consequences The consequences that result from the hazard.
Mitigation Methods used to reduce the hazard
Action Further action required to better understand or
mitigate the hazard
Responsibility The responsibility of the hazard is assigned to a
responsible person
Status The current status of the hazard for example open,
cancelled, resolved, transferred, closed
Note The rationale for the designated status
Date Dates which the hazard status has been modified.
The hazard log is simple and easy to use for generic risks but does not, in its
current form easily identify the characteristics of an interface hazard as it does




The current methodology for the compilation of a risk register in the context of a
project is to produce a summary risk register in a tabular form from which data
is presented for management of the risks. Although this method is simple and
can be expedited quickly it is not without issues.
The majority of risk registers follow a structure which includes the following
sections; risk identification, risk assessment, risk response and risk
management (Ward, 1999). Table 3.2 compares seven structures for the
tabulation of a risk register. Although the seven risk register structures follow
the four sections, the level of detail and focus differs. The structure tends to be
one dimensional and is presented on two levels; a detailed tabulation and a
summary table of risks which are used for decision making.
Of the seven different risk register structures in Table 3.2 only one stipulates the
explicit requirement for hazard identification data requesting the hazard
reference and description (Whipple, 2010). Interdependencies are discussed
and included in the risk register format suggested by Ward (1999) but they are
not explicitly included in any of the other risk register structures. Secondary
risks, although not included in the risk identification section of the risk register,
are included in the risk mitigation section of the Williams (1994) register.
As a result none of these risk register structures are complete.
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Table 3.2 Comparison of seven different risk registers.













 Risk identifier, title
and description.
 Description of causes
and trigger events.
 Description of






 Nature of any inter-
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 The area of the project in
which the risk may
materialise (based on the
generic risk areas [6]).
 Risk Identiﬁcation Number. 



















risk ranking Zhoa ,
2005)










































 Probability value (probability
or likelihood of the risk
occurring, determined
within the risk assessment
stage of the RMM).
 Impact value (impact of the
risk, often in separate terms
of time and cost,
determined at the risk
assessment stage of the
RMM).
 Total impact value
(combination of the impact
values in terms of time and
cost).
 Severity value (combination
of the probability and total
impact values).
 Ranking of the risk within
the project (ranked risks are
those with a high severity
and are active within the
project).
 Track of the risk (i.e. has the
risk increased, remained the
same or decreased in
severity since the previous
month).
























 Likely effect of
responses on this
risk.























 Brief description of the
reduction/mitigation plans
which have been developed.
 Whether the risk is active on
the register.












 Residual risk after
effective response.
 Party bearing the
consequences of the
risk.

























Table 3.2 shows that risk identification is clearly one of the modules in the risk
management process and that there are some common elements to the
structure of the risk identification section of a risk register. The common
elements of risk register structure from Table 3.2 are presented and compared
in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3 Comparison of common elements in the structure of the risk

















Risk identifier YES YES YES YES YES
Risk category YESi YES YES
Risk description YES YES YES YES YES YES
Root cause/







Risk owner YES YES YES YES
Risk location YES1 YES YES
Nature of
interdependencies YES
1 includes business unit, faculty name
Table 3.3 shows common elements include: the risk identification number, risk
location and risk description. If the root cause and hazard description are
amalgamated there are references to hazards in the risk register but not explicit
hazard characterisation. Although there is an implicit consensus on the
minimum level of detail and this is reflected in the review of the seven articles in
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Table 3.2 and Table 3.3, overall the information in the risk register template with
respect to the identification of hazards and risk does not result in a
comprehensive register. This is due to a lack of information evidencing the
identification of the source of risk.
3.6 Issues with the risk register
There is no agreed standard from the British Standards Institute, International
Standard Organisation or the Institute of Risk Management for compiling a risk
register. There is guidance within the generic disciplines for specific
organisations such as the Association of British Insurers, the construction sector
(Risk management of Tunnelling), and UK Government guidance (BTS, 2003).
Within the risk register, hazards are not characterised sufficiently and this leads
to increased uncertainty (Ward, 1999) Table 3.3 shows that this was still the
case (Allan and Yin, 2010).
Although interdependencies were highlighted as an important factor that should
be included in risk registers in the 1990s, practical identification has only
recently being highlighted (Ward, 1999; Allan and Yin, 2010; WEF, 2011).
Issues with the current method of identification and documentation include the
fact that a list of hazards and risk drivers are produced and prioritised without
confirming that this pool is complete. The resulting list is subject to linear
interrogation and management. Little if any analysis of the interrelationship
within the existing pool of hazards and the resulting risks takes place.
It is common practice to simply rank risks, but this ignores contextual data about
dispersion, exposure and therefore impact (Ward, 1999). Qualitative contextual
data exists within the existing pool of explicit risks and implicit hazards
embedded in the risk register and these should be interrogated further providing
a more comprehensive pool of hazards. This comprehensive pool of hazards
may identify known unknowns and unknown hazards.
Risk registers are widely used but, can provide a false sense of security, a
ritualistic approach to identification and risk management (Drummond, 2011).
This illustrates the need for a register to be an interactive repository which
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documents and prompts action. In Section 2.7.5 and 3.1 the gaps in knowledge
with respect to the identification of hazards across disciplines have been
identified. The next step will be to develop a research strategy based on a
review of the different methods of research that are available.
3.7 Methods of research to be considered
3.7.1 Research methods
There are three generally accepted types of research design: qualitative,
quantitative and mixed method research (Johnson et al., 2007; Creswell,
2008).These will be reviewed in turn taking account of the three components of
research design: the philosophical world view; strategies for inquiry; and
research methods (Creswell, 2008).
3.7.2 Qualitative research
Qualitative research facilitates the use of research techniques where there is an
emerging phenomenon. It provides a framework where there is insufficient
quality data, obtaining experimental conditions are not possible and it is difficult
to obtain an acceptable sample population and response rate (Yin, 2011).
These attributes would meet the requirement for researching the identification of
hazards and risk resulting from complexity, interconnectivity and dependency.
Although identified as requiring investigation, little data is available in this area
and much of the data that may be available is proprietary. This is the case for
new and evolving technologies such as CCS and climate change. It is also the
case for environmentally sensitive installations such as landfills.
Five features set qualitative research aside from other approaches to research:
including: the study of participants; in real time, in their natural environment;
capturing the viewpoints of participants; providing insight into evolving
phenomena; and endeavouring to utilise multiple sources of evidence (Yin,
2011). The use of multiple sources of evidence is a feature that is critical to
ensuring validation and accuracy of the research method and data quality. It
creates insight into evolving phenomena and attributes that are to be
incorporated into this research methodology.
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3.7.3 Quantitative research
Quantitative research uses numerical techniques as a method of inquiry, data
collection and analysis. This approach to research is based on theory building
through deductive reasoning which is progressed by focusing on the
significance of statistical hypothesis testing (Kaplan and Duchon, 1988). This is
both an advantage and disadvantage as it only allows science to develop
incrementally as a result of hypothesis testing. Additionally quantitative research
relies on experimental and statistical control such that part of the process is the
isolation of variables to ensure reproduction of the results and experiment
(Creswell, 2008). The cost of removing context is the attainment of objectivity
and testability but this undermines the purpose of the research that of
understanding the phenomena in its natural setting (Kaplan and Duchon, 1988;
Echambadi et al., 2006). The development and testing of a hazard and risk
identification has to be carried out in the context of the real world.
Reliance on quantitative data alone can result in incomplete data collection and
analysis (Kaplan and Duchon, 1988). This could result in the exclusion of non-
numerical data which may have a fundamental impact on the quality of data
collection and analysis (Echambadi et al., 2006).
3.7.4 Selection of inquiry strategy
The strategies of inquiry are determined by the three different research
strategies outlined in Table 3.4. The choice as to the type of inquiry is
determined by the requirements of the research questions and objectives.
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Table 3.4 Characteristics of qualitative, quantitative and mixed methods research
strategies (adapted from Creswell, 2008).
Characteristics Qualitative Quantitative Mixed Method
Philosophical
















structure  Open questions
 Closed
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 Requires a rational
















The attributes applicable to this research project are highlighted in bold italics. It
is clear that this research project has attributes from both qualitative and
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quantitative research. The following section provides a critical review of tools
from both quantitative and qualitative strategies of inquiry and their
appropriateness for this specific research project.
3.7.5 Qualitative strategies
Ethnography and narrative research are focused on human events. This
research is not focused on human events as they happen and as such
phenomenological research is not applicable as a strategy of inquiry. It will not
be possible to observe the process of hazard and risk identification and the
objective of the research is not to explore the human experience, feelings
behaviour or emotions of hazard identification.
Grounded theory involves the development of a process theory or phenomena
from the opinions of participants (Strauss, 1997). The main characteristic of this
type of inquiry is the numerous stages of data collection, the iterative process
and comparative evaluation of different population samples to identify common
themes and differences (Creswell, 2008; Yin, 2011). A case study strategy of
inquiry involves researching phenomena in its real world context. This method
of inquiry may not be appropriate for the initial exploratory stage of research but
is suited to the testing and validation of the developed method. This aspect will
be accommodated in this research methodology.
3.7.6 Quantitative strategies
Quantitative strategies of inquiry include experimental designs and survey
research (Creswell, 2008). Experimental designs involve comparing the impact
of one variable to a control where that variable is absent (Creswell, 2008). Due
to the complexity and dynamic relationship of hazard and risk identification it
would not be possible to carry out this line of inquiry. This research is at the
formative stage of identification and thus once the identification method has
been verified experimentation could be considered.
Survey research is an appropriate method of inquiry for this research project as
it will provide numeric data on trends and views of the sample population. This
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method of inquiry uses questionnaires and interviews to collect data (Creswell,
2008) and will be applied to this research project by the use of interviews and a
web survey.
3.8 Aims and research questions
3.8.1 Aims
The aim of this research project is to identify and investigate (using case
studies) why robust and encompassing hazard identification does not occur,
particularly in areas where multiple fields overlap and to design a framework
that will address these deficiencies.
The accomplishment of this aim and the review of both the prior art and applied
literature has resulted in research questions which focus on responding to the
gaps in knowledge and formulating a method for systematic and comprehensive
hazard identification and documentation.
3.8.2 Research questions
The research questions to be answered by this project include;
Are the current risk management frameworks able to identify cross-disciplinary
hazards?
Can the categories of generic, interface causation and accumulation be used to
identify cross-disciplinary hazards?
Is it possible to develop and evaluate a model for the identification and
documentation of cross-disciplinary hazards and risks?
These research questions support the formulation of objectives which facilitate
answers to these questions.
The research hypothesis to be addressed by this project is;
Can a method be developed to identify and document cross-disciplinary




There is a need for proactive hazard identification which builds on the existing
risk management frameworks providing a solution to the difficulties of applying a
multidisciplinary approach to the identification of risks and hazards.
The method should introduce three additional dimensions to the identification
process, interface, causation and accumulation. The application of these
dimensions to the identification process requires the development of a risk
register which is dynamic and accommodates the multidimensional attributes of
hazard and risk which does not currently exist.
This method should be inclusive and proactive in its identification. not ignoring
hazards that are not capable of quantification and prompting identification
beyond the currently identified silos of generic risk by looking to identify
interrelationships between generic risks and hazards (Rasmussen, 1997; Beck
and Kropp, 2011; Ai et al., 2012). This will allow the identification of new,





4.1.1 Introduction to method development
This chapter sets out the methodology for the attainment of the following
objectives:
• Review current approaches to hazard identification and risk management to
identify their suitability for the identification of cross discipline hazards in an
interconnected world;
• Define the dimensions of generic, interface, causation and accumulation risk
and critically evaluate their application to the identification of hazards; and
• Develop and evaluate a model for the identification and documentation of
multidimensional attributes of cross discipline hazards.
The achievement of these objectives will require a range of methods. This
chapter provides details of the selection and sequencing of these methods.
4.2 Selection of research method
4.2.1 Research strategy
There are three generally accepted types of research design: qualitative,
quantitative and mixed method research (Johnson et al., 2007; Creswell, 2009).
The chosen research strategy for this research project is mixed methods (see
Section 3.2.4).
Mixed methods research is a structured combination of quantitative and
qualitative research which allows the researcher to take advantage of the
attributes of both modes of research. It facilitates interdisciplinary research and
provides the researcher with a wider palette of techniques which makes
maximum use of limited information (Creswell, 2008).
This research project requires a pragmatic approach because the objective is to
develop a methodology to identify new or currently unidentified risks and
hazards. As a result it is necessary to ensure that the research is inclusive with
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respect to data collection but also systematic in its analysis. The strategy of
inquiry will be sequential including: literature review, interviews, surveys and
case studies. Whilst the main modes of research will be sequential, all of the
modes will, at different times, require input from literature, for example to set the
context of the generic risks and case studies.
Both open and closed questions have been used in the interviews and survey.
The approach to data gathering will incorporate both emerging and
predetermined data. Achieving the aim of this research project will require the
identification of unknown and known attributes. Therefore the data pool will
comprise of observed, scripted and numerical data which will include,
documents, images, observation, interviews, and surveys.
The research variables are identified as hazards and risks. This novel area will
require conclusions to be drawn from the interpretation of the data using both
qualitative and statistical methods. The attributes of the different research
strategies were expressed in Section 3.7.4 and the attributes that relate to this
research are highlighted.
4.3 Mixed method inquiry strategy
The choice of type of inquiry is determined by the requirements of the research
questions and objectives. Mixed methods strategies take many forms, and can
involve the sequential or concurrent application of quantitative and qualitative
techniques (Morse, 1991). For this research study a sequential mixed method of
inquiry is proposed where qualitative research is used for the exploratory stage
of the research as it can provide a rich contribution to the development of new
processes and theories (Kaplan and Duchon, 1988). This attribute is to be used
in the proposed methodology. The resulting research design will follow a mixed
method structure.
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Figure 4-1 Structure of research methodology for the development of a novel
approach to hazard identification
The mixed method data collection for this research project as set out in Figure
4-1 is based on four pillars:
Literature review. This is a central pillar where an iterative literature
review provides the context of the research project and helps develop the
focus and structure of modes of data collection.
Expert elicitations. Using structured questionnaires to obtain empirical
data from generic experts on applied identification of risk.
Web surveys. Accessing a wider population of risk professional to
obtain applied data on risk identification.


















The method development will commence with the (1) literature review which will
provide the prior art on which to base the questions for the (2) expert
questionnaires. The results from the expert questionnaires and literature review
will facilitate the structure of the (3) web survey and help to formulate the
method. The method will be tested by application to (4) case studies which will
assist with validation and verification.
4.4 Selection of data collection and valuation strategies
4.4.1 Ethical considerations
The methodology and its execution were agreed by the Universities Ethics
Committee (see Appendix A). The ethical policy of Cranfield University was
adhered to. All participants were provided with details of the context of the
research and were able to withdraw at any point (see Appendix B).
It was decided that personal and corporate names would not be published in the
output of this research as the identification of hazards for individuals and
organisations are a highly sensitive issue and could affect the use of valuable
information required for this research project.
4.4.2 Parameters of research its impact on the definition of data and
sources
Data collection takes place on two levels in this research project; firstly in
respect of identifying the parameters of the methodology, and secondly in the
development of the method of hazard and risk identification. This chapter
establishes the requirements of the methodology for ascertaining the current
status of hazard identification in Chapter 5.
Qualitative data collection of human behaviour includes: interviewing;
observing; collecting; examining, and feelings (Creswell 2008; Yin, 2011).
Although experts may apply emotional and psychological feelings in the
formation of their opinions, this research topic is not concerned with the
emotional or psychological aspects of hazard or risk identification but with the
process and robustness of the identification process. The collection of data from
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experts who have experience of risk and hazard identification and their current
practices and opinions on different aspects of identification is a fundamental
building block of this research project.
This evolving area of research requires tangible evidence from literature, risk
professional and expert details of the context of the identification processes to
be extracted from documents and other media. The process for the analysis of
data collected from expert interviews and a web survey included the following
stages: 1. obtain the raw data; 2. organise and prepare the data for analysis
and synthesis; 3. review the data; 4. code and collate the data; 5. identify
interrelating themes; and 6. interpret the identified themes and descriptions
(Creswell, 2009). These stages are explored in greater detail in the following
section for each type of data collection.
4.5 Published evidence
Peer reviewed data from academic journals are the most robust as they are
subject to peer review prior to publication. Data on how hazard and risk
identification takes place and the actual methods used by experts to document
these variables is empirical and not widely available in academic journals at
present, hence the need to use grey literature.
Selective reviews of data from peer reviewed articles as well as professional
institutions, government and corporate documents were used to help focus the
structure of the expert interviews, formulate the content of the web survey and
choose and develop the methodology for the case studies. Data was accessed
using the academic search engines: ABI Inform Complete (ProQuest), Business
Source Complete, British Standards online, Scopus, Google Scholar and ISI
Web of Knowledge. Non-academic published data was accessed from UK
Government sources such as the Department of Energy and Climate Change,
Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, Department of Business
Innovation and Skills, Office of Government Commerce and professional
institutions such as the Institute of Risk Management, Chartered Insurers
Institute, Association of British Insurers, additionally, corporate information was
obtained from seminars, conferences, and via corporate web sites. All data
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were assessed for quality before inclusion into the assessment (see Section
4.5.4).
4.5.1 Design
The compilation of suitable literature was obtained by specifying keyword
searches. The key words for the initial search were: hazard, risk, and
uncertainty, risk identification, hazard identification, risk analysis, risk
assessment, risk management, risk reporting and risk documentation. Searches
were structured using Boolean terms for each of the following areas:
parameters of research; generic risks and hazards; whole system risk;
management frameworks; methods and tools for identification; dimensions; and
multidimensional identification. For example for parameters of research, the
Boolean search terms are presented in Figure 4-2. The subject of the research
is on the left hand side and the variations of the subject are on the right-hand
side.
Figure 4-2 Structure of Boolean search for parameters of research
As the focus was to look at the identification of hazards and risk in new,
emerging and currently unknown areas of risk, searches were also carried out
looking at risk and hazard identification in carbon capture and storage.
Additional searches were carried out to provide context for hazard and risk
















. The following criteria were used to select data:
 Article must include the keywords in its title as this indicated the focus of
the article.
 Preference was given to quality journal articles which were rated as cited
in the search engine.
 Journal articles published between the time periods 1990 to 2012.
 Grey literature published between the time periods 1990 to 2012.
A quality journal was defined as an academic journal in which an identified
article was cited. Academic journals have an impact factor, derived from the
average citation number for recently published articles. Although the impact
factor of the journal is an accepted indicator it does not mean that the specific
article is acceptable and that is why cited articles were predominantly used. The
search focused on keywords which were highlighted in the previous section and
present in the title of the article, as this was the focus of the article. The result of
the search was refined by reviewing the abstracts and then excluding unrelated
data by subject or date of publication. If there were no results from keywords in
the title the search was widened to references in existing articles and authors in
the specific area.
The use of journal articles was acceptable for the areas of risk and hazard as
there was a long history of research in this area. This was not the position for
case studies such as CCS. As the CCS data was evolving and tended to be
published up to a year after a development at which time there would be further
developments. Journal articles were not up to date and, as a result, data for
CCS was obtained predominately from grey literature supplemented with data
from journals, conferences and seminars. The grey literature was usually




The published sources of data (grey and peer reviewed) were reviewed for
relevance to the development of the method and information surrounding the
case studies. The data sources that were considered for the development of
the method were mainly books and information on the development of the
questionnaire structure and appropriate question structure was identified for use
with the web survey as well as the semi-structured expert interviews. Additional
information was identified on the methods for the analysis of the qualitative and
quantitative data from the survey and interviews. For the case studies, grey
and peer reviewed sources were interrogated for information on the specific
case study as well as the regulations and government literature surrounding the
topics. Current topical peer reviewed articles were also interrogated to supply
additional information in the case study. Where data were identified as relevant
to the risk register, these were included in the discussion of the case study.
4.5.4 Validation
The value of using published data is its validity and quality. Bowden (2004)
states that indicators of source quality include the scientific, method, theoretical
basis, auditability, validation and objectivity which are similar to the
requirements for peer reviewed data. As a result if published data was peer
reviewed, cited and from high impact journals this was the preferred source of
data. Where the development of new methods for emerging areas, these criteria
cannot always be met as knowledge is evolving and not yet published. As a
result the vast majority of literature was peer reviewed either as a consequence
of being published articles in a peer reviewed journal or from experts and
government bodies who have their own bespoke internal peer review process.
4.6 Expert elicitation using structured questionnaires
This method of qualitative data collection was chosen as it provided a structured
framework with focused questions. It facilitates the collection of data without
compromising confidentiality when participation is not possible and provides
control over the direction of questions (Creswell, 2008). Data collected from
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interviews via questionnaires can provide the flexibility to produce quantitative
data, where available.
4.6.1 Design of interview and questions
Face to face interviews with insurance, environmental, health and safety, and
legal experts were carried out using a structured questionnaire following Yin,
(2011) requirements for structured interviews. The questionnaire included a
mixture of open and closed questions. Each questionnaire was divided into two
sections; questions specific to CCS and questions specific to the expert’s area
of generic risk specialism. The questions across all the questionnaires were
similar but accommodated specific anomalies of the generic risk and gaps in
knowledge (see Appendix C). The use of a structured questionnaire where the
interviewee is provided with the questionnaire prior to the interview was used to
minimise interviewer bias and maximise response rates.
Where it was possible and consent was obtained interviews were recorded both
electronically and in written format. Where an interview was not logistically
possible the relevant questionnaire was forwarded to the expert by email for
completion electronically. Prior to receiving the questionnaire the expert was
provided with ethical guidelines for this research project (see Section 4.4.1) and
was made aware that if they did not wish to complete the questionnaire that was
an acceptable response via informed consent. Additionally experts were
informed that personal and corporate data would not be retained. Data was
retained electronically with restricted access to the researcher and supervision
staff.
The sample includes four expert interviews which were conducted for the
following generic risks; insurance, environmental, legal and health and safety.
These specific generic risks were chosen as they are distinctly different but are
inherent in most projects and organisation (see Table 4.1). Technical risks were
excluded from expert interviews as they are specific to the operations of the
project or organisation.
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Table 4.1 Rationale for expert elicitations from generic risk
Generic risk Rationale
Environmental Highly regulated, risk evolving to accommodate
emerging environmental exposures with wide impact.
Health and safety High profile regulated risks with significant accessible
research
Insurance Applied risk, that transcends a number of generic
risks, managed by a proactive mixture of physical,
legal, and financial means
Legal A generic risk which touches all aspects of life and is
predominately reactive identified and managed ex
post.
The rationale for questions on generic risks has to establish how risk experts
accommodate the identification and the documentation of existing and new
risks. The structured questionnaires used in the interviews contained questions
which asked for clarification as to the attributes of risk identification within
generic risk frameworks. The focus on risk identification was used as an
indication of the evidence of hazard identification.
The construction of questionnaires was based on identified gaps in the literature
review to the applied identification of hazards and risk (see Section 3.1). The
questionnaires were designed to facilitate the acquisition of data to respond to
the following gaps:
1. Ascertain the different approaches to generic risk identification;
2. Determine whether the same methods are used by different generic risk
for the purpose of identification;
3. Establish if the dimensions of interface, causation, and accumulation risk
are identified;
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4. Verify the repositories used to document identified risk; and
5. The attributes that should be taken into account when developing a
method for the identification of hazards.
How these gaps relate to the research questions and the relevant sections of
the questionnaires are expressed in Table 4.2 Interviews were carried out after
the initial risk register was developed using CCS data and prior to the web
survey.
Table 4.2 Relationship between the research question, focus of inquiry and
interview subject
Research question Focus of inquiry
Are the current risk management




How does identification take place?
How are risks documented?
Can the categories of generic,
interface causation and
accumulation be used to identify
hazards?
Can the current method for identification of
generic risk identify new and emerging
hazards?
Are interface I risks identified?
Are interface II risks identified?
Are causation risks identified?
Are accumulation risks identified?
Is it possible to develop and
evaluate a model for the
identification and documentation of
cross discipline hazards?
What are the attributes of identification?
Is compliance with ISO31000? required,
Does the method need to be corporate
governance compliant?
What are the preferred methods of
documenting risks?
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4.6.2 Selection of expert interviewees
The requirements for participation in the expert interviews were that individuals
recognised as experts in a specific generic risk areas well as CCS. A summary
of the credentials of the specific generic risks which included: legal, insurance,
environmental, and health and safety are presented in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3 Credentials of generic expert who participated in data collection





























1 COMAH= Control of major accidents hazards http://www.hse.gov.uk/comah/index.htm
2 MAH= Major accident hazards
4.6.3 Data collection
Interview results were documented by recording the expert interviews and
writing the responses to the structured interviews in the questionnaire which
was sent to the expert prior to the interview. Recording as well as documenting
of the questionnaire was carried out to ensure that if the technology did not
work the data was captured in a written format. Where it was not possible to
conduct an interview, the questionnaire was supplied to the expert electronically
with the same guidelines; and requirements of the ethics committee which were
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applied to the interviews. Responses to the interview questions were
transposed on to a matrix which captured themes, quotes and frequency of
occurrence. The matrix was compiled in MicrosoftTM Excel (Version 7, 2010),
and stored there (full details are in Appendix C2).
The interviews and questionnaires were structured and analysed initially by
separating the CCS questions and the non CCS questions. The non CCS part
of the questionnaire was structured with questions clustered in the following
sections: A. identification of risk; B. assessment of risk; C. documenting of risk,
and D. risk management.
The completion of matrices for all generic interviews resulted in common
themes being identified relating to the sections of the interview as well as expert
specific data which corresponds to the sections: identification, assessment,
documentation and management of risk.
Figure 4-3 Section A - Risk identification with themes role and sub themes;
generic and other which relate to the expert questions
The themes and sub themes for risk identification are shown in Figure 4-3. The
resulting output was summarised in tables for each sub theme and comparisons








C3). A summary of the research methodology for the expert elicitation is
provided in Figure 4-4.
Figure 4-4 Stages of data analysis for expert elicitations
The individual expert interview results were synthesised across the generic
risks and the resulting data used to structure the web survey for a wider
population.
4.7 Web survey
A survey was used as a tool to collect data from the wider risk community, as it
is a tool that can be carried out using many different media such as: telephone,
email, mail and web. The objective of this survey was to respond to the lack of
data on the methods used to identify hazards and risks by risk professionals. A
web survey was the preferred mode of data collection due to speed of
administration and the ability to access a wider population.
The software used to produce the survey was a Cranfield University web form
application developed to be accessed via a web browser.
https://webapps2.cranfield.ac.uk/webforms/admin/. The results were transferred
automatically and stored on Microsoft TM Excel spread sheets.
•Expert questionnaire provide to expert
•Completed expert questionaire
•Generic expert matrix
•Consolidated Expert responses by analysis by section
•Analysis by theme
•Analysis by sub theme
•Results of consolidated expert elicitation
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The survey was delivered by inclusion of a URL within a covering letter which
included the code of ethics, details of data protection, and informed consent
instructions for completion, purpose of the survey and contact details. This
method of data collection enabled instantaneous collection of results and
presentation in a Microsoft Excel spread sheet allowing for the efficient
application of quantitative analysis with minimal potential for error which could
result from manual data input and transposition of data.
The survey was collected during the period May 2011 to August 2011. To
improve the responses, email reminders were sent out after 3 weeks. A copy of
the web survey is included in Appendix D1.
4.7.1 Design of questionnaire
The survey consisted of 22 questions structured in five sections:
A. Carbon Capture and Storage specific identification of risk
B. Identification of risk
C. Assessment of risk
D. Documentation of risk
E. Risk management frameworks
The survey questions are a mixture of open and closed questions. Section A
(carbon capture and storage) included the use of continuous scales and the
remainder of sections B to E included a mixture of continuous and categorical
scales, e.g. Yes or No and ranking responses in respect of significance and
importance. A pilot study was sent out to 3 respondents to test the efficiency of
the questionnaire construction. Feedback from the pilot study was used to
improve the format and structure of the questions. Table 4.4 shows the
alignment of research questions to the area of focus and web survey item.
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Table 4.4 Relationship of research questions to focus of inquiry in the web
survey
Research question Focus of inquiry
Are the current risk management




How does identification take place?
How are risks documented?
Can the categories of generic, interface







Is it possible to develop and evaluate a
model for the identification and
documentation of previously unidentified
hazards and risks?
What are the attributes of identification?
Compliance with ISO31000,
Corporate governance,
Preferred methods of documenting risks
The web survey provided access to risk professionals who may not have time to
participate in an interview or workshop. It also provides anonymity and a vehicle
to collect information which participants may not wish to disclose publicly, due
to contractual reasons, the sensitivity of risk to corporate operations or for
reputational impact.
Limitations of the web survey include the fact that reliance on a third party to
send out the surveys meant that surveys were delayed in their inclusion on third
party websites and newsletters. Once sent out there was no way of knowing
who completed the survey. When placing a survey on a web page there is a
presumption that the footfall for the website will encourage completion, but this
may not be the case.
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4.7.2 Selection of participants
The selection of participants to the web survey were risk professionals whose
expertise was either in a specific generic risk or CCS risk professional obtained
from the UK Carbon Capture and Storage Community (UKCCSc) network,
Enterprise Risk Management Association Linkedin network (ERMA) and the
Institute of Risk Management (IRM) (see Table 4.5). The sample was structured
to maximise the responses from managers in a highly sensitive area.
Table 4.5 Potential populations provided with access to the web survey
Potential respondent population
Number invited to participate in web
survey
Institute of Risk Managers (IRM)
Placed on the IRM electronic newsletter
potential audience according to IRM
knowledge manager in the region of 1,300
LinkedIn Enterprise Risk
Management Association (ERMA)
Placed on LinkedIn group which has an
approximate 31,000 members at the time of
the survey.
Risk management professionals 32
CCS risk professionals
United Kingdom Carbon Capture and Storage
Community network (1,000 members at the
time of the survey )
Number of people contacted




The analysis and synthesis of web survey results followed the same logic as the
flow diagram in Figure 4-3.
Data were analysed using quantitative and qualitative methods to establish
trends, gaps in knowledge, highlight benefits and value as well as anomalies.
The web survey data was collected electronically via a web form and
transferred to a spread sheet. The spread sheet was reviewed and checked to
ensure data was transferred without error. Hard copies of the individual sheets
were printed off as a precaution against damage or loss. The structure of the
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web survey had four sections and analysis took place by analysing these
clusters of questions.
Two statistical tests, Chi-squared test and analysis of variance (ANOVA) were
applied to specific types of data collected from the web survey. Questions
where categorical data were collected were subject to analysis by a mix of
qualitative analysis and Chi-squared test. Results were analysed in the cluster
of the four sectors and conclusions from identified themes used to develop the
method for hazard identification. Figure 4-5 provides a summary of the steps
taken in the data capture and analysis of the web survey results.
Figure 4-5 Summary of the production of web survey results
The results of the web survey and expert elicitation provided empirical evidence
to formulate the development of a method using case study research
methodology.
4.8 Case studies
The case study method of research was chosen as a tool best suited to respond
to the question: is it possible to develop and evaluate a model for the
identification and documentation of previously unidentified hazards and risks? In
response to this question the third objective was to develop and evaluate a
model for the identification and documentation of multidimensional attributes of
• Web survey distributed to risk professionals
• Completed web survey results exported to Excel
• Initial analysis of each question by questionnaire section
• Application of the statistical tools where appropriate ; Anova and Chi square
• Analysis of cross dimension relationships
• Identification of attribute for novel method for hazrd identification
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hazards was set. Academic justification for using case study research
methodology for this part of the research is to respond to the question: how will
the proposed method for hazard identification be applied to the real life context?
Table 4.6 Research options available to respond to the research question: how












Experiment How, why YES YES
Case study How, why NO YES











(Adapted from Creswell, 2008; Yin, 2009; Yin, 2011)
Three factors influence the decisions to use case study research methods as
opposed to other methods such as survey, interviews and observation (Yin,
2009). These are; firstly responding to how and or why questions; secondly, the
lack of researcher influence on the case study subject and environment; and
lastly a requirement to obtain data in a real life situation (see Table 4.6). These
three requirements are fulfilled by the data requirements to meet the third
research objective by establishing how the proposed method for hazard
identification will apply to the real life context.
The proposed use of the case study method will take a number of different
forms in this methodology. Firstly, it will be used to develop the novel method by
exploring its application in a pilot case study (exploratory). Secondly, it will be
used to test the methods ability to be applied to different situations which will
accommodate descriptive and explanatory attributes. This approach was
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chosen as it facilitates the demonstration of the risk register methodology within
the risk management framework of different industries.
4.8.1 Requirement for a pilot case study
A pilot case study was carried out to test the methodology for the
multidimensional identification and documentation of hazards. The pilot was
designed to aid the development of the method for each of the dimensions and
establish the feasibility of inclusion in a single document. It is also able to
highlight additional information requirements or redundancy in the methodology.
The attributes required for the pilot case study included the need to be an
evolving technology which comprised a chain of components. The data needed
to include a risk register for the entire lifecycle verifiable by a third party and
publically available. Additionally the results of the application of the novel
method need to be capable of verification by an informant involved in the
development of the initial risk register for the project. CCS fulfils these criteria
as it is an evolving value chain comprised of existing technology which will be
used to capture, and transport CO2 offshore. The UK Government, via DECC,
held a competition where details of the risk register for the entire value chain
and for all phases of the lifecycle were publically available and verified by the
corporate entities which were in charge of the different modules.
Background information to provide context to the pilot case study was obtained
from the output of a review of literature, interviews, web survey, and attendance
to knowledge transfer meetings and the provision of data in the Front End
Engineering and Design (FEED) report which was the result of the First UK
CCS demonstration competition.
4.8.2 Case study selection
This research project will follow multi-case design. The use of multiple case
studies with the application of the logic of method replication is to be used in
this research (Yin, 2008). A sampling logic was not appropriate as the objective
is to establish a method which is repeatable.
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With respect to the number of case studies required to validate the research
methodology three to four would seem appropriate (Flyvbjerg, 2006). The
proposed case study selections are highlighted in Table 4.7.





Publically available data is available with respect to a consortium
to the UK competition. This is an example of a project approach to




Closed landfills are an example of existing operations with known
and characterised risks. The proposed landfill does not have a risk
register so this will need to be developed and verified. This will test




The United Kingdom government has requested via the UK
Climate Change Act 2008 that Climate Change adaptation
reporting should be carried out every five years. This requires
business to identify the risks that result from climate change
adaptation. These are currently unidentified and evolving hazards
and there is no agreed protocol for hazard identification.
4.8.3 Evidence collection
A case study method of research does not preclude other methods of research;
indeed it should embrace other methods (Creswell, 2008). As a result multiple
sources of evidence are used to encourage triangulation. The sources of
evidence widely used in case studies include: documentation; archival records;
interviews; direct observations; participant observation and physical artefacts
(Yin, 2009). In this study physical artefacts and participant observation will not
be used as they are not applicable to the development of an applied
methodology.
Direct observation will take the form of a site visit where appropriate. Archival
records and documentation will be used and weaknesses with respect to
accessibility, retrievability and bias addressed by using publically available
information which is verified by an expert. Interviews will be used to verify the
different dimensions and supplement gaps in documents and archival records.
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This research method embeds an iterative process which is applied to each
case study. This iterative process needs to be flexible enough to facilitate
unexpected disclosures, which can then be tested, and, if appropriate, result in
amendments to the design of the novel method. The intertwining of method and
analysis are a distinct quality of a case study approach. These amendments
may also result in changes to the research design. To ensure that the rigour of
the research is maintained an audit trail of amendments is documented.
4.8.4 Data analysis and validation
The initial analysis of the case study involves reviewing and agreeing the
generic risk register. This base data will be used to identify the hazards for the
different dimensions. Once the generic risk register is agreed, this base data is
used to identify hazards resulting from the application of specific systematic
reviews for each of the dimensions. The identified hazards are documented in
their respective specific register format and the result is a compilation of
registers which document identified hazards for different dimensions for each of
the selected case studies.
The registers of identified hazards can be compared to the initial generic risk
register to ascertain if there are any additional viable hazards that were not
previously identified. Expert review and validation of the resulting register of
hazards were carried out to establish whether additional hazards, classified by
dimension, were identified and to confirm that the new identified hazards are
feasible.
On completion of the three case studies cross-case synthesis will be carried out
(Yin, 2008) The objective of this type of synthesis being applied to the
development of a novel method for hazard identification will be to establish any
common problems that occur across all the case studies and identify
enhancements that need to be made to improve the method.
4.8.5 Building robustness in case studies
The case study element of this methodology is significant and it underpins the
development of the methodology for the identification and documentation of
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hazards. It is essential that conclusions drawn from them are valid and reliable.
Fyvbjerg (2006) states that there is great value in the use of case studies;
however case study research has constraints and the resulting limitations
described in Table 4.8 need to be mitigated.
Table 4.8 Five misconceptions of case studies and proposed solutions to these







knowledge is not seen
as valuable as context
independent
knowledge.
Context is more important than
predictive theories
Context will be taken
into account as part
of this study
One case study




Generalisations based on a single
case study are acceptable if that
case study is seen as” an
example”. This results from the
fact that value in the specific case
study may be central to scientific
development.
In addition to the pilot
case study two case
studies will be used
Case studies should





With respect to this limitation the
proposed case selection strategy
to minimise this is to adopt
information orientated selection
where selection is based on the
data content.
This limitation can be
addressed by an
iterative systematic
review of data and
replication logic in
multiple case studies.




It was not verification that was the
problem but falsification of
preconceived ideas.
Accommodate review
from key experts for
each case study.




The fifth limitation can be
addressed by improving the
narrative of the case study which




The most important factors to be taken into account in case study development
are the reliability and validity of the findings of a case study. This is achieved
through triangulation of the data, analysis and results. This is accommodated by
multiple applications of the case study protocol to a number of the case studies.
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In addition to mitigating the misconceptions and limitations of case studies it is
necessary to ensure that the results are valid and reliable.
4.9 Validity of evidence
4.9.1 Validity and triangulation
This section is concerned with the validity of the entire research project. The
research incorporates four of Maxwell's (2009) seven strategies for reducing
threats to validity in qualitative research which include: triangulation;
comparison; statistics; and respondent validation. There are four tests for
validity which apply to all social science research and these include: construct
validity; internal validity; external validity, and reliability (Yin, 2008).
4.9.2 Internal and external threats to validity
Internal threats to validity can be allayed during the data analysis stage by
using: pattern matching, explanation building, addressing rival explanations,
and the use of logic models (Yin, 2008). The application of replication logic in
multiple case studies at the research design stage is an accepted approach to
the achievement of external validity (Flyvbjerg, 2006; Yin, 2008).
Construct validity is concerned with ensuring the appropriate measures are
taken in data collection. This is achieved by using several sources of evidence
and establishing a chain of evidence. This includes using additional experts to
validate data collection at different stages, for example structured
questionnaires, confirmation of consent and copy of completed interview either
in hard copy or electronically. A summary of the steps taken to achieve validity
in this research are outlined in Table 4.9.
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Table 4.9. Application of the four tests of case study reliability and validity to this











The original base data is the result of




Data used was subject to audit prior to




The data collection results will be
subject to audit by key participants of
the specific case study. Where this is
not possible review will be carried out
with an academic expert.
Internal validity
 Patten matching
In this research this applies to the
identification of the different dimensions
using the same methodology.
 Explanation
building Not applicable to this research project.
 Resolve rival
explanations
These will be addressed during the
application of the method to the
different case study data.
 Apply logic
model













Multiple case studies with different
levels of data and for different
objectives will be used to test the






The case study protocol will be applied
within the application of the method
development and presented with the




Not applicable in this research project.
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With respect to the case studies, expert validation takes place by experts at
each stage of the case study development and this formalised in the case study
protocol. The validation of the initial data, interpretation of the data and the
method was sought by experts. Reliability is sought by developing a case study
repository and audit trail to ensure reproducibility.
4.9.3 Triangulation
Triangulation is a research technique used to support validation of information
by verification from more than two origins of data (Yin, 1999; Johnson et al.,
2007). Triangulation of information can act as an early warning system to
analytical errors and omissions (Kaplan and Duchon, 1988; Johnson et al.,
2007). There are four variations of triangulation: data, investigator, theory and
methodological (Denzin, 1978; Barbour, 2001; Johnson et al., 2007). This
research incorporates triangulation as a means of validation of data collection
and verification of analysis. The use of four modes of data collection, the
integration of qualitative and quantitative data in the initial data collection and
the use of multiple sources in the compilation of the case studies attempt to
increase the validity and reliability of the data quality and the resulting research.
Limitations of triangulation highlighted by Barbour (2001) include that efficient
triangulation is not easy to expedite as the different methods of inquiry do not
always facilitate direct comparison, collaboration of consensus may be the
result of research bias rather than objective research.
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4.10 Summary of strategies selected for research
The methodology to identify and investigate (using case studies) why robust
and encompassing hazard identification does not occur, particularly in areas
where multiple fields overlap and to design a framework that will address these
deficiencies is based on a mixed research design. The research strategy is
composed of four components: literature reviews, expert interviews, survey and
case study as presented in Figure 4-6.
Figure 4-6 Summary of the research methodology for the development of a
method for the multidimensional identification of hazards
The questionnaires and web survey were structured to provide empirical data
for each dimension and for the sections of risk identification, documentation,














Figure 4-7 Diagrammatic representation of the headline themes for data
collection from expert questionnaires and the web survey
The themes developed from the consolidated results of the expert
questionnaires and web survey will provide an outline for the development of a
method of multi-discipline hazard identification. The integration of these themes
into the research strategy facilitates an iterative process of data collection and
result in the formulation of a method of hazard identification which is tested for
















This chapter presents the initial results from expert elicitations captured via risk
specific questionnaires and a web survey distributed to the wider professional
risk population. Both methods of data collection were structured to obtain data
on CCS risks and generic risk (non-CCS risks). CCS was used as an example
of a new technology with a number of unknown hazards. The results of the CCS
data collected will be presented in Chapter 6 where information on CCS is used
to develop the novel method for hazard identification. This will take into account
the results of the data captured on generic risks from expert elicitations and the
web survey.
This chapter provides responses from four experts from the genetic disciplines
of the environment, insurance, legal, health and safety. The web survey was
structured by building on the findings of the expert elicitations and the themes of
risk identification, risk assessment, documentation and risk management
frameworks.
5.1.2 The mix of qualitative and quantitative results
The mixed methods research included expert data collated into sections
themes, sub themes and quotes used. The data from the web survey was
subject to both qualitative and quantitative analysis of the different responses to
the various types of questions within the themes from the expert interviews (see
Section 5.2). Quantitative analysis included examining frequency, and where
applicable, statistical tests such as Chi-squared and ANOVA were used to
establish the significance and validity of the data collected (see Section 4.7.3).
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5.1.3 Main Themes
The main themes for both the expert interviews and web survey were: risk
identification; risk assessment; the documentation of risk; and risk management
frameworks (see Section 4.6 and Figure 4-7).These themes were identified from
the literature review (see Sections 2.3 and 2.4) as factors affected by the
identification of hazards. The introduction of the dimensions of interface,
causation and accumulation (defined in Section 3.3) are tested in the expert
questionnaires and the web survey to establish whether and how these
dimensions are identified.
5.2 Results from expert elicitations
5.2.1 Initial data collection
A copy of the consolidated response of the individual matrices for each expert is
provided in Appendix C3. The consolidated responses of the four experts were
tabulated as a result of an iterative process into themes and sub themes. The
resulting themes and sub themes are presented in Table 5.1. The sections,
themes and sub themes were developed from the initial analysis of data capture
from the interviews and questionnaires.
Table 5.1 The sections, themes and sub themes developed from the initial
analysis of data capture from the interviews and questionnaires
Sections Themes Sub themes
Risk identification Roles  Generic
 Other













Risk assessment Methods  General
 Existing
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 Third party damage
 Regulatory
 Contractual





 Environmental risk register







 Legal instruments for liability reduction
 Other considerations for risk mitigation





 No sub theme
Current frameworks  Adequacy
 Improvements
Risk evaluation  Corporate
 Operational concerns
 No sub theme applicable
Risk mitigation  No sub theme applicable
Importance  Legal liabilities
 Corporate
 Internal corporate
 No sub theme applicable
Improvement  Development of Risk Management
Framework
The analysis of consolidated data found themes evidenced by the frequency of
their occurrence. Table 5.2 provides an illustration of the matrix used to
populate the data from the interviews and questionnaires. It also provides
comments and frequency of themes and sub themes. The responses in Table
5.2 relate to the question “Who in your experience identifies your generic risk?”
This question requires respondents to choose from a selection of roles; the
responses can be found in the comments and examples section of the table.
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Table 5.2 Tabulation of responses from experts across the generic disciplines for
the roles that they perceive as identifying generic risk










Environmental Riskidentification Roles Generic 1
Generic risk
specialist
Legal Riskidentification Roles Generic 1 Lawyer
Insurer Riskidentification Roles Generic 1
Generic risk
specialist
Analysis of expert responses presented in the grids was possible across the
generic disciplines as well for the sections, themes and sub themes.
Conclusions were drawn from the comments and frequency and are presented
in the following section.
5.2.2 Identification of generic risks
The expert elicitation results found that, for all respondents, generic risks were
identified by the generic risk specialist. Table 5.3 shows the additional roles
where risk was identified.








Major hazard regulator 1
Joint competent authority 1
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Methods and tools used to identify risk
When asked how generic risks were identified, the approaches were very
different. The legal expert identified risks by way of:
“application of law to facts”
and stated that identification was an iterative process in line with the definitions
of legal risk given by Maher (2007) and McCormick (2011); (see Section
2.4.4).The environmental expert identified risk from two perspectives: firstly, a
project management approach was taken towards the identification of new risks
and secondly, existing risks were identified through permitting procedures,
inspections and compliance. The environmental expert stated that risk was also
identified through research and changes in legislation being integrated in project
management and compliance.
Identification of risks in new technology
The results with respect to the identification of hazards and risks in new
technologies show that there were very different approaches from each of the
experts. The health and safety expert stated:
“For new technologies hazard identification and risk assessment would
be farmed out to consultants. Consultants may lack expertise”.
Whereas the environmental expert stated that although there was no specific
process for identifying new and emerging environmental risks:
”There is a project management approach which focuses on the
identification of risk”
The insurance expert commented that insurers have a bespoke method of
identification but did not provide details. The legal expert confirmed that;
“Legal advisors look at those risks which they are directed to look at by
the client”.
The difference between new risks and existing risks for the legal expert being
that with new risks, professionals:
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“…… don’t have facts but potential facts”
The health and safety expert stated that where bespoke risk identification was
applied to new technologies the approach was:
“1. systematically identifying the key stages … and 2. Identifying the
major hazard analogues from existing industries”
Table 5.4 Specific processes for the identification of new and emerging risk
Generic expert Example comments
Health and safety
Aware of specific process for new and emerging health and
safety risks
Environmental
No specific process for identifying new and emerging
environmental risks.
Insurer Yes
The responses from the four experts (Table 5.4) shows that there is no
consensus in the methods used to identify hazards for new technology and no
specific process for the identification of new and emerging risks.
5.2.3 Identification of dimensions
The health and safety, environmental and insurer experts all stated that they
identify the dimensions of interface, causation and accumulation (Table 5.5).
Table 5.5 Experts response to the question do they identify the dimensions of
interface causation and accumulation
Expert Interface Causation Accumulation
Health and
safety Yes Yes Yes
Environmental
Yes Yes Yes
Identified at a high level as part of the environmental risk
identification process
Legal






Insurer Yes Yes Yes
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The legal expert could only confirm explicitly that causation risks were identified
because “Causation is a legal concept” (see Section.3.4.3). The legal expert
also confirmed:
There was…no specific framework. It is identified by application of law and
facts” and stated that interface risks are not identified by the legal profession
because:
“A business or technical issue has to be highlighted first prior to legal risk
identification.”
The reactive stance of legal risk identification is evidenced by the comment
made by the legal expert with respect to the identification of accumulation risk:
“Business provide facts and lawyers respond with legal risk assessment”
The legal profession would as a result of responses from the legal expert take a
reactive approach to the identification of the dimensions of interface, causation
and accumulation.
5.2.4 Methods used to identify the dimensions of interface,
causation and accumulation risk
Interface risk
The analysis of comments made by experts did not identify a common method
or approach to the identification of interface risk. The health and safety expert
provided details of the approach taken for major hazards stating:
“….. Identification of all foreseeable scenarios then evaluation of likelihood and
consequence at the interface (domino effect – well understood) to produce risk.
This comment is a little confusing, as although commenting on impacts at the
interface of a process, the expert seems to be describing causation as the
expert uses the “domino effect” to characterise the risk behaviour of interface
risk.
The environmental expert simply stated environmental risk assessment would
be used and;
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“The regulator would assess whether the tools to deal with the risk was
available at the stage of permitting”.
This clearly intimates that experts use a number of existing methods to identify
this dimension.
Table 5.6 Analysis of results from experts when asked to confirm the















Insurer  X X
Legal X X X
Whilst three out of four experts stated that they identified interface risk, only two
(the environmental and health and safety experts) provided details of the
method which they used. The health and safety expert focused on the physical
interfaces of the process and the environmental expert focused on fulfilling the
assessment of risk for permitting. The four experts were not able to provide
details of a specific method for the identification of interface risk as presented in
Table 5.6. This suggests that there may not be a specific or generally accepted
method for the identification of interface risk within these disciplines. It may be
that as these are generic experts their respective disciplines are focused on the
identification of generic risks and not interface risks or cross-disciplinary
hazards.
Causation dimension
The causation dimension (defined in Section 3.4.3) was the only dimension
which was identified by all experts. There was however no consensus in respect
of the methods used to identify causation. Each discipline had their own distinct
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approach and most did not have a specific framework. The environmental
expert stated that the methods used would be applied on a:
“Site by site basis”.
Insurers stated that they used a selection of tools which can be categorised as
quantitative or qualitative and outlined in Table 5.7.





 Age of infrastructure
 Integrity of infrastructure
 Proximity and sensitivity to
receptors
 Experience of technological usage
The quantitative tools listed in Table 5.7 do not identify a risk. They quantify an
already identified risk either by the number of times a risk occurs (frequency) or
magnitude of a risk (severity). A risk must be identified prior to quantification.
The qualitative tools which were identified by the insurer in Table 5.7 are all
factors which contribute to the characterisation of a hazard or risk. What is
lacking is a specific method which brings the identified attributes together to
establish the trigger for a causation hazard and thus the resulting
characterisation of a causation risk.
Although all of the experts stated that they identified causation and stated
methods which they used to identify these risks they did not provide a specific
method of identification for causation risks.
Accumulation dimension
The accumulation dimension was not identified by the legal expert, but was
identified by the environmental, health and safety and insurance experts (Table
5.8).
The health and safety expert stated that in respect of the methods used for the
identification of the accumulation dimension there were a:
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“number of systems available, now all digitalised which integrate and iterate
risks of complex hazard interactions causing escalation of an initiating event
into a major (off-site) incident”.
The environmental expert did not state the method used to identify
accumulation risks but stated the approach taken which was to identify
accumulation risk by looking at the accident potential at the permitting stage on
a site by site basis.
The insurance expert stated that there were two approaches to the identification
of accumulation risk: firstly, identification on;
“a risk by risk basis”
and secondly, within the internal corporate group. The insurer stated that the
methods applied tended to focus on:
“modelling and financial analysis”.
The common theme is that both the insurers and environmental experts were
explicit in disclosing that accumulation risk was identified on a risk by risk/ site
by site basis. All the factors provided by all the experts are considerations or
one of a number of tools, none of the experts provided a specific method for the
identification of accumulation risk.
Table 5.8 Summary table showing those generic experts who classified the
dimension of accumulation, stated that they had a method for identification and
whether that method was a specific method for the identification of accumulation
Generic
expert
Dimension identified Method Specific method
Environmental   X
Health and safety   X
Insurer  X X
Legal X X X
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The dimensions of interface, causation and accumulation risk are not
universally identified by all generic experts but different generic risks had
comprehensive methods of identification for their specific risk (Table 5.8) The
data collected from the four experts did not result in a uniform level of risk
identification across the generic risks for all the dimensions (Table 5.9).
From the results of the expert elicitation it can be seen that there were no
specific methods for the identification of the dimensions of interface, causation
and accumulation. There was no auditable approach to establishing that the
results of the existing identification process were the most comprehensive
across the generic risks. None of the experts stated that a multidisciplinary
approach was taken for any dimension by any generic expert. The current
approach to identification of risk would seem to be focused within the generic
risk silos. Further clarification is required to establish if the conclusions drawn
from the experts also apply to the wider risk community.
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Table 5.9 Summary of comments regarding the identification of the interface,
causation and accumulation dimensions of risk
Dimension Legal Environmental Health and safety Insurance
Interface





first prior to legal
risk identification.
Are not identified by
the legal profession.
They are identified
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major (off-site) incident.
However it is necessary
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5.2.5 Documentation of risk
The documentation of identified risk is an important means of evidencing the
identification of risks. Documentation provides details of the characteristics of
the risk and facilitates its assessment and mitigation. It is vital for auditing the
management of a risk. The identification of a hazard and its characterisation is
essential to the documentation of risk.
When asked if a risk register was used to document risks all experts with the
exception of the legal expert stated” Yes” (see Table 5.10).
Table 5.10 The use of risk registers in the generic occupations of the experts
Generic expert Example comments
Health and safety YesRequired for any major accident regime
Environmental YesEnvironmental risks are included in a risk register
Legal
Legal risks are not included in a risk register.
They may only be included if asked by the client.
Insurer
Yes
Circulated by transfer to underwriters through the issuance of
new underwriting guidelines
Additional comments from the legal expert provided evidence of the legal
approach to the documentation of risk:
"Identified legal risks are reported by giving advice on the facts, law and
application of the facts and recommendations based on the facts”.
Additionally legal risks were not documented in a register but in reports such as
due diligence reports. The legal expert confirmed that:
“Due diligence reports involve going through a significant list of facts and
assessing the advice accordingly.”
This seems to indicate a reactive approach to risk identification which is guided
by legal facts which may or may not include a cross-disciplinary approach.
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The environmental expert stated that risks were documented in three ways:
“…Project risk register in the project management structure,...during the
permitting stage by a system of decision documents for justification of
decisions and,“…for compliance by the use of inspection and monitoring
reports”.
The environmental expert confirmed that projects examining new and emerging
risks would use a:
“formalised risk register system”
The insurer identifies risk on two levels the clients risk portfolio and the
insurance company basis. At the client level:
…“risks were identified by the broker and presented to the insurer on a silo
basis” [for a specific project].
In respect of the insurer’s corporate operations, the method of identification was
disclosed but not the means of documentation. This industry sector is regulated
and so the modelling and financial analysis would have to be provided by the
finance and compliance department in the form of returns to the Financial
Conduct Authority (FCA) usually by class of insurance. The class of insurance
tends to follow the generic risk classifications, for example environmental risk -
environmental impairment liability, property risks – property insurance, marine
risks- marine insurance.
In summary, data captured was specific to the generic risk and the purpose of
capturing the data. There are a number of media used to document risks. Three
of the four experts (environmental, health and safety and insurance) used a risk
register for documenting risk.
5.2.6 Risk assessment frameworks
Experts were asked to state their approach to generic risk assessment. The
legal expert stated that the legal risk assessment followed:
“the business process.. and...the application of existing generic risk
assessment frameworks”.
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This underpins the importance of accurate and comprehensive risk identification
within and across the generic risk assessment frameworks. If the risk is not
identified by the generic risk assessment framework it is unlikely to be identified
by the legal expert; as they are only concerned with the facts presented to
them. As a result the implications of the risk and any potential hazard will
remain unknown.
The health and safety expert stated that a number of different tools and
methods are used to assess risk. These tools which are presented in Table 5.11
can be divided into modelling and other tools and are evaluated in Section 2.5.








 Failure mode and effect
analysis
 Fault tree analysis
 Dangerous dose estimation
 Major accident scenario
The insurance expert also used a number of tools and methods in their risk
assessment process. The integrated approach used by the environmental
insurer to assess risks is summarised in Table 5.12.










Environmental damage   -
Third party damage   -
Regulatory   -
Contractual issues - - 
This approach comprises environmental data incorporated in underwriting
models and guidelines, engineering and legal risk data which are used to
assess a risk for insurability and its potential to have a negative impact on the
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insurer’s capital. This method takes data from three different assessments in
respect of the four risk types. It does not look at the risks of the engineering
assessment and legal assessment as potentially triggering a line of causation
beyond the identified generic environmental risks.
Table 5.13 shows that the methods used were general methods which were
specific to the generic risk but not tailored to the identification of interface,
causation and accumulation. Experts were given the opportunity to suggest
other methods and tools, however only the health and safety expert suggested
an alternative method “frequency analysis”. The legal expert stated that they did
not use any methods or tools for the identification of the dimensions, and the
insurer did not use any tools for the interface dimension.
Table 5.13 The different methods and tools used to identify the dimensions of
































































Health and safety   
Insurer 
Legal 
Total 6 3 3 2 1 1 4
The environmental expert did not provide a method for accumulation risk and
the insurer provided no details for the interface dimension. The insurer used
best guess in addition to the application of existing generic risk assessment
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frameworks and the health and safety expert used a selection of different
methods for each of the dimensions.
When asked to specify the methods used for the identification of the dimensions
of interface, causation and accumulation risk, there was some consensus
between experts. The environmental, insurance, health and safety experts all
used their existing generic risk assessment frameworks. This is illustrated in
Figure 5-1 where the application of existing generic risk assessment was the
most frequently quoted method for all dimensions.
Figure 5-1 The frequency of methods and tools to identify risks in the
dimensions of interface, causation and accumulation
In summary, there was no consensus on the methods used to identify the
dimensions of interface, causation and accumulation. As a result the following
methods should be included in the web survey to establish if there is any
consensus from the wider population of risk professionals:-
 Application of existing generic risk assessment frameworks
























5.2.7 Requirements for risk management
5.2.7.1 Attributes of risk management
Experts were asked to comment on the attributes of generic risk management
frameworks. The insurance expert was unable to provide details of the risk
management framework and the legal expert stated that the development of a
risk management framework:
“is an evolving situation. Risk management is important for the management of
legal liabilities especially if these can be transferred”.
The environmental expert provided a list of tools and procedures that were used
to aid environmental risk management which included:
“Geographic information systems (GIS), computer modelling, process and
environmental monitoring, quality of rivers and stack emissions”.
The health and safety expert gave an overview of the quality of risk
management in organisations:
“In best major hazard industries there are integrated safety and environment
management programmes supported by quality management systems (HSG65)
and independent verification schemes… In worst companies, statutory minimum
is practised and systems are degraded and not up to date.
Many major hazard companies in the UK will be subject to COMAH [Control of
Major accident hazards] or nuclear safety regulation, so safety frameworks are
statutory and systematic. “
5.2.7.2 Compliance with ISO31000
With respect to ISO31000 compliance, only the health and safety expert
provided any comment stating, that health and safety risk management was not
structured to be compliant with ISO31000 guidelines. Both the environmental
and insurance expert thought that risk management was important, in the case
of the environmental expert the level of importance is illustrated by the fact that:
“the first condition of a permit is that the operator understands the risk”
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The insurance expert took a similar position stating that it is important that the
strategy for risk management should be evidenced throughout the organisation
requesting insurance.
5.2.7.3 Embedding risk management in an organisation
The insurer confirmed that risk management is embedded in their organisation.
The health and safety expert gave an interesting insight into the acceptance of
risk management and the corporate culture of different organisations when it
came to embedded risk management stating:
“Most major hazards industries – chemicals, oil and gas, nuclear, public
transport identify health and safety risks as a key reputational and financial risk,
particularly large and global businesses whose success depends on licensing
by public authorities and even governments, and whose operations are
scrutinised by NGO's, or where public aversion to major accidents is a risk (e.g.
nuclear, and offshore oil)”.
The legal expert indicates that legal experts do not actively promote proactive
risk management beyond the confines of the generic legal silo. The health and
safety expert suggested that experts in this area take the most proactive
approach to risk management. The health and safety expert talked about the
incorporation of aspects of technical and environmental risk; and would be the
most advanced in respect of operating across the disciplines and looking to
facilitate the dimensions of interface, causation and accumulation. Further
investigation was required from a larger population of risk professionals to
identify key attributes that a method for hazard identification should possess to




5.3.1 Structure of analysis
The web survey had a similar structure to the expert elicitation with the following
sections:
Section A CCS - the results from this section is provided in Chapter 6.
Section B Identification of risk
Section C Assessment of risk
Section D Documentation of risk
Section E Risk management frameworks
5.3.2 Analysis of data
The objective of collecting data from risk professionals via a web survey was to
establish how the identification of risk was performed and evidenced. The focus
on risk was that these professionals would identify hazards which would be
characterised both qualitatively and quantitatively facilitating risk analysis,
assessment and management. The data was analysed using similar themes as
the expert interviews. The analytical techniques applied were those stated in
Section 4.7.3. The survey was sent out to three formal professional groups who
had a cumulative membership of approximately 33,332 and the number of
responses received was 27.
5.3.3 Risk identification
In Section 5.1 experts had identified a number of occupational roles where risk
was identified (Table 5.1). This section of the web survey builds on the
responses given by the experts and asks a wider population of risk
professionals to state who identifies the risk dimensions of generic, Interface I ,
Interface II , causation and accumulation risk. The results of their responses are
captured in Table 5.14.
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Table 5.14 Roles which are perceived to identify the dimensions of generic,
interface, causation and accumulation risk
Roles where risk is











Generic risk specialists 8 5 4 3 0
Risk manager 15 12 11 13 9
Departmental manager 12 8 8 12 5
Finance department 8 5 4 5 5
Project manager 10 7 7 7 7
Risk committee 11 7 9 9 8
Business continuity
professional 4 3 7 2 4
Board of directors 6 3 2 3 0
Insurance professional 7 3 2 2 3
Not part of the
identification process 1 4 3 1 4
other 0 3 3 3 0
The results confirm that a risk manager has the highest frequency of
respondents for each dimension of risk, followed by a departmental manager
and risk committee. There was little difference between the roles which were
considered to identify causation, interface I and II. Although interface and
causation risks are identified by the generic risk specialists, the accumulation
dimension was not identified by the generic risk specialist. The most widely
identified dimension was generic risk and the least identified by the portfolio of
occupational roles was accumulation risk this is in line with the findings of the
expert questionnaires (see Section 5.2.4 and Table 5.8.)
Roles which are perceived by respondents as identifying risk across the
dimensions of generic, interface, causation and accumulation are the risk
manager, department manager, risk committee and project manager. The board
of directors were perceived as focusing on generic risk and less on the other
dimensions. A Chi-squared test confirmed that there was not a statistically
significant relationship between the occupational roles and the identification of
the dimensions generic, interface, causation and accumulation risk (p<0.05).
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However it is not clear whether it is the methods, tools, procedures or
dimensions used to identify hazards that need adopting or the fact that there is
no means of identifying all the dimensions.
5.3.4 The identification of new risks
When asked whether new and emerging risks were identified by respondents
18 out of 24 stated that they identified new and emerging risks. Five stated that
did not, and 1 respondent used a bespoke method of identification.
When asked to state their level of confidence 77% of respondents had a
positive level of confidence in the methods used by their organisation to identify
new or unknown risks, the impact of this is illustrated in Figure 5-2.
Figure 5-2 The number of respondents and level of confidence in the
identification of new or unknown risks
No respondents had 100% confidence in the current methods which illustrated
that there was room for an improved method of identification. Respondents
were asked to provide details of the methods they used to identify new and
unknown risks. Of the 24 respondents, 6 did not respond to this question. Their
responses are provided in Table 5.15 and show that there is a wide selection of




























Table 5.15 methods used by respondents to identify new and unknown risks
No Response
1 Systematic questionnaire to some 50 people
2 Business Model Risk Framework (BRMF)
3 Board regular review of risk list
4 Did not comment
5 ERM Champions review their lists and global suggestions
6 Did not comment
7 Quarterly review of risk map within the business
8 Lawyers attend Continuing Legal Development training
9
Emerging risk are continuously assessed either via the departmental risk committees or
business imperatives that would have a transversal impact on the business e.g. global
warming; disaster response etc.
10 We run scenarios using reverse stress testing based on its broken - what broke it?
11 Scenario planning, Game theory and environmental scanning and brain storming
12 Quarterly Risk Certification
13 EU, DNV and company guidelines
14 Standing agenda item at all four of our meetings dealing with risk.
15 Facilitated structured workshops involving different teams
16 Part of the ESIA process
17 Iterative Risk Assessment and Risk Management exercises
18 Did not Comment
19 Aspects register - review of emerging science
20 Did not comment
21
Dedicated emerging risk identification sessions at different levels within the
organisation using generic risk categories and often external data as a prompt to
identify risks which could prevent us delivering against or influence future business
strategy
22 Did not comment
23 Did not comment
24 Risk Register & full risk review process
There was no consensus with respect to the methods that are used to identify
new and unknown risk by respondents. Respondents used a wide selection of
methods which included lists generated from ERM champions, who are
managers within the organisation who are tasked with the implementation of
ERM (Section 2.6.3). Other methods included questionnaires, inclusion as an
agenda item at board meetings, facilitated workshops, and inclusion in aspects
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register by review of emerging science. Two respondents provided details of
how their organisation identified emerging risks. The first stated:
“Dedicated emerging risk identification sessions at different levels within the
organisation using generic risk categories and often external data as a prompt
to identify risks which could prevent us delivering against or influence future
business strategy”
The second respondent stated:
“Emerging risk are continuously assessed either via the departmental risk
committees or business imperatives that would have a transversal impact on
the business e.g. global warming; disaster response etc.”
Out of the 24 respondents, 18 stated that it is part of a process or covered in
other operations and 6 did not comment. The large number of different methods
shows a willingness to identify risk and the use of a number of different tools.
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5.3.5 The identification of the dimensions interface, causation and
accumulation
Figure 5-3 Frequency of respondents who stated that they identified (A) interface
I, (B) II, (C) causation, (D) accumulation risks (n=24)
The respondent population for all dimensions was the same and so
standardisation adjustments were not required. When asked whether interface,
























risks were identified, 72 % stated that causation risk were identified and 63%
stated that accumulation risks were identified.
The number of negative responses (“No” or “Don’t know”) shows that 42% of
respondents were unable to confirm that they identified interface (I and II) risks
compared to 21% for causation and 33% for accumulation risks. This shows
that interface and accumulation risks are two dimensions of risk which are less
likely to be identified by the population who responded.
The majority of respondents (over 50%) shown in Figure 5-3 reported that the
dimensions of interface, causation and accumulation were identified. This would
mean that efforts were being made by the respondents to identify these
dimensions. The results also show that interface and accumulation are the two
dimensions of risk which are less likely to be identified by the respondents to
this web survey, and this was also the case with respect to the outcome of the
expert interviews (see Section 5.2.4). This could indicate that 1. the
respondents were not the individuals who would identify these dimensions of
risk as part of their remit; 2. it was difficult to identify these risks with the
available tools and methods; and /or 3. It was not felt necessary to identify
theses dimensions. Options 1 and 3 are unlikely to be the case and as a result
show that over 50% reported that these dimensions were identified. This seems
to indicate that it is the method of identification which is the issue.
5.3.6 Preferred methods for identification of the dimensions
The 24 respondents provided 22 different methods of identification for four
different dimensions. The results were categorised into four categories, formal,
qualitative, quantitative and bespoke methods. Some respondents gave more
than one answer for one dimension, indicating that a number of methods may
be used to identify a dimension.
140
Formal methods
Formal methods are well characterised and have an agreed structure. These
methods are also outlined in Section 2.5.
Table 5.16 Formal methods of identifying dimension
Formal methods Interface I Interface II Causation Accumulation Total
HAZOPs 0 0 1 0 1
HAZID 0 0 1 0 1
BRMF 1 1 1 0 3
COMA 0 0 1 0 1
Swiss Cheese 0 0 0 1 1
Bowtie 0 1 2 0 3
Features events
and processes 1 1 2 1 5
Failure mode and
effect analysis 0 0 1 0 1
Supply chain risk
assessment 0 1 0 0 1
Source pathway
receptor 0 0 1 0 1
Sub total 2 4 10 2 18
Qualitative methods
Qualitative methods are the result of a collaboration and capture of expert
elicitation, and scenario testing in workshops.
Table 5.17 Qualitative methods for identification of dimensions
Summary of
results Interface I Interface II Causation Accumulation Total
Risk register 1 1 0 0 2
Scenario 2 4 2 3 11
Brain storming 1 1 0 0 2
Risk workshops 2 2 3 1 8
Reviews (not
scenarios) 2 1 3 2 8
Expert judgement 1 1 0 1 3
Business process
mapping 1 1 2 0 4
Cross business risk
meeting 0 0 1 0 1
Sub total 10 11 11 7 39
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Quantitative techniques
Quantitative techniques are quantitative in approach and output.
Table 5.18 Quantitative techniques for the identification of dimensions
Quantitative
techniques Interface I Interface II Causation Accumulation Total
Multivariate analysis 0 0 0 1 1
Risk correlation 0 1 1 1 3
Quantitative
analysis 0 1 0 2
3
Total 0 2 1 4 7
The table shows that very few respondents used quantitative techniques for the
identification of dimensions with only two techniques being identified
multivariate analysis and risk correlation. No quantitative methods were
identified as being used for the identification of Interface I hazards.
Bespoke methods
Bespoke methods are those methods created and developed by the
respondent’s organisation.
Table 5.19 Bespoke methods for the identification of dimensions
Bespoke Interface I Interface II Causation Accumulation
Specific CCS risk
identification 0 1 0 1
The only bespoke methods were those developed for CCS risk identification.
This may be due to the fact that this was an emerging technology and an
untested new value chain which was subject to drivers such as: intense




Table 5.20 Analysis of non-responses
Type of non-response Interface I Interface II Causation Accumulation
Did not comment (DNC) 9 8 8 12
None 1 2 1 0
Subtotal of
non responses 10 11 9 13
Total responses 24 26 31 26
A large number of respondents to the survey did not respond to this specific
question. The highest number of non-respondents was 13 (50%) for
accumulation risk followed by 42% each for interface and causation. This would
seem to indicate that more than 40% of respondents did not state the method
used to identify the dimensions of interface, causation an accumulation. The
results show that there is no clear method used across all the dimensions and
the variable totals show that more than one method is used to identify a
dimension; this is especially true of the causation dimension. Alternatively the
results could be showing that the percentage of non-respondents could indicate
a lack of methods available to identify these dimensions or that these
dimensions are not identified.
5.3.7 Risk assessment
The survey also asked risk professionals about risk assessment frameworks to
capture data on the identification of hazards and risks where identification takes
place as part of the initial risk assessment (Aven, 2011).
Respondents were asked to state the risk assessment methods used to assess
generic risks. The results of the 24 respondents were collated in their generic
risks and a list of all the methods, concepts and frameworks used to assess
generic risks produced. Table 5.21 shows the thirty-nine different methods for
seven generic risks which included: economic, environmental, finance,
geological, legal and technical.
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Aspects register and legal register 1 1
Q Aspects register risk scoring 1 1
Q Audit and financial review 1 1
Bow tie analysis 1 1
BRMF 1 1 1 1 1 5
Common risk management 1 1 1 1 4
Common risk management process 1 1 1 3
Contract risk register 1 1
Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of
the Treadway Commission (COSO) related
own framework
1 1
Q Defined risk assessment + Hazard 1 1
Discursive review 1 1
Q Econometric expert evaluation 1 1
Q Engineering and technical standards 1 1
Enterprise Risk Management 1 1 1 1 1 1 6
Expert evaluation 1 1 2
Q Fault tree 1 1 1 1 4
Q Feature Events and Processes( FEP) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7
Q Financial modelling 1 1
General review 1 1
Hazard and effect management process
(HEMP1) 1 1 2
HSE, BRMF, COMAH 1 1 2
Q Impact description 1-5 scale 1 1 1 1 4
individual review 1 1 1 3
Q Insurance 1 1
ISO 31000 2 2 2 1 3 1 2 13
Legal 2 2
Legal analysis 1 1
Periodic review 1 1
Process and procedure review 1 1
Process reviews 1 1
Q Project risk register 1 1




















Projects -implementation of new legislation
review and prosecution cases
1 1
Q Quantitative evaluation of data 1 1
Regulatory requirement 1 1 2
Q Risk assessment semi quantitative 1 1
Q Severity / probability assessment group 1 1 2
Q Severity/probability 1 1 1 1 4
Source pathway receptor 1 1 2
Q TESLA 1 1
Total Number 12 14 13 8 15 15 12 89
Not applicable 4 0 3 9 2 2 3 23
No response 7 9 7 6 6 6 8 49
Overall total 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 161
3 Hazard and effects process management
The broad list of methods in Table 5.21 shows that generic risk practitioners did
not provide a consensus on the methods of risk assessment for generic risks.
The table shows that 11 out of the 39 methods were specific to a generic risk
such as “engineering and technical standard” for a technical risk or contract risk
review” for a legal risk. Apart from the method features, events and processes
(FEPs) which were applied across all generic risks, there was no convergence
of methods even in respect of regulated generic risks such as health and safety.
Those methods which were applied across most of the generic risks tended to
be frameworks such as ERM and general descriptors such as business risk
management framework (BRMF) and common risk management. These
methods were not specific in providing an agreed methodology. Respondents
who gave these responses applied them to all generic risks. Common concepts
and broad frameworks predominated as responses for example frameworks
such as ERM and ISO31000. Concepts included process reviews and
qualitative methods; general reviews and individual reviews. Of the 39 methods
16 were quantitative methods as highlighted in Table 5.21 by the letter Q in the
first column.
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Some respondents gave the same reply to each generic risk type this was the
case for the ERM, BRMF, common risk management and common risk
management processes. In some cases this may be appropriate; such as
ISO31000 which may be applicable to all risk types and is accepted as a whole
system risk management framework. However, there were no specific
guidelines or methods for the identification or assessment of the generic risks.
This shows that there is no consistent framework used for the assessment of
generic risk, either perceived or actual. It may not be appropriate to use the
same method of risk assessment for all disciplines; however the objective of this
question was to establish if there were common methods or tools used to
assess risks. If this was the case, this information would help to formulate the
proposed method for cross-disciplinary hazard identification. As there was not a
common method for risk assessment for the different disciplines it would seem
appropriate to develop a method which could identify hazards across the
disciplines this would require a new method rather than the use of an existing
method.
Table 5.22 Analysis of non-responses to the question; what generic risk









































applicable 1 3 3 9 2 2 3
DNC = Did not
comment 5 6 7 6 6 6 8
Total 6 9 10 15 8 8 11
% 26.09% 39.13% 43.48% 65.22% 34.78% 34.78% 47.83%
Table 5.22 shows that respondents failed to respond either because they did
not feel the question applicable or did not comment. The highest non-response
was for geological risk and this is likely to be due to the lack of geological risk
146
expertise from the majority of the respondents to the survey. The non-
responses are an indicator of the lack of expertise in risk assessment in areas
outside the specific generic risks. This shows that lack of cross-disciplinary
knowledge may contribute to silo focused identification and assessment of risk.
This may be a reason for the reliance on broad frameworks to act as umbrella
frameworks to consolidate the identification, assessment and management of
risks.
The results of this question show that although there are generally accepted
frameworks and concepts which are a mixture of quantitative and qualitative
method; no single method apart from FEP is used across the disciplines to
assess risk if identification occurs in the risk assessment process.
5.3.8 Risk assessment frameworks used to assess interface,
causation and accumulation risks
The methods used to assess the dimensions of interface, causation and
accumulation risk are collated and presented in Table 5.23.
Table 5.23 Comparison of risk assessment methods for the dimension of
interface, causation and accumulation
Observed Dimensions of risk
Method of assessment Interface Causation Accumulation Total
Project management risk
assessment framework 3 1 1 5
Best guess 5 4 2 11
Expert elicitation 6 5 7 18
Fault tree 1 2 1 4
Application of existing generic risk
assessment frameworks 4 8 7 19
operational process review 1 0 0 1
Other 1 0 1 2
The results are biased by the fact that the same number of respondents did not
respond to each dimension; even though they were given the same opportunity
to respond. The results were ranked according to the total frequency for the
individual dimensions. The results in Table 5.24 show that the preferred
methods of risk assessment are predominantly based on expert knowledge in
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the form of best guess or expert elicitation. Frameworks were also used; the
application of existing risk assessment frameworks was most widely used for
interface and causation risks, with project management risk assessment
framework being ranked equal with best guess for accumulation risk.
Table 5.24 Results of the ranking of methods of risk assessment for the
dimensions of interface, causation and accumulation risk
Ranking of interface risks
Method of assessment Frequency
Expert elicitation 6
Best guess 5
Application of existing generic risk assessment frameworks 4
Project management risk assessment framework 3
Fault tree 1
operational process review 1
Other 1
Ranking of risk assessment methods for causation risk




Project management risk assessment framework 1
operational process review 0
Other 0
Ranking for accumulation risk
Best guess 7
Project management risk assessment framework 7
Expert elicitation 2
Application of existing generic risk assessment frameworks 1
Fault tree 1
Other 1
operational process review 0
The top three ranked methods for risk assessment
The preferred methods for the risk assessment across for all dimensions of risk
were best guess and expert elicitation. There is a heavy reliance on experts and
their opinions and this confirms the fact that there is no clearly agreed method
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for the assessment of risk across disciplines. Given that identification of hazards
is part of the assessment of risk then there is no clear method identified.
5.3.9 Documentation of interface, causation and accumulation risks
To establish if there was a preferred method of documenting risks respondents
were asked to state their preferred method of documentation for each of the
dimensions. The results are presented in Table 5.25.
Table 5.25 Showing the frequency of different methods used to report the
dimensions of Interface, causation and accumulation risk
Method of
documentation Interface I Interface II Causation Accumulation Total
Specific inclusion
in the risk register 13 12 13 0 38
Meeting of the risk
committee 8 8 7 7 30
Meeting of generic
risk committee 7 6 4 4 21
Risk report 8 9 9 12 38
Other 4 2 2 1 9
All the media provided in the survey as options for documentation were used for
the four dimensions of risks. Table 5.25 shows that if ranking the methods of
identification based on the total frequency, the risk register and risk report would
be equal followed by the meeting of the risk committee, the generic risk
committee and other. However a risk register was not the vehicle of choice for
the documentation of accumulation risk by the respondents to the survey. A risk
report was the most popular method used to document accumulation risks.
A Chi-squared test was applied to establish if there was an association between
the identification of the dimensions and the different method of documenting
risks. The test found there was no statistically significant association between
the method of documentation and the dimension, of interface, causation and
accumulation (P>0.05).The fact that all media are used shows that there is no
consensus with respect to a central repository for the documentation of
identified risk.
149
When respondents were asked if they produce a risk register, 71% of the 23
respondents stated that they produced a risk register. Where a risk register is
used, 74% of respondents stated that it is embedded in the management
system of the organisation. When asked if the dimensions were included in their
risk register more than half of the 20 respondents (n= 17) included three or
more dimensions in their risk register. However, only eight out of twenty
respondents stated that they included all the dimensions in their risk register.
Four of the 24 respondents did not provide a response.
In summary, a number of methods are used to document risk. A risk register is
widely used but it is not able to accommodate all the dimensions and this is
evidenced in the results for accumulation risk where 12 of the 38 responses
(31%) from the 23 respondents used a risk report to document risk and this was
the most frequently used method of documenting accumulation risk. If it were
possible to document accumulation risk in a risk register this would provide a
central repository for evidencing identified hazards and risks. This would seem
to be a gap in knowledge.
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5.3.10 Risk management frameworks
Table 5.26 showing the frequency of factors used to prioritise risks for
management by ranking. (The highlighted areas are the most frequent reason





2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Leastused
12
Frequency 1 6 1 2 1 3 0 1 0 0 1 1
Significance/severity 11 3 3 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Risk tolerance 1 3 5 1 1 3 0 0 1 1 0 0
Financial impact 4 1 5 5 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0
Compliance 0 1 2 4 3 1 3 3 0 0 1 0
Reputational risk exposure 0 4 1 3 4 1 3 1 0 1 0 0
Cost benefit analysis 1 1 1 0 0 0 2 1 5 0 1 0
Public perception 0 0 0 3 1 4 2 0 0 0 0 0
Potential for legacy liability 0 0 1 1 3 0 1 3 3 2 1 0
Access to cost effective capital 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 1 2 6 0 1
Access to insurance markets 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 2 7 0
Other 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9
DNC 4 5 5 5 7 8 10 11 11 11 13 13
Important drivers for the identification of risk are the factors which motivate risk
professionals to identify risk. Respondents were asked to rank those factors
which they thought were most widely used to prioritise risk for management
from 1 to 12, where 1 was the most widely used and 12 the least used. The
resulting data from Table 5.26 were analysed using ANOVA. The result of the
univariate test of significance show that there is a statistically significant
relationship at the 95% confidence interval (p < 0.005) between the 12 different
drivers for motivating professionals to identify risk. The implication is that the




15 Effective hypothesis decomposition







































































































































Figure 5-4 Confirmation of the factors used to prioritise risk for management
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The graph in Figure 5-4 confirms the ranking of factors which respondents
considered a priority for the management of risk. The greatest priority was given
to factors where there would be an immediate impact to an organisations’ ability
to continue as a going concern and included, severity, financial impact,
frequency and risk tolerance. The second group of factors were important,
requiring swift resolution and involved third parties. They included; reputation,
compliance and public perception. The third group of factors were operational
aspirations which required management and included, cost benefit analysis,




Figure 5-5 Analysis of the results of ranking the factors used to prioritise risk for
management based on grouping of the ANOVA results in Figure 5-4
The most widely used parameter for prioritising risk for management is














Access to cost effective capital
and insurance markets
153
Criteria used as the basis for managing risk
When asked to state the basis for managing risk, the 24 responses from
respondents were allocated to the categories of risk tolerance, severity, cost,
benefits, compliance, other and did not comment. The result of this
categorisation are presented in Table 5.27 and shows the key considerations
for managing risk are risk tolerance, severity and cost.







Did not comment 4
Total 24
One of the considerations in developing a methodology for cross-disciplinary
hazard identification is the need to integrate the different risk management
frameworks Figure 5-6.
Figure 5-6 Options used to integrate the different methods risk management
frameworks
The integration of numerous risk management frameworks is accommodated in
a number of different options which include, embedding in an ERM framework,
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Embedded in ERM framework
Risk culture of the organisation
Risk committee

















the risk culture of an organisation, risk committee, potential impact on corporate
activity and adherence to ISO31000. The most frequently cited option by
respondents is embedding in an enterprise risk management framework. ERM
was identified by respondents as an important framework integrating numerous
risk management frameworks.
Adequacy of current methods to manage new and emerging risks
Figure 5-7 The number of respondents who stated that current methods of risk
management are adequate for the management of new and emerging risks
The majority of respondents (15 out of 22) stated that the current method of risk
management was adequate for the management of new and emerging risks
(Figure 5-7).
5.3.11 Attributes
Respondents were asked to comment on the compliance of risk management
frameworks to corporate governance, ISO31000 and ERM. The results show
that the majority of respondents (17 out of 23) stated that it was important for a
new framework to accommodate corporate governance requirements.
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management standard was adequate for the identification and management of
risk. This is evidenced by 15 of the 23 stating “no” it would not be adequate or
that they “do not know” whether it was adequate. Although eight respondents
stated” yes” it would be adequate, there was clearly a view that there is a need
for a better framework for the identification and management of risk. When
respondents were asked whether they used ERM 13 of the 23 respondents
confirmed that they used ERM. In summary the attributes of a new method of
hazard identification should accommodate corporate governance, and ERM.
However respondents were not convinced that compliance with ISO 31000
would result in adequate identification and management of risk.
5.4 Key findings from the experts and web survey respondents
The result of the expert interviews and web survey confirms that risk is identified
by a number of different roles in an organisation and not just generic risk
specialists. The risk manager, project manager, departmental manager, risk
committee are the most commonly quoted roles where risks are identified.
Additionally there is no consensus in the methods used to identify hazards and
risk for new and emerging risks and no specific process for new and emerging
risk identification.
The survey and elicitation results suggest that efforts were being made to
identify all the dimensions as all the experts stated that they identified the
dimensions and over 58% of web survey respondents stated that they identified
the dimensions, interface, causation and accumulation. The results also show
that interface and accumulation are the two dimensions of risk which are less
likely to be identified by the respondents to this web survey. This was also the
case with respect to the outcome of the expert elicitation.
There was no specific method for identifying the interface dimension. The
results did not identify methods for the identification of interface risk despite
three of the four experts stating that they identified interface risk. Two experts
provided details of the method which they used but these were not specific
methods for the identification of interface risk.
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Both experts and web survey respondents did not have a specific method for
identifying the causation dimension. There was a definite need to identify this
dimension which was met by using a collection of different methods. With
respect to the accumulation dimension there was no specific method for the
identification of this dimension. The most frequently cited methods were
qualitative scenario planning and reviews.
A number of methods were used to document risks with three of the four
experts using a risk register for documenting environmental, health and safety
and insurance risk. A risk register was the most widely used but it was not able
to accommodate all the dimensions and this is evidenced in the results for
accumulation risk where 12 of the 38 respondents (31%) used a risk report,
which was the most frequently used method of documenting accumulation risk.
If it were possible to document accumulation risk in a risk register this would
provide a central repository for evidencing identified hazards and risks. This
would seem to be a gap in knowledge.
Both the experts and respondents to the web survey found a heavy reliance on
experts and their opinions during risk assessments and this confirms the fact
that there is no clearly agreed method for the assessment of risk across
disciplines. If identification is part of the assessment of risk then there is no
clear method for the identification of risks or hazards as the source of risk.
Risk management is important but there was no consensus on the approach
taken by experts. Risks are prioritised for management based on significance
and severity, cost and tolerance (Section 5.3.10). ERM is seen by risk
professionals as important in facilitating the integration of a number of risk
frameworks. The ISO31000 risk standard does not seem to have a positive
profile as it is not seen as an adequate framework for the identification and
management of risk this is evidenced by the fact that the health and safety
expert did not think that it was adequate for the management of health and
safety risk. There was a clear need for a method which was seen as more
comprehensive in the applied identification and management of risk.
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5.5 Summary
Although it is clear that both experts and risk professionals wish to identify the
dimensions of interface, causation and accumulation, a method which identifies
all these dimensions does not currently exist.
The research shows that:
 The dimensions of interface, causation and accumulation should be
identified.
 Experts believe that the dimensions are useful in assessing new and
unidentified risks.
 Evidence suggests that this does not currently occur.
The requirements of the proposed method based on the results of the initial
research are:
 A method that facilitates the identification of hazards across the generic
risks.
 The method should identify the dimensions of interface, causation and
accumulation.
 These identified dimensions should be evidenced in the same repository
and as the most frequently used media is a risk register method this is
the chosen method of documenting hazards.
The results of the initial research from expert elicitation and the web survey
identified a gap in knowledge for a robust and applied method of hazard
identification which provides the foundation and framework for consistent and
comprehensive risk identification. The gap between belief and actual evidenced
identification is illustrated in Figure 5-7 which showed that respondents stated
that they believed the current method of risk management was adequate for the
management of new and emerging risks. Further evidence is required to
investigate this gap. The carbon capture and storage value chain could provide
a useful analogue to develop a method of identification of cross-discipline




6 METHOD FOR HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND
DEVELOPMENT OF REGISTER
6.1 Introduction
A risk register was one of two preferred tools for the documentation of risk and
the most widely used as expressed by responses from the web survey (Section
5.3.9). Currently risk registers accommodate linear documentation of hazards,
so a format that facilitates multiple dimensions needs to be developed to fill this
gap in knowledge (Section 5.3.9) and accommodate cross-disciplinary hazard
identification. This chapter shows the process for the development of a method
for cross-disciplinary hazard identification and how this is incorporated into a
register method.
6.1.1 Requirements for a solution
The solution should accommodate the identification of the different dimensions
of hazards and accommodate the fact that frequently a hazard may by itself be
negligible but coupled with others may result in a significant impact (Ward and
Chapman, 2003). These dimensions should consider the inclusion of chains of
causation (Section 3.4.3), hazards that may result from the interface of two or
more risk sources (Section 3.4.2) and portfolios of hazards that can result in an
accumulation hazard (Section 3.4.4) (Ward, 1999; Ward and Chapman, 2003).
The current method of compiling a risk register by documenting the identified
hazards is linear, documenting only those hazards that can be quantified.
Although conceptual thinking does not require quantification, the applied nature
of compiling a risk register as evidenced in Section 3.5.3 and Table 3.2 has
historically included some combination of quantitative metric in the form of
probability, severity, frequency, impact or exposure. The requirement to include
quantitative data may create a tendency towards identifying those hazards and
risks which can be quantified. As a result it does not take account of all the
available information on hazards and risks within the register (Allan and Yin,
2010). Additionally it does not facilitate the inclusion and synthesis of qualitative
data which could be included in a register. The proposed method will focus on
160
identification not quantification (Aven, 2012). The development of a
multidimensional approach to hazard identification requires a risk register
framework that is familiar to risk professionals (Patterson, 2002) and
constructed to provide a systematic, auditable process capable of documenting
different dimensions of hazard. This chapter concentrates on the development
of a risk register method for the identification and documentation of the four
dimensions of hazards.
6.2 Initial methodology for the register of hazards
The proposed method needs to identify cross-disciplinary hazards and present
the results in a register. The dimensions of interface, causation and
accumulation will be used to identify the systematic identification of cross
discipline hazards. Prior to the identification of the new dimensions a register of
generic hazards had to be developed which is required to formulate the generic
register. This is the basic data for the identification of cross-disciplinary hazards.
The stages involved in the development of the register of hazards are outlined in
Figure 6-1.
Figure 6-1 Stages of development for the register of hazards
Initial register of hazards template development
Develop descriptors
First iteration of register of hazards template
Structural development of register to accommodate four dimensions
Second iteration of register of hazards template
Feedback from case studies
Third iteration of register of hazards template
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The first iteration of the risk register involved obtaining a basic structure that
could be applied to all dimensions. This required the identification of descriptors
to ensure the correct information was collected. The pilot method was
developed using the information from the CCS case study which is discussed in
more detail in Chapter 7.
6.2.1 Development of descriptors
The initial risk register template had a linear structure which was developed
using an Excel spread sheet with 21 column descriptors. The descriptors were
formulated as a result of a review of seven risk registers and the identification of
common descriptors highlighted in Section 3.4.3. The descriptors were
categorised to obtain the following data: reference; component; lifecycle;
classification; characterisation; mitigation; quantification; and dimensions.
Details of the origin of the descriptors are provided in Table 6.1.
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Specific number which identifies a risk (Carter et
al, 1995; Paterson, 2002)
Risk classification Risk classification from original data
Reference Reference from the literature
Component Module option Business unit/ facility name (Whipple andPitblado, 2010).
Lifecycle Phase of lifecycle
Requires identification of the different stages of
the lifecycle and subsequent assignment of a
risk/ hazard to the stage of the lifecycle that it
relates to.
Classification
Generic risk classification Event type , safety, environment (Whipple andPitblado, 2010)
Risk category Sub category of risk classification
Risk type Sub category of risk category
Risk sub category Sub category of risk type
Characterisation
Source
Source of the risk which cause and trigger an
event (Whipple and Pitblado, 2010 Ward, 1999;
Cox, 2007).
Description Description of the risk and its context (Allan andYin, 2010, Ward,1999)
Hazard identification
Identification of the hazard that makes it a risk
(Whipple and Pitblado, 2010). The data includes
a hazard description.
Mitigation Method of risk mitigation
Method of risk management used to mitigate this
risk (Carter et al 1995; Willams, 1994; Paterson,




The risk that remains after mitigation and
management (BS ISO31000, 2009 ; Ward, 1999;
ISO31100, 2007)
Risk threshold
Level of risk above which and organization is not
prepared to accept, tolerate or be exposed.
Data not available and not required for hazard
identification
Probability Likelihood of occurrence (Kaplan and Garrick1981; Willams, 1996)
Impact
Cost of risk, damage, harm etc. (Jaafari, 2001;
Willams 1994) result or effect of an event
(ISO31100, 2007)
Expected value Probability x impact or consequence (Zhao,2005; Aven, 2012).
Dimensions
Interface
Hazard at the interface arise when two or more
generic risks occur and result in an additional
risk not captured by either of the generic risk
management frameworks (see Section 3.4.2).
Causation This hazard derives from one hazard causinganother generic risk, (See Section 3.4.3).
Accumulation
This type of hazard occurs from the culmination
of a number of risks crystallizing at the same
time (See Section 3.4.4).
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The practical application of some of the descriptors requires further explanation
as to why they are required and this is provided in the following sections.
6.2.1.1 Reference
 Risk identification number (Risk ID)
It was important that the individual risks were allocated a unique number as this
was used throughout the application of the method to identify the hazard
dimensions and maintain an audit trail. Where the data relates to a hazard it will
be a known by its hazard Identification number (Hazard ID).
 References
These are the references for the origin of the characterisation data in the
literature for the risk. This data will commence the audit trail. For the initial
register the data was obtained from a mixture of published data from journals,
books, and grey documents.
6.2.1.2 Components
This referred to the specific module in the process for which the data related. In
the initial register this was the transportation module of CCS by pipeline.
6.2.1.3 Phase of lifecycle
This method proposes to have risks which are lifecycle specific. This requires
identification of the phases of the lifecycle that are appropriate for the; event,
project, process or entity. The stages may be defined time periods such as
short, medium and long term; they could also be actual time periods if this
information is available. The rationale for including the phases of the lifecycle is
that a hazard may change during the lifecycle and anticipating this change will
facilitate the identification of hazards in the transition of the lifecycle. The
lifecycle phases which were used in the initial CCS transportation register were,
concept development, pre-commissioning, construction, pre operational,
operational, mothballing and decommissioning and “all”.
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6.2.1.4 Classification
The characterisation of hazards needs to be comprehensive, correct and
precise. As a result hierarchical classification has been incorporated into the
model and includes the generic risk classification, risk category, and risk type. A
diagrammatic representation of this hierarchical characterisation is illustrated in
Figure 6-2.
Figure 6-2 Diagrammatic representation of hierarchical characterisation for the
generic health and safety risk
The generic risk in the example in Figure 6-2 is health and safety. Health and
safety is the result of two risk categories, health and secondly safety. Health is
concerned with the wellbeing of an employee and safety with the protection of
the employee. As a result health risk types include health effects which include
a number of different effects one of which is bodily injury. The purpose of the
hierarchical risk classification is to be as precise as possible with the hazard
that is being identified. The classification applies to all generic risks and
requires sufficient knowledge of the generic to be completed accurately.













 Generic risk classification
The initial classification of risks commenced with a sample portfolio of generic
risks which would be included at all stages of the value chain and lifecycle. The
proposed sample portfolio included the following generic risk classifications:
health and safety; environmental; financial; economic and technical.
 Risk category
The individual generic risk classification is broken down into risk categories
identified from analysis of the processes, respective risk frameworks and
corresponding literature search.
 Risk type
Each of the risk classes had their own specific group of risk categories, and
each risk category has a number of risk types as outlined in Figure 6-2. For
some risks it may be necessary to have an additional sub risk type.
6.2.1.5 Characterisation
Hazard descriptors are the section of the register that provides details of the
attributes of the hazard and included the source of the risk, description and
hazard identification.
 Source
This descriptor requires details of the source of the risk.
 Description
This description refers to the risk. It requires qualitative details as to the
construction of the risk, the damage caused, the harm or loss.
 Hazard identification
This descriptor was used to obtain a response to the question; what is the
potentially damaging physical event, phenomenon or human activity that may




The reason for including risk mitigation was that, if this data was available, it
would highlight new hazards by identifying hazards that could not be mitigated
with the current resources.
6.2.1.7 Quantification
As well as the descriptors outlined in the previous section the original register
template included sections which required quantitative data on the residual risk,
impact, risk threshold, probability and expected value of the risk. This
information is usually specific to a project or organisation and is difficult to
obtain for emerging technologies as it is proprietary information which is not
publically available.
6.2.1.8 Dimensions
Following the traditional linear approach to risk registers the additional
dimensions were accommodated by adding separate columns for each of the
dimensions. The register collected information for the individual generic risks on
separate spread sheets. The initial template of the generic register was tested
by populating with data from the transportation module of CCS using references
from literature on the transportation of CO2 by pipeline. Main issues with the
initial template
The main issues with the initial template (Appendix E) were (1) the quality of the
data, (2) the structure of the register and (3) the relevance of the descriptors.
6.2.1.9 Data quality
At the time of collecting data from published literature to populate the register
there was a lack of credible quantitative data and when revisited this data was
not publically available until December 2011. Additionally methods of mitigation
for CCS pipelines were in the process of development and this data was held by
National Grid Plc and not publically so this descriptor was excluded from the
proposed register. The fact that CCS technology was emerging meant that
there was a lack of robust published literature and it was not possible to
complete all the descriptors from one source for one hazard. This meant
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verification and validation of the individual hazards was not possible and a
number of column descriptors were excluded (Table 6.2).
Table 6.2 Rationale for inclusion and exclusion of the 21 column descriptors in
the initial register template
NO Column descriptor Reason forinclusion Reason for exclusion
1 Risk ID No
Identification and
audit trail2 Risk classification
3 Reference
4 Module option Component part




9 Risk sub category
10 Source
Confusion over the difference with





13 Method of riskmitigation
Risk mitigation requires hazard









Does not allow characterisation or
accommodation of attributes20 Causation
21 Accumulation
6.2.1.10 Descriptors
The quantitative data did not support the identification of hazards as the
identification of the hazards came prior to quantification and so was not relevant
to this research project. The method of mitigation was also not relevant to the
identification of hazards as the hazard needed to be identified prior to the
application of appropriate mitigation. The source identification in the context of
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safety is called hazard identification (PD ISO IEC, 2002); having a descriptor for
source and hazard identification caused confusion and duplication in cross
discipline application and as a result the source descriptor was removed.
The characterisation of the component risks and the resulting relationship were
not adequately accommodated in the initial format. It became clear that this was
an essential part of the context of the hazard and so this descriptor was added
by making the module option specific to the project or process. The descriptors
that were taken forward to the next stage of register development are
highlighted in Table 6.2.
6.2.1.11 Generic classification
The initial generic risk classifications of health and safety, environmental,
financial, economic and technical were amended to include regulatory and
societal. Regulatory risk was added as legal risk did not include compliance and
the implication of changing regulations in an evolving regulatory landscape. The
previous list of risk classifications did not accommodate risks such as reputation
and societal impacts and so societal classification was included. Financial risk
was removed and included in the economic risk. The generic classifications
used in this research are defined below.
Regulatory
Regulatory risks are the result of harm caused by non-compliance with existing
regulations, or potential changes in regulations. A regulatory risk can result from
the way that regulations are implemented by the regulator (process of
regulation) or uncertainty as to which regulator or regulations will be applied to a
specific situation.
Legal
A legal hazard includes; the non-performance of a contract or warranty, legal
liability resulting from a duty of care, negligence, misrepresentation, strict
liability or fraud. Legal risk results from a hazard emanating from a legal source.
If there is no legal source a legal risk is absent (Mahler, 2007). Legal risk is the
exposure to legal action, liability, fines or other legal remedies that result from
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the uncertainty of application, changes in laws, directives and the unknown
outcome of legal proceedings (Section 2. 4.4).
Environmental
Environmental hazards include: land degradation, deforestation, desertification,
wild land fires, and loss of biodiversity, land, water and air pollution, climate
change, sea level rise and ozone depletion. Environmental risks are a source of
harm to media such as: air, land, water, flora, fauna and humans (Section
2.4.1).
Health and safety
Health and safety hazards include the following: biological, ergonomic,
chemical, physical, psychosocial, slipping/tripping hazards, inappropriate
machine guarding, equipment malfunctions or breakdowns, adverse health
effects. Health risks are concerned with impact on the health and wellbeing of
an individual and would result in disease and adverse health effects. Safety
risks are those risks which arise from lack of precautions and can result in
injury. The Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 states the aim is to secure the
health and safety of employees by protecting at work.
Economic
Economic hazards impact the economic process and include the distribution of
factors of production, and consumption (goods and services). The economic
process includes members of the population and firms who carryout economic
activities producing productive resources in return for wages, interest, profits
and rent used to consume goods and services. Economic risks also arise from
the calibration of markets and fiscal policy via supply, demand, inflation,
exchange rates, taxation and pricing. Business and financial risks are taken as
a subset of economic risks.
Societal
Societal hazards occur as a result of negative exposure to trends in norms,
mores, culture, behaviour, perception, attitudes and demographics. Social
factors may influence demand for a company's products and the structure of its
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business model. For example, negative impacts to a brands reputation may
result from a pollution incident such as Union Carbide in Bhopal 1984 (Power et
al., 2009).
Technical
Technical hazards originate from processes and components of manmade
infrastructure, or products which include mechanical, chemical, technological
and engineering impacts which cause harm (Section 2.4.5).
6.2.1.12 Structure of the register
The register included individual columns on the same spread sheet for each
dimension with the intention of documenting the different dimensions. This
linear approach did not accommodate the classification or characteristics of the
dimensions. The requirement to be able to document the dimensions was
physically impossible in the registers linear format, as:
 It was not possible to show the risks that were interconnected on the
same spread sheet and thus the requirement for an audit trail was not
possible.
 It was impossible to include the characteristics for the interface,
causation or accumulation dimensions within their individual columns. It
became clear that the dimensions had to have register structures that
captured their specific attributes as well as the original base data.
The development of the initial register structure provided confirmation of why
respondent to the web survey have stated that they identify these dimensions
and are included in repositories other than a register (see Section 5.3.9).
The production of the initial register confirmed that identification of hazards did
not require the descriptors for mitigation and quantification as you needed to
know what you were quantifying before you were able to quantify it and the
same is true of mitigation. The initial register did not meet the criteria of a
comprehensive, clear, precise and auditable characterisation of hazards which
supported identification. The result of this exercise proved that the focus of this
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research should be on dimension led registers with descriptors that facilitated
identification.
The resulting generic register structure remained with ten risk descriptors
focused on characterising hazards using hazard related risk register data. This
included: the risk ID number, reference, phases of lifecycle, component, risk
classification, risk category, risk type, risk description and hazard identification
as defined in Section 6.2.1. This register structure was the basis for the
development of the additional dimensions of hazard not just for the
documentation of hazards in a register but for the development of the method of
identification. As a result the development of the register and the method of
dimension identification were developed jointly.
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6.3 Multidimensional hazard identification method development
6.3.1 Stages of developing the hazard identification method
The development of the method is the result of an intertwining and iterative
process between the hazard identification method development and the
evolution of the register documentation from
Figure 6-1 to Figure 6-2.
Interface Accumulation
Step 3





First iteration of hazard register - Population of generic
hazards
Step 4
Synthesis of subsidiary registers
Development of dimension methods
Step 5
Second iteration of register of hazards
Step 6
Pilot case study application of hazard identification method and register of hazards
Step 7
Third iteration of register of hazards
Step 8
Improvement of dimension methods from case study results
Step 9
Final iteration of register of hazard template
173
Figure 6-3 Hazard Identification method developments and the integration of the
register of hazard development
6.3.2 Generic hazard classification and register of hazards
The Generic register of hazards sets the standard for the minimum level of
information required for the characterisation of hazards within the dimensions of
interface, causation and accumulation. To obtain the generic register of hazards
an existing risk register was reviewed and the individual risks were classified
according to the generic risk classifications in Section 6.2.1.4. The register
template was then populated with the data which corresponds to the ten
descriptors: hazard ID, risk reference chain component, phase of lifecycle,
classification and characterisation. Table 6.2 shows a section of a generic
register of hazard for a CCS project using the risk register template. For each
risk there is a unique number, reference, and chain component, applicable
phase of lifecycle, classification and characterisation.










































































6.3.3 Engineering of register of hazards template
The development of the hazard identification method and the documentation of
identification results were intertwined. This section is structured to provide
details of the tasks required to identify the hazards and to document them in the
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register. Each dimension has its own specific idiosyncrasies and these are
accommodated in their respective sections.
The draft registers were developed firs,t but it became clear that it would be the
method of identification that would drive the structure of the register for each
dimension. The dimensions were developed in the following order; interface,
causation and accumulation because it was assumed that the interface
dimension would be the most challenging to produce an auditable method. This
was due to the need to document two separate hazards and their attributes.
6.3.4 Production of the subsidiary register
The original register of hazards categorised the phase of lifecycle and the
module, location, business unit or process (Appendix E). Each phase of the
lifecycle was used to create a separate subsidiary register. This was achieved
by filtering the respective column in the Excel spreadsheet by the respective
phase of the lifecycle. The rationale for producing subsidiary registers was that
it was necessary to identify hazards that were in the same stage of the lifecycle.
The result was a complete set of hazards for each stage of the lifecycle. A
matrix (illustrated in Table 6.4) is completed so that each subsidiary register is
easily identifiable. This provides context for the hazards and facilitates
visualising potential realistic dependency and interconnection not possible to
ascertain from an arbitrary list of hazards. The result is a matrix of hazards
compiled by lifecycle.










Once the subsidiary registers are produced the number of hazards per generic
classification for each subsidiary register was calculated. The inclusion of the
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total number of hazards allowed cross checking of the number of hazards in the
register and further analysis of the dimensions. Where there are no details on
the phases of the lifecycle then the register provided details for one phase.
Each hazard from the initial subsidiary register was matched with another in the
same subsidiary register.
6.4 Development of dimension identification methods
6.4.1 Interface hazard identification
The initial interface dimension was tested using couplings of risks. A coupling is
defined as the method of creating a cross-disciplinary pairing of two risks from
different generic classifications but from the same stage of the lifecycle. The
initial method for the production of the interface dimension involved listing all the
individual risks by generic risk and risk classification and then numbering them
consecutively. A random number generator was then applied to pick the two
risks which would result in a coupling. Although the risks were chosen
objectively the result was not a portfolio of all the couplings. In fact the random
number generators had a tendency to pick the same risk IDs. This undermined
the fact that the register was a complete list of real identified risks for which all
the risks should result in a coupling. This approach did not create an improved
position as it did not use all the identified risks in the generic register or produce
all coupling combinations.
Interface hazard identification method
As using a random number generator did not provide couplings for all the
identified hazards in the original register it was decided that a method would be
developed which produced couplings of all the hazards in the original risk
register. The objective of interface hazard identification was to produce a
register of hazards where two risks occur simultaneously and together result in
an additional hazard. The interface portfolio of hazards was the result of all
possible coupling combinations from the generic register subject to conditions:
1. Risks from the same generic group were not included in the register
of interface hazards as it was assumed that the chance of more than
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one generic risk occurring would have been explored within the
generic risk identification framework. This may not be the case but
the objective of this research project is to look at cross-disciplinary
hazards not the relationship of hazards within a generic risk
classification.
2. Each risk was categorised using a uniform approach to classification
and characterisation. The approach to classification was generic
hazard and project specific. For example the technical hazards for a
landfill would be different to the technical hazards for an offshore
oilfield.
3. A hierarchy for classification of the relevant generic hazards was
developed by reviewing the individual risks in the register and from an
understanding of the context of each project gained from experts,
literature such as project specific reports and risk assessments. With
respect to characterisation the risk reports and registers provide
hazard specific characterisation.
4. The resulting risks were then grouped into subsidiary risk registers
which related to the specific phase of lifecycle. The individual risks
within each subsidiary register were grouped into their generic risk
families. Within each subsidiary risk register a risk from one generic
family was coupled with a risk from a different generic family. An
example of this is shown in Figure 6-4.
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Key Hazards Legal Environmental Technical
Figure 6-4 Example of the couplings that result from a subsidiary register
comprised of two generic hazards from each of three generic risk classification
environmental, legal and technical
5. The couplings were assigned a unique interface identification number
(interface ID No) which made it possible to identify the phase of the
lifecycle /subsidiary register that the hazard was derived as illustrated
in Figure 6-5.
Figure 6-5 An example of a matrix showing the total number of interface hazards







Design A 10 19 10
Construction B 20 49 30
Operational C 50 59 10
Closure D 60 100 41
Total number of risks 91
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The resulting interface hazards were characterised, identified and documented
in the respective dimension of the register. The resulting hazard couplings for
each subsidiary register were amalgamated into a master register of interface
hazards. The list of couplings was verified by an expert who has knowledge of
the initial risk register.
Development of a register template for interface hazards
The unique requirement of the interface hazard identification methodology is
that it requires the register to show the hazards that are coupled together. It
also needs to be flexible enough to accommodate groups of more than two
hazards.
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Figure 6-6 Example of register structure for interface hazards
Stage of process Phases of lifecycle ClassificationReference Characterisation
Coupling
180
The allocation of the interface ID No provides a specific reference for the
interface hazard that result from the grouping of the original generic risks.
Figure 6-6 shows a template for the presentation of interface hazards in a
register. The resulting couplings are characterised from the initial risks. The
output needs to be verified as possible and applicable by an expert of the
system for which the register has been provided.
6.4.2 Causation hazard identification
The line of causation was developed by establishing if one hazard triggers a
subsequent hazard. This is an iterative process and can continue until the
project is terminated, the entity is no longer a going concern or no further
potential hazard could be triggered. There are two types of causation hazards
which need to be tested by application to the case study data they include:
6.4.2.1 Option 1 Causation within a stage of the lifecycle
This option takes each of the subsidiary registers as described in Section 6.3.4
and establishes whether there is a line of causation for each hazard in the
respective stage of the lifecycle. For each subsidiary register the results were
reviewed taking into account the stage of the lifecycle, placing the hazards in
context and stating the next progression of hazard if applicable. Taking the prior
hazard I tried to establish if this initial hazard could trigger or result in a
subsequent hazard. This iterative process was continued until the outcome was
termination or an acceptable outcome for the continuance of the project under
normal conditions.
6.4.2.2 Option 2 Cross lifecycle causation
Additional lines of causation are hazards that occur across all phases of the
lifecycle. These hazards were compiled by applying the same criteria as in
Option 1 (Section 6.4.2). The resulting chain of causation was compared with
the outcome of the generic list of hazards to establish if these hazards were
identified. If not they should be included in the register of causation hazards.
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When reviewing the hazards for all options any hazards that would immediately
result in the termination of the project should be removed but highlighted as
having a negative impact on the viability of the project. For all the options the
results were compared with the generic table to establish if the context makes a
difference to the line of causation and the resulting feasible portfolio of
causation hazards. The final stage of the methodology required the provision of
a comprehensive list of causation hazards that included the output of the three
different means of obtaining lines of causation and removal of any duplication
that was highlighted in the comparison.
6.4.2.3 Development of a register template for causation hazards
The causation register required the user to review the originating hazard and
establish the subsequent hazard it triggers. As a result the register needed to
have a number of columns to accommodate the subsequent hazards. Table 6.5
shows the addition of column descriptors for each subsequent hazard. This
structure shows the base data from the original register and the resulting chain
of causation.
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6.4.3 Accumulation hazard Identification
Accumulation hazards result from a number of hazards occurring in a short
period of time and whose cumulative impact is significant. The differentiating
attribute is that the hazard is a portfolio, not an individual hazard. The result is
the identification of a variety of feasible accumulation hazard portfolios. This
method introduces three types of accumulation hazard portfolios:
6.4.3.1 Type 1 lifecycle portfolio
The subsidiary registers are a portfolio of identified hazards for an entire stage
of a lifecycle and thus provide a list of the worst case scenario, should all these
hazards occur simultaneously.
6.4.3.2 Type 2 transversal portfolio
The transversal portfolio includes hazards which occur across all the phases of
the lifecycle. They are identified by filtering the generic register by lifecycle to
establish those risks that occur across all phases of the lifecycle. This results in
a transversal portfolio.
6.4.3.3 Type 3 component portfolio
This portfolio includes hazards which occur within one component process or
business unit. This third option is concerned with the concentration of hazards
in a specific operation. Filtering by the component, process or business unit
provides the potential portfolio for the specific component.
These options require a review to establish if the individual compilations are
feasible and provide reasons why individual hazards or compilations should be
excluded. This will be investigated when the method is applied to the case
study data.
6.4.3.4 Development of register template for accumulation hazards
The accumulation hazard register needs to accommodate options that examine
the data in a number of ways and cannot be easily presented in one worksheet
as one accumulation hazard is comprised of a set of multiple hazards. It is
important to present all the data so that context can be taken into account. As a
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result data for accumulation hazards include subsidiary registers as each
individual register is an accumulation hazard. The format for this option is the
same as the generic characterisation but a portfolio of hazards. Option two is
displayed in a separate worksheet showing all the hazards that traverse all
phases of the lifecycle. Option three is displayed in a separate worksheet
showing the potential concentration of hazards in one part of a process. As a
result the inclusion of accumulation hazard identification includes a number of
accumulation portfolios all presented in individual spread sheets. The number
of accumulation hazards is a function of the number of phases of the lifecycle
plus the transversal portfolio and the number of components.
6.5 Second iteration of register of hazards
The development of the generic register to accommodate the four dimensions
alongside the development of the hazard identification methodology for each
dimension resulted in a second iteration of the register of hazards. The register
evolved from a single master register of hazards to a family of subsidiary
registers which facilitate the respective methods of identification to provide a
working document for the synthesis and further analysis of hazard identification.
The second iteration of the register and the methodology for the identification of
multidimensional hazards was tested by application of the method to real data.
6.5.1 Testing the development of the risk register methodology
The method for the identification and documentation of the hazard dimensions
of generic, interface, causation and accumulation was tested by application to a
Pilot case study (Step 6) using the data from “First United Kingdom’s CCS
Demonstration Competition FEED Close out report” (see Chapter 7). The
method was subsequently applied to a closed landfill without a risk register
(Chapter 8) and to the data in climate change adaptation risk assessment for a
utility company (Chapter 9).
6.6 Chapter summary
This chapter provided an outline of a method for the identification and
documentation of cross discipline hazards by application of the multiple
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dimensions of interface, causation and accumulation. The next stage of
development is outlined in Figure 6-7.
Figure 6-7 Progression of results from validation of hazard identification and




Pilot case study application of hazard
identification method and register of
hazards
Step 7
Third iteration of register of hazards
Step 8
Improvement of dimension methods from case
study results
Step 9
Final iteration of register of hazard template
CHAPTER 7
Step 4
Development of dimension methods
Interface Causation
Step 2
Population of generic hazards with first iteration of hazard
register
Step 3
Identification and documentation of subsidiary registers
Synthesis of subsidiary registers
Accumulation
Step 5
Second iteration of register of hazards
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7 PILOT CASE STUDY - CARBON CAPTURE AND
STORAGE
7.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the results of applying the cross-disciplinary
multidimensional hazard identification model outlined in Chapter 6 to one of the
two front end engineering design studies (FEED) for CCS.
Carbon capture and storage (CCS) is regarded as the most practical option to
reduce greenhouse gases (GHG) (Yu et al., 2008: Davison and Thambimuthu,
2009). CCS is a bridging technology which for the purpose of this research
includes the capture of carbon dioxide (CO2) from industrial installations and
transportation to a suitable geological formation for permanent storage (EU
Directive 2009/31/EC). This method of CCS is known as geologically
engineered CCS. The main technologies used for the engineered capture of
CO2 are: post-combustion, pre-combustion and oxy-fuel combustion
(Haszeldine et al., 2009).
The FEED studies are the result of a competition launched in 2007 by the UK
Government to demonstrate full-scale CCS power generation in the UK using
post combustion technology. A major power generation company responded to
the competition by forming a consortium which will be known as XP which
included; an oil company (Oil Co), an energy distribution company (Distribution
Co) and a power generation company (Power Co). The project included both
onshore (land) and offshore (marine) activities and each consortium member
had expertise aligned to specific modules of the CCS value chain, this is
illustrated diagrammatically in Figure 7-1











Figure 7-1 The location and allocation of risk for each module of the CCS value
chain by member of the consortium
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The XP consortium included the generation of electricity from an existing coal-
fired power station off the coast of Scotland which will be upgraded and retro
fitted with abatement technologies. The Distribution Co were responsible for the
transportation of CO2 from the power station which requires construction of two
new sections of pipeline, (1) modification of existing pipeline (known as Feeder
10) so it is compatible with the transportation of CO2 and (2) the construction of
a new compressor station at Blackhill near to the St Fergus Terminal. Oil Co.’s
responsibility is to transfer CO2 from the Distribution Co pipeline to permanent
containment in the subsurface environment. This involves confirming that the
available storage capacity is a minimum 20 million tonnes of CO2 and that this
capacity is capable of safe storage (DECC, 2011).
7.2 The issue
Stenhouse et al., (2009) highlighted the need for factors other than safety to be
considered in risk assessments and Gerstenberger et al., (2009) identified that
risk assessment for CCS should extend beyond the primary containment and
address a wide range of economic, social, political and engineering issues. Both
Stenhouse and Gerstenberger refer to risks and their assessment but neither
comment on the identification of hazards. Gerstenberger et al. (2009) proposed
a novel method of risk assessment using modularised logic trees. The method
relies on expert elicitation at each stage of the risk assessment process and its
intentions are: identification of risk variables; identification of additional research
to reduce risk variables; uncertainty; and assignment of probabilities to risk
variables (Gerstenberger et al., 2009). The focus was on already identified and
known exposures not on the identification of unidentified hazards or cross
discipline exposures. Gerstenberger et al. (2009) introduced five dimensions
which were then applied to the modules of the CCS value chain. The conclusion
of the modularised approach does not reduce uncertainty but may highlight
unacceptable risk issues which need to be addressed. Aarnes et al. (2009)
suggests the use of experts to identify and rank hazards using the DNV
Structured What-if Technique (SWIFT). Wilday et al. (2011) have developed a
new tool for the identification of hazards using CCS as an emerging technology.
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The tool includes the time dimension, a lifecycle approach to risk management
and communication which is stated as having application to generic emerging
risks. The proposed inclusion of time introduces three dimensions; severity,
frequency and probability (Farret et al., 2010).
Wilday et al, (2011) also suggest the use of Dynamic Procedure for Atypical
Scenarios Identification (DyPASI). DyPASI hazard identification involves five
steps which focus on the collection of data for the individual parts of the process
and equipment. For each part of the equipment the critical event is identified
and fault trees and event trees are built. The analysis of these fault and event
trees result in bow-ties. In each case the approach is to look at the critical event
and thus follow a top down approach to hazard identification. This approach is
part of the solution to hazard identification as it only works for known or pre-
identified critical events. It is not proactive in identifying unidentified critical
events which may arise from non-technical hazards or cross discipline hazards.
7.3 Method
The main objective of applying the method for the identification of
multidimensional hazards to the risk register for a CCS project is to establish if
applying the method outlined in Section 6.3 to the initial XP risk register results
in the identification of the dimensions: interface, causation and accumulation.
The second objective is to establish whether the identified dimensions can be
evidenced in a register. Any variations to the method are documented in this
chapter at the appropriate stage.
7.3.1 Generic register
The data was provided by the Department of Energy and Climate Change
(DECC) United Kingdom’s CCS Demonstration Competition Front End
Engineering Design (FEED) Close out report for XP. The XP report contained a
risk register, reports on risk and the context of the proposed CCS demonstration
project. The full register compiled by XP for DECC in the post feed report was
cross checked with information in the report. Although both contained the same
risks, they differed in the priority allocated to the individual risks within the
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following ranges 23-25, 33-38 and 40-42. This research is not concerned with
the prioritisation of the risks but with the identification of risk. This research
project used the list in the report as this was the most up-to-date list. A list of the
top 50 risks is presented in Table 7.1 (DECC, 2011).
It has been assumed that because the information was supplied as part of a
request from the UK Government and the risks reviewed and evaluated by the
three parties to the consortium as well as various regulatory bodies it is the
results to a robust risk pool.
Table 7.1 XP consortium post FEED top 50 risks for the first UKCCS competition












Key project onshore construction consents not obtained to




Key project onshore operational consents not obtained to
programme- to be managed by third parties outside the
Consortium
Onshore
3 Key project onshore construction consents not obtained toprogramme- to be managed by the Consortium
Onshore
4 Offshore decommissioning and post-closure consentuncertainties. Offshore
5 Offshore construction and operation consent uncertainties. Offshore
6 Project team disbanded due to significant gap between FEEDand contract award. Whole system
7 Key project onshore operational consents not obtained toprogramme - to be managed by the Consortium Onshore
8 Complications due to scaling-up CCS technology. Whole system
9 Adverse public reaction to CCS. Whole system
10 Operations staff unfamiliar with CO2. Whole system
11 Offshore system sensitive to variable flow rates. Offshore
12 Offshore construction and operation risks. Offshore












13 Macroeconomic volatilities impacting project economics. Whole system
14 CCS levy fails to be adopted. Whole system
15 Uncertainties with mine workings along the new onshorepipeline route. Onshore
16 Integrity of existing offshore equipment found to be poor. Offshore
17 Migration of CO2 from the storage site Offshore
18 Other construction works at power station impact on CCSprogramme.
Onshore
19 Items of novel plant have shorter life than predicted. Onshore
20 Failure to agree offshore asset transfer terms. Offshore
21 Archaeological finds along new onshore pipeline route. Onshore
22 Unit supplying flue gases to Carbon capture plant (CCP) notoperating at required load factor. Onshore
24 23 Low CCP operating efficiency due to flexible power plantoperation. Whole system
25 24 Inability to agree flue gas composition specification. Whole system
23 25
Problems encountered during River Forth pipeline crossing. Onshore
26 Disruption on online assets during disconnection of onshorepipeline. Onshore
27 Changes to proposed new pipeline crossing methodologies. Onshore
28 Damage to onshore pipeline system due to transportation ofCO2.
Onshore
29 Industrial disputes and relationship issues. Onshore
30 Further ground contamination at proposed CCP site. Onshore
31 Uncertainty in the level of change instigated by stakeholders. Whole system
32 Depressurisation of CO2 cause low temperature embrittlement ofonshore plant. Onshore
34 33 Third Party Access to CCS infrastructure is required. Whole system
35 34 Insufficient suitably qualified and experienced resources todeliver CCS project. Whole system
38 35 Two-shift operation introduced at the power station. Onshore
33 36 Construction risks with unidentified adverse ground conditionsalong pipeline route. Onshore












38 Further ground contamination along CO2 pipeline route (powerstation boundaries). Onshore
39 Further ground contamination along CO2 pipeline route. Onshore
42 40 Onshore pipeline commissioning delays due to switch fromnatural gas to CO2.
Onshore
40 41 CCP is below required performance acceptance criteria. Onshore
41 42 CCP degrades more readily due to amine degradation. Onshore
43 Failure to address applicable safety legislation. Onshore
44 Low availability of flue gas to CCP due to aged power plantassets. Onshore
45 Political changes result in withdrawal of CCS funding / interest. Whole system
46 Legal challenge is made against state aid / funding. Whole system
47 Inadequate control of project due to scale of project. Whole system
48 Intellectual property infringement. Whole system
49 Regulator unwilling to license aquifer. Offshore
50 Additional compressor requirements for onshore pipeline due tofriction in pipe. Onshore
7.4 Risk descriptors
The risk descriptors to this CCS case study are discussed in this section.
7.4.1 Reference
The risk Identification number used in this case study were the numbers
allocated to each risk in the column risk ranking in Table 7.1. These numbers
are referred to in the development of the different risk dimensions. The XP
reference provides detail of where the risk details originated in the XP data set.
7.4.2 Carbon capture and storage chain component
This column provides details of the infrastructure modules for the CCS value
chain. Although different descriptors were used in the initial development of the
risk register template the XP descriptors were used for the structure of the
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generic risk register as they related to the risk owner in the consortium. The
categories were broadly divided into 3 groups:
A. those that relate to the whole system;
B. onshore ( land based); and
C. Offshore (marine based) components.
The component categories have been allocated to the respective risks in Table
7.1 and a summary of components and subcomponents are provided in Table
7.2.
Table 7.2 The components and sub components of CCS
Component Sub component
Whole system  Not applicable
Onshore




 On shore pipelines




 Wells and reservoir
 Offshore storage
7.4.3 Phases of the lifecycle
The following phases of the lifecycle included; FEED, construction,
commissioning and proofing, operations, decommissioning and post closure.
These phases were the phases designated for the project in the report (DECC,
2011).
7.4.4 Risk classifications
The generic risk portfolio for the XP top 50 post feed risks include; regulatory,
legal, environmental, health and safety, economic, societal and technical. The
definitions of these generic risks which were applied to classification of the 50
risks in XP risk register can be found in Section 6.2.2.3.
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7.4.5 Risk categories
Analysis of 50 risks disclosed in the Post FEED risk register found that XP used
18 risk categories. These were used along with the risk descriptions and
consequences in the XP risk register to apply a risk classification. The XP risk
register did not breakdown the risks into risk categories but included variations
in the basic risk category, for example there are seven different types of
technical risks and three types of construction risk as illustrated in Table
7.3.The data has been developed further by providing risk specific clarification
for each risk classification and this is summarised in Table 7.3
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The risk descriptions presented in the initial generic risk register were taken
from the original FEED study (see Table 7.1) based on the rational they are
concise and would allow easier critical analysis of the data in the risk register as
additional dimensions were developed. The more detailed XP risk register data
was used as a reference repository to confirm the intent of the disclosure.
7.4.7 Hazard identification
The detailed descriptions of the XP risk register were used to support the
attributes of hazard identification. Hazard identification was achieved by asking
the question;” what was the hazard that is the source of the risk?" When
answering this question the definition of hazard applied was a source or cause
of; adverse effects, danger, harm, loss, injury, damage, disruption, and
degradation (Smith, 1981; Sutton, 1992; IPCS, 2004; Kaplan and Garrick, 1981;
IPCS, 2008; HSE, 2011). The resulting complete generic risk register is
provided in Appendix F and an example of part of the register is provided in
Table 7.4.
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Key project onshore construction
consents not obtained to programme- to
be managed by third parties outside the
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Yes Yes Regulatory Consent Consents Compliance
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not obtained to programme- to be
managed by third parties outside the
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Yes Yes Regulatory Consent Consents onshore/
operational
Key project onshore operational consents
not obtained to programme - to be
managed by the Consortium
Consents not acquired in required timeframe threatening
viability of project
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7.5 Subsidiary risk register
7.5.1 Method for the production of subsidiary registers
The next stage was the preparation of the subsidiary risk registers which
involved dividing the registers into onshore and offshore registers for the
respective stage of the lifecycle. Table 7.5 and Table 7.6 provides a matrix of
the subsidiary registers produced from the initial top 50 post FEED list for
onshore operations from XP. The subsidiary registers help to establish the
clustering of risks which occur at the same phase of the lifecycle and in respect
of the CCS components.
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The number of risks per generic risk for each stage of the CCS lifecycle using
the subsidiary registers listed above for onshore and offshore risks was collated
in Table 7.7 for onshore hazards and Table 7.8 for offshore hazards. This
information would be needed to identify the interface hazards and compile the
interface register.
Table 7.7 Number of generic risks per offshore subsidiary register
Onshore
Generic risk
FEED Construction Commissioning Operations Decommissioning Post
closure
Economic 5 2 3 2 1 1
Environmental 1 4 1 2 0 1
Health and
safety
2 0 1 1 0 0
Legal 2 1 1 1 0 1
Regulatory 5 2 0 4 2 0
Societal 2 2 2 2 0 2
Technical 4 11 10 7 0 2
Total 21 22 18 19 3 7
Table 7.8 Number of generic risks per onshore subsidiary register
Offshore
Generic Risk
FEED Construction Commissioning Operations Decommissioning Post
closure
Economic 5 2 2 2 1 1
Environmental 0 0 0 0 0 0
Health and
safety
1 0 1 1 0 0
Legal 4 2 2 2 0 2
Regulatory 4 1 1 1 1 1
Societal 2 2 2 2 0 2
Technical 6 4 6 7 1 3
Total 22 11 14 15 3 9
7.5.2 Results of the subsidiary registers
Subsidiary registers were successfully produced for all stages of the lifecycle. A
review of the subsidiary registers highlighted some inconsistencies with the
original data in the risk register. The onshore and offshore decommissioning
subsidiary registers did not contain any hazards which were specific to the
decommissioning. Some of the hazards which comprise this register in some
cases should not exist at the decommissioning stage of the project. One would
suggest that by the time decommissioning was about to occur construction
consents (ID 1) would have been obtained and the macro economic viability (ID
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13) would have been addressed during the earlier stages of the project. The
onshore post closure stage of the project also has inconsistencies such (ID 23)
Low CCP operating efficiency due to flexible power plant operation; this issue is
not applicable to this stage of the lifecycle as decommissioning has already
taken place.
7.6 Interface hazard identification
7.6.1 Method of interface hazard identification
A register of concurrent hazards was produced by matching each of the 50
generic risks with another risk in the initial risk register. The intention being that
these two risks occur simultaneously and result in an additional hazard. The
conditions set out in Section 6.4.1 were applied and the following CCS specific
variations made;
1. No variation was made to the first condition.
2. Condition 2 was varied as each risk was categorised by the specific
generic classification (Table 7.7 and Table 7.8) the stage of the CCS
lifecycle, designating whether they were onshore or offshore and the
module of the CCS component (Table 7.5 and Table 7.6). The resulting
variation required amendments to the structure of the register which
included the addition of 6 columns, one for each phase of the lifecycle.
Two columns were also added for the components, one to distinguish
between onshore and offshore and another to state the applicable
components. Figure 7-2 shows a section of a subsidiary register for the
presentation of the interface hazards.
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Figure 7-2 Diagram showing an example of the structure of a register of interface hazards incorporating an audit trail to the
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3. The hierarchy for classification was developed (Table 7.3).
4. The resulting generic risks were then grouped into subsidiary registers/
phases of the lifecycle.
5. Taking each subsidiary register option the risks were allocated a unique
number. The numbering system used started at 100 and increased by
200.
Table 7.9 The allocated unique hazard identification number for the respective
sub register and the total number of interface hazards for each sub register
Sub register Number assigned Number ofhazardss
Start End
ONSHORE
A. FEED 100 267 167
B. Construction 300 420 120
C. Commissioning 500 597 97
D. Operations 700 841 141
E. Decommissioning 900 901 1
F. Post closure 1100 1117 17
OFFSHORE
G. FEED 1300 1379 79
H. Construction 1500 1545 45
I. Commissioning 1700 1772 72
J. Operations 1900 1980 80
K. Decommissioning 2100 2102 2
L. Post closure 2300 2328 28
Total number of hazards 849
The allocation of a unique number for the resulting coupling/ concurrent
hazard facilitated an audit trail from the initial generic risk register (base
data) through to the subsidiary registers, iterations of the data and the
final register of concurrent hazards. Additionally this facilitated each
subsidiary register and the combinations of generic risks to be identified
from the base data. The resulting 849 interface hazards were
characterised identified and documented in their respective register.
6. The interface register was synthesised by application of the following:
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The hazard couplings which occurred ‘most frequently’ in the master
register were identified. Most frequently occurring was defined as
frequently occurring across all stages of the lifecycle. The twelve
frequently occurring hazards have been identified in Table 7.10.
Table 7.10 The twelve most frequently occurring hazards
Generic Hazard Risk ID Risk description
Economic
13 Macroeconomic volatilities impacting projecteconomics.
34 Insufficient suitably qualified and experiencedresources to deliver CCS project.
Environmental 30 Further ground contamination at proposed CCP site.
Legal 33 Third Party Access to CCS infrastructure is required.48 Intellectual property infringement.
Regulatory
3
Key project onshore construction consents not
obtained to programme – to be managed by
consortium.
5 Offshore construction and operation consentuncertainties.
Societal
9 Adverse public reaction to CCS.
31 Uncertainty in the level of change instigated bystakeholders.
Technical
12 Offshore construction and operation risks.
17 Migration of CO2 from the storage site
23 Low CCP operating efficiency due to flexible powerplant operation.
The twelve frequently occurring hazards were used to create a matrix of
couplings ( Figure 7-3). Hazards from the same generic family were not
coupled and this is illustrated in Figure 7-4 by using the letter N (not
coupled). The shaded area is a mirror image of the result of couplings in
the un-shaded area, as this is duplication it has been excluded from
further analysis.
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Risk ID 13 34 30 33 48 3 5 9 31 12 17 23
13 N N
34 N N
30 4 5 N
33 4 5 0 N N
48 8 8 5 N N
3 3 3 3 0 4 N N
5 4 4 0 3 4 N N
9 8 9 2 5 7 2 4 N N
31 8 10 4 4 8 2 4 N N
12 4 4 0 3 4 0 4 4 4 N N N
17 4 4 0 4 4 0 0 3 4 N N N
23 8 10 3 5 10 2 4 10 10 N N N
TOTAL NUMBER
OF COUPLINGS
55 62 17 24 41 6 16 17 18 0 0 0 256
NIL COUPLING
FREQUENCY
0 0 4 1 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 8
ECONOMICS LEGAL REGULATORY SOCIETAL TECHINCAL
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A register was created using the matrix of frequently occurring couplings
( Figure 7-3). The result was 256 coupling hazards (see Appendix H 1).
Using the 256 resulting concurrent hazards those couplings that were
identified as similar because they took place at the same stage of
lifecycle and CCS chain component were identified and the result was a
register of 41 concurrent hazards (see Appendix H 2) of which an
example is presented in Figure 7-4.
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A sample of the structure of the register used for the final iteration and
documentation of interface hazards is presented in Figure 7-4 and a full copy is
provided in Appendix H 2.
7.6.2 Results of interface hazard identification
The identification of cross-disciplinary hazards was achieved by the couplings
produced from the register of 50 risks. Couplings were produced from the 12
most frequently occurring hazards. Although two health and safety risks were
identified in the original risk register they were not identified as being one of the
most frequently occurring hazards. This was due to the fact that one of the
hazards (ID 43) only occurred at the FEED stage of the lifecycle and the other
hazard (ID10) was present at the FEED, commissioning and operations stages.
The most frequently occurring hazards include all the other generic
classifications.
The most frequently occurring interface hazards should provide a reason for
focusing the active management of these hazards. Frequency in the context of
interface identification is the most coupled risks. This should however be
tempered with the potential for bias that could be introduced by the large
number of whole system risk (14) in the portfolio of 50 risks. Also the
designation of the classification whole system itself does mean that the hazards
will affect the whole system. This highlights the requirement to make sure that
whole system risks actually apply to the whole system and across the stages of
the lifecycle where this is appropriate. If this is not the case errors in the
identification of cross discipline hazards may occur.
7.7 Causation hazard identification
7.7.1 Method of causation hazard identification
A causation hazard is dependent on a prior hazard occurring. If the prior hazard
does not occur then causation will not take place. The method set out in
Chapter 6 was applied to the XP data and involved taking the individual
subsidiary risk registers derived from the generic risk register and for each
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individual risk establish if this risk triggers a hazard. This line of thinking was
repeated until there were no additional hazards or the project was terminated.
For each of the 50 hazards if the initial risk did not take place the subsequent
hazard would not arise. An example of the structure of the causation register is
provided in Table 7.11.



































































































































Figure 7-5 Structure of the causation register for XP
The rationale for using the subsidiary register is that these registers provide
details of risks which would occur within one stage of the CCS lifecycle. By
using these registers there is a complete and verified pool of risks for the
specific stage of the lifecycle. The second step was to identify any hazards
which would result in the termination of the project.
Option 1 causation within a stage of the lifecycle
The identification of causation hazards was achieved by taking each sub
register and using knowledge about the stage of the lifecycle, placing the
hazards in context, and stating the next progression of the hazard. At each
stage the question; ”does the prior hazard result or triggers the subsequent
hazard?” was asked and was continued with each subsequent hazard until the
outcome was termination or an acceptable outcome for the continuance of the
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project under normal conditions. A summary of the results are provided in Table
7.12 and the full results are in Appendix I-2.
Table 7.12 Generic risks and resulting causation hazards by stage of lifecycle
Onshore /
Off shore
Sub Registers/ stage of
lifecycle
Number of initial risks






A. FEED 21 60
B. Construction 22 46
C. Commissioning 18 64
D. Operations 19 62
E. Decommissioning 3 6
F. Post closure 7 8
Offshore
G. FEED 22 57
H. Construction 11 42
I. Commissioning 14 60
J. Operations 15 64
K. Decommissioning 3 10
L. Post closure 9 19
Total 164 498
Option 2 non-lifecycle specific causation The same approach as option 1
was taken to the generic risk register (option 2) and resulted in a summary
register of causation hazards (see Appendix I.1).
Option 3 transversal causation. This involved highlighting all the hazards that
transverse five or more of the stages of the lifecycle. This was applied to the
consolidated lifecycle register. There were 10 transversal hazards which are
detailed in Table 7.13 and the resulting causation hazards are highlighted in
orange in the consolidated causation register (Appendix I.3).
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Table 7.13 List of transversal hazards
Risk ID Hazard description
9 Adverse public reaction to CCS.
13 Macroeconomic volatilities impacting project economics.
17 Migration of CO2 from the storage site
23 Low CCP operating efficiency due to flexible power plant operation.
30 Further ground contamination at proposed CCP site.
31 Uncertainty in the level of change instigated by stakeholders.
33 Third Party Access to CCS infrastructure is required.
34 Insufficient suitably qualified and experienced resources to deliver
CCS project.
47 Inadequate control of project due to scale of project.
48 Intellectual property infringement.
7.7.2 Results of identification of causation hazards
The identification of causation hazards facilitated cross discipline hazard
identification as many of the initial hazards did not result in a hazard from the
same generic classification. This is illustrated in Appendix J an example is ID 42
(amine degradation of CCP) a technical risk which results in increased CAPEX
to replace the CCP. This is also the case for ID 29 which is an economic risk
concerned with the use of unskilled labour which results in a health and safety
exposure. It is clear that each hazard may have a number of outcomes of which
one is shown in the register for each hazard and subsequent hazard produced
for this research.
An observation from all the chains of causation is that in many cases the project
is only terminated when the financial feasibility of the project is in question
resulting in stranded assets and project termination. The chains of causation
provide knowledge of potential outcome so as to allow corrective action to be
taken if this is an option. The objective of the pilot was to establish whether the
method set out in Chapter 6 could be applied to real data and with respect to
the identification of causation hazards and compile a register of causation
hazards, this has been achieved and evidenced in Appendix J.
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7.8 Accumulation hazard identification
7.8.1 Method of accumulation hazard identification
Section 6 proposed three different types of accumulation hazards which were
applied to the XP risk register data set. They are;
Type 1 portfolio - hazards that are stage of lifecycle specific.
Type 2 portfolio - hazards that occur across the stages of the lifecycle.
Type 3 portfolio - hazards that occur within a component or module of the
process or project.
Type 1 portfolio - stage of lifecycle specific accumulation hazards. The
subsidiary registers as shown in Table 7.14 are portfolios which comprise all the
hazards that occur within a specific stage of the CCS lifecycle.
Table 7.14 List of subsidiary registers and the corresponding number of hazards
which comprise the respective accumulation hazard portfolio
Location SubsidiaryRegisters















L. Post closure 9
Total 164
Type 2 portfolio There were six stages of the lifecycle and the maximum
number of hazards across all the stages of the lifecycle was five. Those hazards
which occur across the maximum stages (5) of the lifecycle are listed in Table
7.15.
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Table 7.15 The Risk ID for those hazards that occur across the maximum number of stages (5) accross the lifecycle with their
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A third type of accumulation hazard is the portfolio of hazards within one
component or module. These hazards are identified in the XP risk register by
applying the filter to the respective CCS chain component and obtaining
registers of hazards from each of the nine components/ modules identified in
Table 7.2.








Feeder 10 26,38 2
The hazards are unlikely to
occur at the same time
additionally risks are








performance related and go
to the heart of the rationale
for the process and could




It is feasible that all risks
materialise at the same time
Offshore
platform 12 1 Not applicable
Offshore
storage 17,49 2 Accumulation potential
Offshore








16 1 Not applicable






Total number of hazards 50
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On reviewing the hazards that comprise the portfolio of component hazards in
Table 7.16 it was clear that some of these portfolios were not portfolios due to
the small number of hazards (offshore platform) and the possibility of the
hazards to resulting in a significant event (offshore elements). The remaining six
accumulation hazards are presented in Appendix K.
Unlike the other pools of risk these risks are not additive they have to remain in
their components. However the “whole system risks” can be allocated to each
portfolio and the result is a potential compilation of accumulation hazards.
As the whole system risks traverse all components they have the potential to
trigger and create accumulation hazards that could result in a catastrophic loss
impact or event as a result they are included as a separate transversal
accumulation hazard.
The resulting three methods of identifying accumulation hazards result in a
register which is comprised of:
1. Sub registers from each phase of the lifecycle and additionally for on shore
and offshore operations.
2.Hazard relationships which cross all the stages of the lifecycle and which
include identified hazards as well as those designated whole system hazards,
and
3. Individual registers for the individual CCS chain components.
Figure 7-6 The number and composition of the different accumulation hazard



















As a result of applying the XP CCS data the steps for the method for identifying
the accumulation hazards will be;-
1. Produce subsidiary registers for each stage of the lifecycle of a new project
or technologies taking into account the context such as onshore or off shore
operations.
2. Identify those risk relationship which occur across all stages of the lifecycle.
3. Produce the individual registers for each of the modules of the process and
value chain.
With the outcome of each of these steps establish if the compilation is feasible
and give reasons why the hazard should be excluded.
7.8.2 Results of identification of accumulation hazards
The compilation of accumulation hazards provides examples of portfolio
hazards within which there is the potential for interaction of a number of hazards
within a short period of time. This means that there is the potential for hazards
to interact with each other and cross discipline hazards are implicit in the
identification process. This occurs with transversal hazards in an accumulation
portfolio and the concentration of component hazards. It is illustrated in the
power station, onshore pipeline and whole system components (Appendix K, L
and Table 7.16) where there is a concentration of different generic risks.
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A. FEED 2 62%
B. Construction 22 36%
C. Commissioning 18 50%
D. Operations 19 47%
E. Decommissioning 3 33%
F. Post closure 7 86%
Offshore
G. FEED 22 36%
H. Construction 11 82%
I. Commissioning 14 64%
J. Operations 15 60%
K. Decommissioning 3 33%
L. Post closure 9 67%
Total 145 62%
The results show that whole system hazards have a significant influence on the
accumulation hazards. Of the 14 whole system risks 6 traverse all stages of the
lifecycle with the exception of decommissioning. Table 7.17 shows the number
of whole system hazards as a percentage of the total number of hazards in
subsidiary registers. All the risks are over 33% and eight out of the 12 are over
50%. This highlights the important influence that the whole system component
has over the results of the entire project. Further investigation should be carried
out to ensure that the allocation of a generic component is correct.
7.9 Register developments
7.9.1 Generic register
The generic register was successfully adapted to include the six stages of the
lifecycle, the onshore and offshore locations and ten components. The original
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risk register data was used to derive the classification and characterisation of
the 50 risks from the original risk register. This parameter proved to be able to
accommodate the information required for characterising this specific project.
7.9.2 Subsidiary register
Compiling the subsidiary registers is a function of the quality of the original data.
Hazards which are stated as occurring throughout the entire system and across
all stages of the lifecycle may not be applicable or appropriate to all stages of
the lifecycle and this is highlighted when analysing the subsidiary registers. For
example in the subsidiary register for the onshore decommissioning phase
(Table 7.18) there are three hazards of which two regulatory hazards would not
be hazards as they are concerned with the onshore construction consents and
as such at the decommissioning stage would not threaten the viability of the
project post operation. However if the objective of this register is that it is
highlighting risks from later stages in the lifecycle that need to be addressed
early in the lifecycle then this would be correct. The third hazard is economic
and is a potential exposure. Based on the decommissioning of power stations
and pipelines there should be other hazards identified in the onshore
decommissioning stage. The absence of these hazards is highlighted at the
stage of reviewing the subsidiary registers.
Table 7.18Subsidiary register for decommissioning stage of the lifecycle
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The post closure stage of the lifecycle for XP (Table 7.19) highlights additional
issues as it is unlikely that an infrastructure project of such substantial
investment and which spans a significant time frame would be in a position
where the risks highlighted in red would still be outstanding.
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3rd party Intellectual
Property
Analysis of the highlighted hazards in Table 7.19 shows an incomplete position
for the onshore post closure stage of the lifecycle as a result of the following;
 Risk ID No 4, 23, would be dealt with prior to the operational stage and are
unlikely to have an impact on the post closure stage after decommissioning.
 Risk ID No 34, is concerned with the delivery of the project. It could be said
that at the post closure stage the project has been delivered what is required
is maintenance and security of containment CO2 at the post closure stage.
 Risk ID No 33, is according to the XP risk register positioned after closure
and decommissioning so it is unclear what the threatened commercial
capacity would be at the post closure stage.
 Risk ID No 47 It is difficult to see what the scale up exposure would be at the
post closure stage as the project is completed. The lack of experience of
post closure containment and remediation would be the specific hazard for
this stage of the lifecycle, but this was not included.
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Even if the assumption is made that these are hazards highlighted now, for
resolution early in the project lifecycle, there are additional hazards which have
not been identified. One reason for this could be that these additional hazards
were not in the top 50 risks.
7.9.3 Interface hazard identification
The method for the identification of interface hazards produced 849 potential
interface hazards in the first iteration (Table 7.20). The objective of the pilot
study was to establish if interface hazards were identified from the original data
set and this objective was met as hazards were identified for each subsidiary
register. To produce a more manageable number of hazards the second
iteration focused on those hazards which occurred most frequently across the
lifecycle (256) couplings. Analysis of these couplings found that a number were
repeated and the result was a register of 49 interface hazards.
Table 7.20 Summary of the number of interface hazards identified from 50
generic hazards




Original register of generic hazards 50
Interface hazards
Onshore A. FEED 21 167
B. Construction 22 120
C. Commissioning 18 97
D. Operations 19 141
E. Decommissioning 3 1
F. Post closure 7 17
Offshore G. FEED 22 79
H. Construction 14 45
I. Commissioning 14 72
J. Operations 15 80
K. Decommissioning 3 2
L. Post closure 9 28
Total first iteration 167 849
Total second iteration 256
Consolidated total 49
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7.9.4 Causation hazard identification
The three methods of causation were successfully applied to the XP data set.
Application of the causation method to the generic register did not allow
consideration of the risks within the context of their lifecycle. Examination of the
resulting data highlighted the issue of assuming that hazards result in the same
causation irrespective of where they are in the lifecycle. This is illustrated by the
inclusion of operational hazards which would not apply in the decommissioning
and post closure phases. As a result applying the methodology by stage of
lifecycle is the most acceptable approach. The importance of the application by
lifecycle is illustrated by the fact that with the identification of transversal
hazards it is possible to identify where mitigation should occur to minimise the
potential of a creeping hazard. From the 50 risks taken from the generic register
498 additional hazards were identified. The number of causation hazards for
each stage of the lifecycle is presented in Table 7.21.
Table 7.21 The results of the causation register using the consolidation of the
subsidiary registers













L. Post closure 19
Total 498
223
7.9.5 Accumulation hazard identification
The three methods of identifying accumulation hazards were successfully
applied to the XP data. When analysing the results there are four portfolios with
less than 10 hazards which should be investigated further as they may not meet
the conditions of an accumulation risk. These have been excluded from the
calculation of the number of type 1 accumulation hazards.
Table 7.22 Type 1 accumulation portfolio - stage of lifecycle
Stage of the lifecycle Hazards within dimension Number of hazards
A. FEED 21 1
B. Construction 22 1
C. Commissioning 18 1
D. Operations 19 1
E. Decommissioning 3 0
F. Post closure 7 0
G. FEED 22 1
H. Construction 14 1
I. Commissioning 14 1
J. Operations 15 1
K. Decommissioning 3 0
L. Post closure 9 0
Total 167 8
Type 2 – transversal accumulation hazards were identified and the summarised
results show that there are very few component hazards that are transversal.
With the exception of the whole system component the majority of components
have less than three transversal hazards in their portfolio. As the whole system
component has more than three hazards it is the only portfolio that has been
included.
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Table 7.23 Type 2 accumulation portfolio - transversal
Component
Number of hazards







Feeder 10 0 0
Power Station and Carbon
capture plant 1
0
Off shore elements 2 0
Offshore platform 1 0
Offshore storage 1 0
Onshore elements 2 0
Onshore pipeline 0 0
Surface facilities and wells 1 0
Well reservoirs 1 0
Whole system 9 1
Total - 1
The application of the method for identification of type 3 component
accumulation hazards was successfully applied and a summary of the results
are provided in Table 7.24. This table highlights that there are components
where there is only one hazard (offshore platform, storage and, surface facilities
and wells) and these were excluded as not fulfilling the definition of an
accumulation hazard. When some of the components were analysed it was not
possible for the hazards to result in an accumulation hazard, for example
Feeder 10. With respect to the well reservoir component this is only an
exposure during the operational stage of the lifecycle. If these five components
are excluded there are five potential accumulation portfolios from the
component parameter.
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Feeder 10 2 0
Power Station and Carbon capture plant 10 1
Off shore elements 4 1
Offshore platform 1 0
Offshore storage 2 0
Onshore elements 4 1
Onshore pipeline 10 1
Surface facilities and wells 1 0
Well reservoirs 2 0
Whole system 14 1
Total 50 5
7.10 Validation
Steps of validation of XP data, application and results are summarised in Table
7.25 and involved checking the base data as presented was correct, the
application of the method was possible and resulted in registers of cross-
disciplinary hazards.
Table 7.25 Table to show the method of validation applied to data integrity,
method application, register production and cross-discipline hazard
identification
Parameter Validation of process Validation of results
Data integrity
Data was cross checked with
risk register and table within
the report.
Discrepancies were identified
and the most recent data used.
Application of the
method in Section 6
Method applied to the
identification of cross-
disciplinary hazards in
accordance to the method laid
out in chapter 6.
Production of the registers of
cross discipline hazards.
Generic register
Initial data was validated by
the three companies who
compiled the risk register and
report and by DECC.
CCS expert reviewed the
application of the descriptors
and the resulting generic
register of hazards
Subsidiary register
Audit trail back to original
data.







This chapter applied the method outlined in Chapter 6 to the XP data set and
found that the method identified cross discipline hazards through the additional
dimensions of interface, causation and accumulation hazards. The subsidiary
register presented the generic register in subsidiary lifecycle registers and was
essential to the identification of the novel dimensions.
Figure 7-7 Method resulting from the outcome of the pilot case study
The new method for the identification of hazards has provided three additional
dimensions to the original register which have identified previously unidentified
cross-disciplinary hazards. The enhanced method which resulted from the pilot
study will be tested to establish whether it is possible to identify the generic,
interface, causation and accumulation dimensions for a process which does not














8 CASE STUDY 2 - CLOSED LANDFILL HAZARD
REGISTER
8.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the application of the method for identifying novel
hazards (see Chapter 6) to a risk register from a closed landfill site. The aim of
this case study was to test whether it was possible to produce a register of
generic hazards from original data, and identify the dimensions and evidence in
a register.
A closed landfill was chosen because landfills at this stage of the lifecycle are
well characterised and have been in existence for many years. As a result
verification of the generic register by experts would be possible and
infringement of intellectual property would not be an issue. The rationale for
choosing this site was based on the fact that a site specific risk register did not
exist. As a result a register of identified hazards would need to be compiled in
accordance with the method (Chapter 6) which requires a risk register as the
base data to commence the identification of the dimensions. Divulging the
details of the actual site was an issue as landfills are sensitive structures which
can result in reputational damage to the company and the area that it is located.
As a result these details have been excluded from the case study in line with
the requirements of the Cranfield Ethics Committee (Section 4.4.1).
A landfill is defined as a waste disposal site for the deposit of waste onto or into
land (Article 2(g) of the Landfill Directive 1999/31/EC). The studied site is
defined as a historic closed landfill as it fulfils the requirements of the
Environment Agency Closed Landfill High Priority Review Process which are
that the landfill is closed, no longer has a permit, and was closed prior to the EU
Landfill directive (1999/31/EC; EA NTS, 2010). The footprint of the site is
presented in Figure 8-1.
The site is a disused quarry located on the outskirts of a small town in the
Midlands. To the north-east perimeter of the site there is residential housing
which is within the 250 metre boundary (Town and Country Planning – General
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Development Procedure- Order 1995) and a lagoon to the west edge of the site.
The site is adjacent to an ex-local authority landfill which has no gas or leachate
management. This landfill ceased operating in the early 1990s and planning
permission was given to allow restoration for use as pasture and grazing.
Subsequently, in 1993, the waste disposal license was handed back to the local
authority.
The entity identified as the polluter under the Contaminated Land Regime (Part
II A) is not the original owner but now has been tasked with addressing the
residual contamination. An indemnity for a fixed amount to fund the aftercare
costs for this site was given to the current owner of the site when the site was
sold by the original owner. The contamination results from the migration of
landfill gas towards potential receptors and the migration of leachate from the
site. A remediation statement was agreed in 2005 requiring;
 The installation of a gas management system, monitoring, collection of
landfill gas; and
 The monitor of leachate on the basis of management by long term monitored
natural attenuation (Site Specific Quarterly Report, 2011).
Figure 8-1 Map of the closed landfill (September 2011 Quarterly review)
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The local Borough Council agreed to carryout off-site environmental monitoring
to support the gas management remediation strategy. On-site monitoring has
been carried out on a monthly basis by a third party, who is also responsible for
the maintenance of the gas management system. The monitoring data collected
on-site and offsite is used to calibrate the gas management equipment to
ensure maximum collection of landfill gas. The determinations (2000 and 2002)
and the remediation statement required that the landfill gas and leachate were
managed until they no longer posed a further threat to the environment or
human health.
8.2 Method specific to this case study
The method of multidimensional hazard identification requires a register of
verified hazards prior to the identification of interface, causation and
accumulation hazards (Section 6.3.2). The register of hazards for this site was
compiled from the perspective of the site and not as an owner, tenant or
stakeholder. The quantification of the identified hazards could not take place as
monitoring data was not available. There were three sources of data; the
unpublished September 2011 quarterly review completed by the consultant to
the site, information on the website from local authority, and researcher site
visits in December 2011 and March 2012 (see Appendix M). Additional data
was obtained from academic journal articles and UK regulatory guidance which
provided details on the impacts of generic closed landfills and the knowledge of
the researcher having placed environmental impairment insurance for over
1000 landfills in the UK.
In the previous case study (Chapter 7) the risk register was already complied
and used as the base data prior to the application of the method. In this case
study the initial register did not exist. As a result the compilation of the register
was achieved by identifying hazards using all the sources of data highlighted
above.
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Figure 8-2 outlines the stages followed to compile the register of hazards prior
to the application of the method outlined in Chapter 6.
Figure 8-2 Steps involved in producing the register of hazards prior to the
application of the method
The figure shows that the lists of 71 hazards were reviewed twice prior to the
application of the method. Firstly by an environmental underwriter who is an
expert at underwriting landfills and confirmed that the hazards were a fair
reflection of those expected on a closed landfill; and secondly after prioritisation
by the consultant in charge of the aftercare for the site. The resulting prioritised
risks were then reviewed and used to apply the method for the identification of
cross-disciplinary hazards as stated in Chapter 6.
8.3 Risk descriptors
8.3.1 Risk identification number
In the absence of a risk register a register of hazards was compiled and as a
result each hazard was given a unique hazard Identification number (hazard
ID). The hazard ID was used in the same way as the Risk ID in the XP pilot
study (Chapter 7), providing an audit trail throughout the synthesis of data used
to produce the different dimensions of hazards.
Raw Data
Production of a list of hazards








Although operational landfill activities have not taken place on-site for over 18
years, the following processes are occurring responding to the remediation
statement and general aftercare:
 Gas management which includes the management of landfill gas;
 Leachate management;
 Stability; and
 Aftercare which includes restoration as well as the physical and financial
maintenance of the site.
These landfill specific processes will be used instead of the CCS chain
components in Chapter 6. These are specific processes which need to be
managed to ensure the improvement of the site to a position of negligible
impact to health, safety and the environment.
8.3.3 Stages of the lifecycle
Based on discussions with the consultant (Appendix M notes from November
2011 and March 2012) it is assumed that the site ceased operating as a landfill
and closed in the early 1990s. The waste disposal licence was given back to the
local authority in 1993. The consultant stated that the site is believed to have
been closed for at least 18 years. There has been no agreed timeframe within
which the landfill would be deemed safe. As a result of the potential open ended
length of the post-closure stage, the lifecycle has been divided into three
phases:
 Short term (1- 4 years inclusive);
 Medium term (5 -14 years); and
 Long term (15 + years).




The same generic classification of hazards used in the pilot study was used in
this case study and included; health and safety, environmental, economic,
societal, technical, regulatory and legal (Section 6.2.2.3).
8.3.5 Prioritisation of closed landfill hazards
After the initial review by an underwriting risk expert, the register of 71 hazards
were prioritised to ensure that the hazards in the resulting register; used to
derive the interface, causation and accumulation hazards, posed a threat. The
method of prioritisation involved using a scale of high, medium and low. These
categories were used to assign quantitative and qualitative scoring of hazards
and risk (Ward, 1999: HSE, 2006). The scale used by the Environment Agency
for closed landfills used the parameters high, medium and low and divides each
parameter into knowns and unknowns, resulting in 6 strata (EA, 2010). As there
was no access to monitoring or quantitative data, a decision was made to use
the three parameters of high, medium and low with qualitative descriptors
(Table 8.1). The rationale for using a scale was to highlight the hazards that are
likely to have the greatest negative impact on a site and thus pose a threat in
respect of cost to the owner, liability, regulatory impact and damage to human
health and safety.
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Table 8.1 Criteria used to rank the individual hazards in the initial generic
register
Parameter High Medium Low
Health and
safety




























 Third party liability
costs
 Loss of use of
property
















Each individual hazard was assessed based on its likelihood to have the
impacts identified in the descriptors listed in Table 8.1. The result of
prioritisation was captured in the register as part of the characterisation of the
hazard.
8.3.6 Generic hazard classification
The initial portfolio of 71 hazards (Appendix N) were produced and presented in
a register according to the structure in Section 6.2.2. The portfolio was
prioritised in accordance with Section 8.3.5 and this resulted in a register of 49
medium and high rated hazards (Appendix O). The 22 hazards categorised as
low risk were excluded from the register as they are not considered sufficient
risk to require special consideration outside of the normal operations of the site.
The resulting register of hazards was used to identify the dimensions of
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interface, causation and accumulation Table 8.4. The review of the initial
register of hazards resulted in the classification of hazards using the following
classifications, categories and hazard types which were specific to closed
landfills (Table 8.2).
Table 8.2 The generic hazard classification with the respective hazard category
and hazard type for the closed landfill site
Generic hazard
classification
Hazard category Hazard type
Economic
Macro Greenhouse gas tax
Financial




















































Hazard category Hazard type
Acceptance of phase 1 liability
Regulatory regime ComplianceChanging regulations
Societal
Stakeholder Conflict






















8.4 Result of prioritisation
In preparation of the identification of the dimensions and production of registers
for these dimensions it was necessary to prioritise the base register of hazards
to obtain a comparable number of hazards to the pilot case study (Chapter 7).
Table 8.3 provides a summary of the outcome of prioritising the base data, full
details are in Appendix O.
Table 8.3 The number of high and medium generic hazards that result from the





Economic 5 3 8
Environmental 0 12 12
Health and Safety 3 9 12
Legal 0 3 3
Regulatory 0 3 3
Societal 0 2 2
Technical 2 7 9
Total 10 39 49
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The rankings in Table 8.3 show there to be a higher number of economic risks
compared to health and safety. This is due to a non-operational site with no
public access; and the fact that the funding for the aftercare of the site is
threatened by a fixed indemnity, which needs to be sufficient for an unknown
period of time. The actual generic hazard IDs for the 49 hazards are presented
in Table 8.4.





Number1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Economic 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 8
Environmental 17 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 71 12
Health and
safety 1 2 3 4 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 16 12
Legal 64 65 66 3
Regulatory 41 42 44 3
Societal 38 39 2
Technical 47 48 49 54 56 57 58 62 63 9
Total 49
The hazard IDs in Table 8.4 will be used to process the interface hazards.
8.5 Identification and documentation of subsidiary registers
The subsidiary registers of hazards were compiled from the generic register of
49 hazards by filtering the data by stage of the lifecycle. This resulted in three
registers, one for each phase of the lifecycle. Table 8.5 shows the components
that comprise the different subsidiary registers.
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The identification of the chain components highlight the concentration of
hazards identified within the specific components. This is particularly useful in
the identification of the chain component accumulation hazards. Highlighting the
components at this stage of analysis illustrated gaps in the components, such
as the fact there were no stability or leachate management hazards in the last
phase of the lifecycle. The subsidiary registers facilitate the identification of
hazards which occur at the same stage of the lifecycle and can be found in
Appendix P.
8.5.1 Synthesis of subsidiary registers
The number of hazards for each generic hazard and phase of the closed landfill
lifecycle using the subsidiary registers listed above are presented in Table 8.5.
The results show a decline in the number of hazards over the lifecycle phases;
short, medium and long term, which is to be expected as a result of reduced
gas and leachate production. The declining production of landfill gas results in a
negligible exposure to the residential housing on the periphery of the site. This
results in a reduced exposure to health and safety, legal, societal and technical
hazards. In preparation for the identification of interface hazards it was
necessary to identify by Hazard ID the specific generic hazards, these are
tabulated in Table 8.6. This would facilitate an orderly coupling of hazards.
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Table 8.6 The number of hazards per generic classification for each stage of the
lifecycle. Showing the Hazard ID for each subsidiary register
Generic
classification Hazard ID for short term (A)subsidiary register
Total number
of hazards
Economic 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 8
Environmental 17 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 71 12
Health and safety 1 2 3 4 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 16 12
Legal 64 65 66 3
Regulatory 41 42 44 3
Societal 38 39 2
Technical 47 48 49 57 58 62 63 7
Total 47
Generic hazards Hazard ID for medium term (B)subsidiary register
Economic 30 31 32 33 34 35 6
Environmental 17 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 71 12
Health and safety 1 2 3 4 6 7 9 10 11 12 16 11
Legal 64 65 66 3
Regulatory 41 42 44 3
Societal 38 39 2
Technical 47 48 49 57 58 62 63 9
Total 46
Generic hazards Hazard ID for long term (C)subsidiary register
Economic 30 31 32 33 4
Environmental 17 26 28 71 4
Health and safety 0
Legal 64 1
Regulatory 41 1
Societal 38 39 2
Technical 47 58 2
Total 14
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8.6 Interface hazard identification
8.6.1 Method of interface hazard identification
The initial stage of deriving the interface hazard register is the compilation of
subsidiary registers for each phase of the lifecycle as listed in Table 8.5. The
assumptions set out in Chapter 6 with respect to interface hazards were
adhered to. The resulting matrix of generic hazards are found in Appendix Q1
and summarised in Table 8.7.
Table 8.7 The number of interface hazards for each subsidiary register and their
unique identification number
Subsidiary register Number assigned Number ofhazardsStart Finished
A Short Term 100 1073 973
B Medium Term 2000 2864 864
C Long Term 3000 3064 64
Total number of hazards 1901
The process for compiling the interface register (see Section 6.4.1) was
followed and a matrix of couplings from these frequently occurring hazards was
produced see Table 8.8. The result was 195 couplings made up of the most
frequently occurring hazards (Appendix Q1). The next step involved using the
195 resulting concurrent hazards and identifying those couplings that are the
same by stage of lifecycle and chain component. This resulted in a register of
43 concurrent hazards (Appendix Q2).
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Table 8.8 Matrix of frequently occurring couplings produced from the register of generic hazards for a closed landfill for the
identification of interface hazards. (N= Not applicable as these couplings are a mirror image of remainder of the table.)
GENERIC RISK FAMILY
ECONOMICS ENVIRONMENT LEGAL REGULATORY SOCIETAL TECHNICAL
30 31 32 33 17 26 28 71 64 42 38 39 47
30 N N N N N N N N N N N N N
31 N N N N N N N N N N N N N
32 N N N N N N N N N N N N N
33 N N N N N N N N N N N N N
17 3 3 3 3 N N N N N N N N N
26 3 3 3 3 N N N N N N N N N
28 3 3 3 3 N N N N N N N N N
71 3 3 3 3 N N N N N N N N N
64 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 N N N N N
42 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 N N N N
38 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 N N N
39 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 N N N




27 27 27 27 15 15 15 15 12 9 3 3 0 195
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The results of the top 49 hazards from the initial register are 43 interface
hazards (Appendix Q2). The compilation of the register of hazards and
verification both on initial compilation and post prioritisation by both risk and
landfill experts increased the validity and integrity of the base data. The method
successfully identified interface hazards which were evidenced in a register
adapted for a closed landfill.
The application of the method for the identification of interface hazards
produced 1901 hazards. The first iteration of the interface hazards resulted in
195 hazards which when consolidated by looking at the most frequently
occurring couplings produced 43 interface hazards. A summary of the additional
cross-disciplinary hazards identified by the application of the interface method
of identification for two concurrent hazards are presented in Table 8.9.
Table 8.9 Summary of the number of interface hazards identified from 49 generic







Original register of hazards 71 -
Post prioritisation 49 -
Interface
Portfolio A – short term 47 973
Portfolio B - medium term 46 864
Portfolio C – long term 14 64
Total first iteration 1901
Total second iteration 195
Consolidated 43
The total number of interface hazards is a function of the number of generic risk
classifications and the number of hazards in each classification. The second
column in the table shows that the reduction in initial hazards results in a
reduction in interface hazards for each stage of the lifecycle. The first iteration
includes all the interface hazards that result from the prioritisation of the
hazards in the generic register of hazards (1901) and the second iteration
shows the application of including only the frequently occurring hazards (195).
The consolidation includes those interface hazards that occur across all the
stages of the lifecycle (43). Table 8.8 shows that from an initial register of 71
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hazards 49 hazards where ranked as high or medium 43 interface hazards of
cross-disciplinary hazards were identified.
8.6.2 Results of interface hazard identification
A review of the interface hazards found that the method was applied as stated
in Section 6. 4.1. However the method in Section 6.4.1 did not accommodate
the prioritisation of risk based on whether the impact was high, medium or low
as a result it was based on the frequency of the hazards across the lifecycle.
This resulted in only 3 out of the 10 hazards which were ranked high being
included in the hazards used to derive the interface dimension (Table 8.10).
Additionally, 3 out of the 13 most frequently occurring hazards across all the
stages of the lifecycle were used for the identification of interface hazards. With
respect to the identification of interface hazards it suggests that further analysis
of the residual interface hazards should take place and the inclusion of all high
risk hazards should be added to the portfolio of hazards, which would be used
to identify cross- disciplinary hazards.
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Table 8.10 The hazards ranked as high risk in prioritisation of hazards for the
closed landfill. The hazards included in the application of the interface method











































































































collects in the cellars of
houses situated within
250 meters of the
landfill.
Migration of landfill gas
towards residential
housing where there might
be a source of ignition out
of the control of the Class
A polluters of the site.
Hazard exists if the quality
of methane is equal to or
above 5% in the air the
percentage of methane in
landfill gas is likely to be






































attenuation. It is possible
that natural attenuation is





























al The boundary of the site
is less than 250 meters
from residential housing.
Potential migration and
































n There is no financialprovision for the
aftercare of historic
landfills. There is only an
indemnity for this site.
The basis of the indemnity
may not be adequate for
the remediation and
aftercare required for this












































































































The land does not
provide any economic
value for the Class A
polluter. Economic value
is only extracted by the
owner and tenants at the
expense of the Class A
polluter.
Potential long tail liability
which is not capable of
financing within the
existing indemnity and
draws on the resources of
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regime is not adhered to
by the local authority
and the corrective
calibration of the gas
management
infrastructure is not














































































































regime does not provide
consistency for the
management and
reporting of gas and
leachate required to
illustrate that there is a
reducing risk to the
environment and human
health.
Site is unable to
demonstrate a declining
risk and so move towards
satisfying the exit
requirements for the Class
A polluter.
An additional improvement to the interface method of cross-disciplinary hazard
identification would be to apply the method for interface hazard identification to
the pool of 10 hazards which were ranked as high risk in Table 8.10.
8.7 Causation hazard identification
8.7.1 Method
The lifecycle method of causation hazard identification successfully identified
causation hazards and resulted in 452 additional hazards from the initial 49
hazards as summarised in Table 8.11. The full register for causation hazards is
provided in Appendix R.
Table 8.11 Generic risks and resulting causation hazards by stage of the lifecycle
Subsidiary register
Number of initial risks
with a defined hazard
per sub risk register




Portfolio A = Short-term 47 208
Portfolio B= Medium Term 46 195





Analysis of the chains of causation for the landfill case study highlighted the
importance of the indemnity to the continued aftercare of the site. Out of the 49
hazards, 10 hazards immediately required funding for management and the
remainder require funding at some point in the chain of causation. It is clear that
if the indemnity is insufficient to fund the aftercare requirements of this site there
is the potential for it to become an abandoned site. The chains of causation
illustrate the different points at which action could be taken to stop a hazard
resulting in additional cost, reputational issues or non-compliance.
The difference in lifecycle is facilitated initially by the variation in the number of
hazards that comprise the different stages of the lifecycle (Table 8.12). The
chains of causation for the different stages of the lifecycle were presented as
having the same chains of causation, with respect to the hazards in the
respective lifecycle. However, this is unlikely to be the case as those hazards
identified at the start of the short-term stage of the lifecycle would be at a
different stage of development at the medium or long-term and so the initial
hazard would be different. This would require the register to be updated to
accommodate these changes.
Without a register of hazards it is difficult to see how decisions about effective
allocation of funds can be made for the long-term management of the site and
the prudent use of the indemnity. The consequence of inadequate funding for
the aftercare is the greatest issue for this site and one which transcends all
stages of the lifecycle. Most hazards result in a financial implication to the
owner, past owner, tenant, residents, regulator or other stakeholder, as
financing is required to take corrective action.
8.8 Accumulation hazard register
8.8.1 Method of accumulation hazard identification
As stated in Section 6.4.3 there are three different methods for synthesising the
identification of accumulation hazards and all three were applied to post
prioritisation register of hazards in the closed landfill.
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Type 1 portfolio phases of the lifecycle accumulation hazards
The subsidiary risk registers shown in Table 8.5 are risk portfolios which
comprise all the risks that occur at a specific stage of the closed landfill
lifecycle. The accumulation registers for the three stages of the lifecycle are
presented in Appendix S.
Table 8.12 List of subsidiary hazard registers and the applicable number of
hazards which comprise the respective accumulation hazard pool.
Sub Registers Number of hazards comprising the accumulationhazard
A Short term 49
B Medium term 45
C Long term 13
The table shows there are three accumulation hazards, one for each stage of
the lifecycle. It also shows the number of hazards that comprise an
accumulation hazard over the lifecycle declines. In this case study the potential
impact of this accumulation hazard reduces as the number of high and medium
hazards are reduced. The process of ranking hazards took place at one point in
time it is possible that the hazards in the long-term stage of the lifecycle could
change to medium or low. This would change the profile of the accumulation
hazard for this case study.
Type 2 portfolio - transversal accumulation
A second accumulation portfolio results from hazards which occur at all the
stages of the lifecycle. For the closed landfill there are three stages of the
lifecycle and the maximum number of hazards across all the stages of the
lifecycle is three. There are 13 hazards that occur across all stage of the
lifecycle (Table 8.13).
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Table 8.13 the Type 2 generic accumulation hazards
Generic classification Generic hazard identificationnumber
Economic 30, 31, 32, 33
Environmental 17, 26, 28, 71





Total number of hazards 13
The following schedule of hazards was compiled from the generic register by
applying the condition that all type 2 accumulation hazards occur in their
respective stage and filtering the generic register of hazards to establish those
hazards that are common to all stages of the lifecycle. The result was a list of
13 generic hazards which occur in all three stages of the post closure lifecycle
and are presented in Table 8.14.



















































































































































































The site is supposed to
have taken mainly building
waste and wood rather
than municipal waste as
the permit was given back
in 1993 no details are
available. If the waste was
building waste from the
1970s it is not
inconceivable that
asbestos was included in

































landfill gas is the subject of
a determination and its
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environment is required for
the Class A polluter to exit
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the expense of the Class A
polluter.
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ty The current indemnity wasput in place in 2006 to
manage the gas and
leachate on site. The
requirements for aftercare
have changed and the
current indemnity may not
be adequate for the length
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tenants, and regulators
could impact the safe
management of the sites
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heart of this is facilitating






































The waste disposal licence
was handed back in 1993
and as a result it is not
subject to the landfill
directive as it is not
retrospective. There is




for a site without a permit
(historic landfill site) and
uncertainty as to the
regulations that apply.






























































































There are no details as to
the capping strategy so
there is uncertainty as to
the integrity of the cap and
the exposure to


























Currently the Class A
polluter has access to the
site until 2016. The
September 2011 quarterly
review states that it will
take many years before
the site does not present
further risk to the
environment and human
health. If access is not
facilitated beyond 2016 the
Class A polluter losses
control of the remediation,
cost of remediation and
liabilities that result from
migration of gas towards
sensitive receptors.
Uncertainty results
from loss of access
after 2016 with

























Land quality impaired by
mobilised and reactivated
pollution due to increased
flooding resulting from
changing climatic








The contents of Table 8.14 shows that the majority of hazards are aftercare
components (10). These are the hazards that continue through to the long-term
phase of the lifecycle. This is confirmed in Table 8.15 where the number of
hazards are 13, made up of 10 aftercare hazards and 3 gas related hazards.
With respect to a closed landfill there are unlikely to be any additional hazards
at the end of its lifecycle as the objective is to remediate the site back to a level
of providing public amenity.
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Type 3 portfolio component accumulation hazards
The component accumulation hazards are identified in the closed landfill
register by applying the filter in the relevant lifecycle spread sheet to the chain
component and obtaining registers from each of the five components/ modules.
Table 8.15 shows the concentration of component hazards over the lifecycle.
Table 8.15 Type 3 portfolio accumulation hazards for each stage of the lifecycle
Chain component
Number of hazards in chain component
accumulation portfolio
Short term Medium term Long term
Gas management 18 18 3
Leachate management 7 7 0
Aftercare 21 18 10
Total number of risks 46 43 13
The table above shows the decline in the number of hazards over the lifecycle
of the closed landfill. It shows that the majority of hazards are aftercare hazards
and it also shows that the leachate management component is not an exposure
in the long-term which would be expected as natural attenuation should be
complete. Gas management exposures show a significant reduction over the
lifecycle which significantly reduces the exposure to residential housing. The
result of these two reductions leaves the on-going aftercare exposure which is
mainly concerned with the ability of the indemnity to have sufficient funds to
maintain the aftercare which is the greatest exposure of this site. Three
aftercare hazards were excluded from the medium term portfolio as they were
ranked as low risk by the consultant during the review and are presented in
Table 8.16.
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Table 8.16 The three aftercare hazards reclassified as low risk and excluded from






























































































































































Respiratory disease is a
potential latent exposure
to past employees and
occupants in residential
housing on the periphery
of the site from the landfill.
The exposure results from
the operational phase of
landfill and the range of
microbes and microbial
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One leachate and gas hazard (33) was identified in the initial register of
hazards, and this was included in the gas management portfolio. One stability
hazard was identified (48), which could result in a catastrophic incident but does
not result in an accumulation exposure as it is not in a group of other identified
hazards. It could trigger other events and therefore would need further
investigation. This should be addressed in the chain of causation. Unlike the
other pools of hazards the components are not additive they have to remain in
their components as the objective of this accumulation hazard is to look at
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where hazards are concentrated within the specific components and identify
components at risk. Those hazards that traverse all components have the
potential to trigger and create accumulation hazards that could result in a
catastrophic loss, impact or event. The gas management and aftercare
components also contain hazards which traverse all stages of the lifecycle; this
resulted in two subsidiary component registers as presented in Table 8.17.
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results in property







This table shows that the three hazards all have financial implications. The
central hazard is the adequacy of funding for aftercare as without this it would
be difficult to manage long-term gas management and property blight. Both of
these hazards require financial management. With respect to the aftercare
accumulation register in Table 8.18, a significant amount of calibration is
required to ensure that access is maintained to facilitate economic and effective
aftercare so that best value is obtained from the existing indemnity. This is
highlighted by the characterisation of hazards in Table 8.18.
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8.8.2 Results of accumulation hazard identification
The resulting three methods of identifying accumulation hazards produced eight
hazards (Figure 8-3).
Figure 8-3 The number and composition of the different accumulation hazard
portfolios for closed landfill
The three methods for identifying the accumulation hazards were successfully
applied to the 49 hazards identified as generic hazards. The method identified
seven accumulation hazards Figure 8-3. Table 8.19 provides a summary of the
identified accumulation hazards. The table shows that where a component has
one hazard this is not accepted as an accumulation hazard, as previously
stated an accumulation hazard is a portfolio of hazards. That is not to say that a
significant event would not happen as a result of one hazard for example the
stability hazard. The purpose of this research is to identify cross-disciplinary
hazards and this cannot occur with one hazard.








Portfolio A Short term 49 1
Portfolio B Medium term 45 1
Portfolio C Long term 13 1
Components
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The synthesis of the 49 generic risks resulted in the following additional
hazards; 43 interface hazards, 452 causation hazards and 8 accumulation
hazards.
The accumulation hazards for the closed landfill are comprised of portfolios of
hazards from a wide range of generic hazards. These portfolios provide an
environment for cross-disciplinary hazard identification whether this is via the
subsidiary / lifecycle registers, transversal or the components. These cross-
disciplinary hazards are presented in registers in Appendix S, T and U.
8.9 Problems issues and developments of applying the method
to the closed landfill
The main issues that arose from the application of this method were with the
preparation of the generic register. It was clear that a significant amount of
expert knowledge was required to identify the hazards and to verify the results
of the identification. The expert knowledge was required to assess the stages of
the lifecycle and chain components. This problem was overcome in this case
study by engaging the expert who has managed this site from the end of the
1990s and is experienced in managing the operational and aftercare
requirements as a consultant for a large portfolio of landfills in the UK.
Prioritisation of the hazards was the greatest challenge because of the impact
of the changing profile on the dimensions as a result of inclusion in the post
prioritisation register of hazards. This was illustrated by the downgrading of the
three aftercare hazards from medium to low (Table 8.16). The process of
prioritisation also highlighted the subjectivity of the prioritisation process based
on the person who compiled the register and the person reviewing the register.
The prioritisation was reviewed by the consultant to the site who would have
different considerations compared to an underwriter who would prioritise based
on different criteria and have a different appetite for risk. The different
experiences of the experts are likely to provide different results. The underwriter
is likely to be more risk averse than the consultant as he has more detailed
knowledge of the site.
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The stability hazard (ID48 in Appendix S) highlighted the issue of a single
hazard that can trigger multiple hazards and have catastrophic implications.
This is in conflict with the accumulation requirement (Section 6.4.3) for a
number of risks to occur within a short space of time. This hazard was excluded
as an accumulation hazard but is highlighted in the causation. However with
respect to interface hazard identification the stability hazard did not occur as a
hazard across the three phases of the lifecycle but if the method included the
hazards that had a high ranking it would be included. This method highlights the
need for a level of expert knowledge to identify hazards which should be traced
throughout the application of the dimensions to obtain its multidimensional
impact. As a result of the dimensions it is possible to illustrate the potential
impact of this individual hazard through interdependency and the chain of
causation.
When a component descriptor covers two components such as leachate and
gas management hazard (ID33 in Appendix N), there needs to be an
appropriate means of incorporating it into a suitable existing component group.
As there was only a component group for gas management it was included
within that grouping, however, it would also have been included in a group for
leachate if present. Further investigation into the proportional composition of the
hazard would need to take place if that was the case. Alternatively it highlights
the need to have component groupings which are singular in the component
description.
The accumulation dimensions in respect of transversal gas management
highlighted the issue of the minimum number of hazards that should be included
in an accumulation portfolio. This has to depend on the individual hazards, their
potential impact and would require further investigation of the hazards and
context. In this case three hazards were initially not considered sufficient for an
accumulation hazard but on closer inspection the three hazards are linked and it
is feasible for them to all occur within a short period of time.
This case study facilitated the development of the method to produce the
register of hazards prior to the application of the method highlighted in Chapter
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6. These developments included gaining access and preparation of the original
data, site visits, prioritisation, validation and presentation of the data in the
generic register template outlined in Chapter 6.
8.10 Validation of case study results
To validate the closed landfill case study results, a meeting was held with the
consultant who has managed the long-term aftercare of the site. The purpose of
the meeting was to confirm that the application of the hazard identification
method provided value to the expert. Value was defined as:
 The identification of hazards which have not previously been identified,
 A practical method providing a mechanism for management of hazards
throughout the lifecycle,
 Presentation of the identified dimensions of hazards in a register format
that is easy to use and provides tangible information on the qualitative
characterisation of the hazards.
The meeting was structured in four sections which related to the identification of
the four dimensions (Appendix BB2).
8.10.1 Generic hazard identification and prioritisation
After compiling the initial register of 71 hazards, a scale for categorising the
hazards was applied as stated in Section 8.3.5. The consultant was asked to
comment on the method used to prioritise the hazards. The consultant stated
that the rationale for prioritisation of the generic hazards (using the descriptors
high, medium and low) was plausible and the criterion applied to the descriptors
was acceptable. As a result no changes were suggested to the existing scale
descriptors or parameters.
The consultant suggested that the attributes of frequency and severity could be
added as parameters. This would be acceptable if data was available to provide
an indication of these parameters. Additionally this research is focused on
characterisation of hazards using qualitative data and not on the quantitative
attributes of the hazard.The focus is on identification of hazards not on the
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severity or frequency of a hazard as a means of identification. The consultant
reviewed the 71 hazards in the initial register and confirmed that 3 hazards
which were designated as medium should be rated as low. This change was
made and resulted in a register of 49 hazards. The consultant confirmed the 49
hazards used for the identification of interface, causation and accumulation as a
fair reflection of the hazards that would result from the close landfill.
8.10.2 Interface dimension
The methodology for deriving the interface dimension was explained to the
consultant and the resulting consolidated register shown (Appendix Q). The
consultant stated that he did not foresee any issues with the method and the
resulting interface risks were feasible as they were derived from the original 49
risks in the generic register. When the consultant was asked if he would use this
methodology he stated that he would “as it would be of value to operators in
planning for the future”. The merits of using this methodology in respect of the
current requirements of the regulator (Environment Agency) according to the
consultant are:
1. the regulator wants operators to be proactive in their hazard
identification;
2. the regulators would also like to see evidence of planning and
assessment of risk ahead of the risk occurring;
3. the consultant felt that once set up cost savings could result by
allocating resources where they may have the greatest mitigation and
facilitating planning; and
4. the identification of the interface dimension may enable improved
comprehensive corporate social reporting.
The consultant suggested that there may be issues with the practical
application of this method. The regulator would need to audit the method to
ensure that it was acceptable and did not have unidentified downside risks.




The consultant found no issues with the methodology used to identify the
causation dimension. With respect to the feasibility of the resulting causation
risks, these were seen as feasible and valuable as “it forces the individual to
think what could subsequently happen once the initial hazard has occurred”.
The consultant saw the method for this dimension as one which he would use.
The suggested advantages of using this causation identification method are that
it adds value by prompting forward thinking as an individual and a group. The
consultant suggested that the information and method were required for
permitting/ risk management of new waste sites. Problems that need to be
addressed are the timing of the components of a chain of causation, as in some
cases, the subsequent hazard will be a function of time. Additionally the
likelihood of whether these hazards are likely to occur as well as severity will
need to be taken into account.
8.10.4 Accumulation hazards
There were no issues with the method applied to derive the accumulation
hazards. The consultant felt the resulting hazards were feasible in so far as they
were derived from the generic register of 49 hazards. The consultant stated that
he would use this method of identification for accumulation hazards. The merits
of using this methodology were that the components for the accumulation
hazard have already been identified and are feasible as a result it may be more
realistic than brainstorming scenarios. The consultant stated he felt that the
main difficulty was that this approach to risk was so different that initially it may
be difficult for the logic to be followed by the layman. As a result simplification of
the method may be required if it is to be used.
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9 CASE STUDY 3 - CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION
9.1 Background
The Climate Change Act 2008 (CCA) provided the impetus for the Statutory Climate
Change Adaptation Program implemented by Defra to aid adaptation reporting
powers. Reporting authorities (RA) of key national infrastructure were requested to
provide an assessment of the current and future impacts of climate change in
relation to the reporting authority’s functions. The definition of a reporting authority
includes; statutory undertakers, utility companies and organisations carrying out
functions of a public nature (CCA, 2008). Authorities were specifically asked to report
on:
 The assessment of current and predicted climate change impacts on the
authorities functions;
 Provide details in the form of a statement of proposals and policies to be
used to employ adaptation in expediting the authority’s function; and
 A time-frame for advancing the adaptation policies and procedures (CCA,
2008).
Guidance and tools to aid the production of the climate change risk assessment
(CCRA) report were provided by various sources (see Table 9.1) for use by the
reporting authorities.
Table 9.1 List of guidance and tools made available to reporting authorities to aid the
production of CCRA (CCRA, 2012)
Guidance Tools
Statutory Guidance to reporting Authorities
2009 (Defra, 2009)
Adaptation wizard for climate




Frequently asked questions (Defra, 2010)
Cranfield Evaluation Framework
UKCP09 ( UKCIP, 2009)
The resulting assessment had to include: a summary of statutory and other identified
functions; an outline of the methodology used to assess impacts in relation to these
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functions and results of the climate change impact assessment on the identified
functions.
This case study is based on documents provided by an RA in a highly regulated
industry sector of strategic importance in terms of the infrastructure and service it
provides. The RA is one of the major providers of water and waste water services in
the UK, covering an area of 21,000 km2 and serving 7.8 million customers (CCRA,
2011). The identified functions of this organisation are firstly to provide a continuous
supply of quality water and secondly, treat waste water effectively. The key strategic
intentions, planning requirements, operational priorities and investment drivers are
set out in Figure 9-1 and the challenges associated with climate change are
embedded in each of these. Additionally the organisation has identified three main
constraints to its activities: climate change impacts; the ability to accommodate an
expanding and changing population; and protection of the environment and natural
resources.
The RA stated that climate change is incorporated in the RA Enterprise Risk
Management Framework, used to implement corporate risk management (CCRA,
2011). The key activities for the RA are: water, waste water and support services as
identified in the RA CCRA report.
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Figure 9-1 The key functions, investment drivers, operational priorities plans and strategic initiatives within which climate change
adaptation has to be managed (Where 1= operational expenditure 2 = capital expenditure; factors highlighted in bold are impacted by
climate change)
Authorities functions
1. Providing a continuous supply of quality water
2. Treating waste water effectively.
Key strategic intentions (KSI)
1.Provision of continuous supply of water.
2. Effective management of waste water
3. Responsive to consumer requirements
4. Minimising carbon footprint
5. Lowest possible charges
6. Skills to deliver KSI
7. Maintain investor confidence
8. Promoting an effective regulatory regime
Operational priorities
1. Address flood risk
2. Build resilience into network
3. Reduce sewer flooding
4. Reduce leakage






2. Capital maintenance of aging assets
3. Meeting EU water quality and environment
standards
4. Population and housing growth
5. Deteriorating water quality.
Planning
1. 25 year strategic plan and five year
rolling business planning process.
2. Water resources management plan
2010
3. Drought plan 2009 (measures for
continuous supply)
4. Distribution operations
management strategy (OPEX1 and
CAPEX2 for consistent water quality)
5. Drinking water safety plans ( risks
from source to tap)
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Climate change adaptation is an essential requirement for the short term and long
term commercial viability of RA. Water is the primary resource which is being
provided without the primary resource there is no service and therefore no revenue
for the RA. The rationale for using the RA climate change risk assessment was to
establish if the method for the identification of hazards (Chapter 6) and developed in
the case studies (Chapter 7 and 8) could be applied to a climate change risk
assessment as required under Climate Change Act 2008 (CCA). The rationale for
using the RA publically available report was that the data had been verified and
validated by the company, and used by Cranfield University as part of its bench-
marking exercise (Drew et al., 2010). Additionally the report provided a detailed
register of climate adaptation risks for each of its business units in the appendix to
the CCRA.
9.2 Method specific to this case study
9.2.1 Data for derivation of a register of hazards for climate change
hazard assessment
The data for the register of climate change hazards was provided by the RA in a
Climate Change Adaptation Report in response to a government request under the
Climate Change Act (2008). The report by the RA provided details of the method
used to produce the register of climate change risks for the climate change risk
assessment and an overview of the risks and operations of the business units: water
services, wastewater services and support services. Details of the uncertainties and
assumptions made in the data, strategy for managing climate change and
consideration of stakeholder engagement were also included. As requested by
Defra, dependencies and interdependencies were addressed along with barriers to
implementing the adaptation programme although not included in the register.
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The data required to derive a register of hazards for climate change was contained in
the report, which included registers for each of the business units; water, waste and
support services.
Figure 9-2 Steps involved in preparing the generic register of hazards from the CCRA
report
9.2.2 Review of base data
The review of the base data commenced with a comparison of the parameters for
the risk assessment registers for each of the business units highlighted in Figure 9-2.
The water and waste water units followed a similar structure but the support services
business unit did not provide data on asset levels 2 and 3 or the pedigree of data
(Table 9.2). Asset Levels 2 and 3 refer to the infrastructure components of the water
business unit. These are explained and compared in Section 9.2.5.
CCRA Report
Descriptor review







Table 9.2 The data descriptors applied to the water, wastewater and support services
business for the RA
Descriptor Business units of the RAWater Wastewater Support services
Reference YES YES YES
Climate effect YES YES YES
Climate impact YES YES YES
Consequence YES YES YES
Asset level 2 YES YES NO
Asset level 3 YES YES NO
Threat/ Opportunity/ Neutral YES YES YES
Proximity YES YES YES
Likelihood YES YES YES
Total YES YES YES
Population YES YES YES
Severity YES YES YES
Total YES YES YES
Overall risk rating YES YES YES
Pedigree of data YES YES NO
Confidence YES YES YES
Comments YES YES YES
Data/ Evidence source YES YES YES
Climate drivers YES YES YES
The focus of this report was the provision of information on climate adaptation. The
three descriptors that relate to climate change are: 1. climate effect; 2. climate
impact; and 3.climate drivers. It is critical to the subsequent synthesis of data for
hazard identification that these parameters have been applied consistently.
9.2.3 Climate change specific descriptors
The climate effect
The water business unit used the descriptors in UKCP09 (summarised in Table 9.3)
and took into account the two different time periods (i.e. to 2050s and 2080s) over
which climate change affects have been modelled for climate effect. Figure 9-3
shows the seven 30 year time periods for which projections have been provided.
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Figure 9-3 The seven time periods used to provide scenarios for the projection of
climate change impact (adapted from UKCP09; http://ukclimateprojections.defra.gov.uk/22915)
Each time period has projected scenarios for temperature, precipitation, and
emissions for a specific geographic location. The CCRA has taken the 2050s and the
last decade the 2080s.
Table 9.3 UKCP09 descriptors used by the water business unit for climatic effects
Descriptor Year Emissions
2050 2080 Medium High
Drier summers    
Extreme higher temperatures    
Warmer summers    
Warmer winters    
Wetter winters    
The three descriptors used for climate effect for the waste unit did not include a time
period or level of emissions. They were; lower precipitation infiltration and inflow plus















1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090
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The support services business unit used the following 21 different climatic effects;
 Hotter drier summers
 Higher average summer temperatures
 Higher average temperatures
 Higher temperatures and longer growing seasons
 Higher average temperatures and increase hours of sunshine plus lower
cloud cover.
 Higher average winter temperatures
 Wetter, warmer atmosphere
 Warmer winters/ decreased snowfall.
 Higher average hours of sunshine
 Increased localised flooding
 Reduced raw water available coupled with increased localised flooding
 Variations in water quality
 Increased precipitation and intensity
 Increased precipitation leading to increase flooding
 Increased incidence of extreme precipitation events
 Increased storm conditions, extremes of weather
 Increased windstorm/ gales
 Increased magnitude of extreme winter events
 More extreme weather events, increase in wind.
 Increase in tropical air borne disease
 Windstorm/ gales
The lack of uniform application of the climate effect descriptors, illustrates a lack of
consistency in the descriptors used for climatic effect across the three business
units. This made it impossible to provide a consolidated register for the three
business units that comprise the RA for the specific objective of climate adaptation.
Each parameter for every business unit was not the same, therefore there was not a
uniform climate on which to base a consolidated position for the RA. The water
subsidiary, wastewater and support services provided results based on different
climate descriptions.
Climate drivers
A climate driver is defined as including precipitation, temperature, and evaporative
demand (determined by net radiation at ground level, atmospheric humidity, wind
speed, and temperature) for water availability (IPCC, 2007). When the climatic
drivers for each of the business units were compared there was no consistent
application across the business units. Table 9.4 shows that although it may be
possible to align the water and waste units, the support services descriptors did not
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fit either water or waste drivers. The support services also introduced the descriptors
of wind and weather variability which was not explicitly included in either the water or
waste units.
Table 9.4 Comparison of the climatic drivers used in the CCRA registers for the three
different business units Source adapted from CCRA, 12)
Water Waste water Support services
Increased winter precipitation High winterprecipitation









Changes in annual, seasonal or
daily precipitation








None provided None provided Increasing variability of weather
None provided None provided Changing wind patterns
The approaches taken may suit the individual business units but the climate
descriptions should be consistent for all business units, as there will only be one
climate impact being experienced in the same region which impacts all three
business units. Whilst this research project is not focused on the CCRA process, this
inconsistency is noted and descriptions which are similar will be paired across the
business units. However, as a result of the inconsistencies this parameter cannot be
used to consolidate the business units of the RA.
Water and wastewater activities focus only on temperature and precipitation as
mutually exclusive drivers for two seasons, winter and summer. Support services
have focused on variability of temperature, precipitation across the seasons. Wind is
not included in either of the operational units of the RA and no comment has been
identified on wind or the efficient working of infrastructure for either wastewater or
water business units, however it is included in support services.
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Climate impact
The climate impact parameter in the RA data is a function of the climate effect and
the operations carried out by the business unit. Therefore it is unlikely that there are
consistencies across the three business units due to inconsistencies in the climate
effect descriptors. In order to apply the method of hazard identification to the data
provided in the climate change assessment the business unit which adhered to the
UKCP09 descriptors was chosen as the unit to apply the model. As a result all
reference to the CCRA report will relate to the data and register for the water
services business unit.
9.2.4 Risk identification number
The original risk IDs were retained when the generic register of hazards was
compiled. Throughout this case study only the RA ID numbers will be used.
9.2.5 Chain component
The CCRA report was not consistent in the identification of the components that
comprise the water service activities Table 9.5 shows the activities highlighted in the
CCRA report.
Table 9.5 The activities highlighted in CCRA Report for the water services business
unit
Activity as expressed CCRA Commercial function of activity
Power supplies Externalities required for water services to
operateSupply chain









- As a result the Potable
- Agricultural
Sewage works discharge
Treatment and quality managementAgricultural pollution
Treatment works
The activities expressed in the register as Asset Levels 2 and 3 in Table 9.6 were not
compatible with those in Table 9.5.
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Table 9.6 The composition and relationship between Asset level 2 and Asset level 3
activities








Raw water reservoirs, service reservoirs, water treatment works
Reservoirs
River abstraction /Reservoirs /Boreholes
Water treatment works
Water network
Chlorine boosters, service reservoirs, distribution mains
Pressure boosters, service reservoirs, distribution mains
Water treatment River abstraction
The components that were applied in the generic hazard register were those
designated as Asset Level 3. These were the lowest level attributable to an asset
and thus should result in less ambiguity in the actual component within the activity of
water services (Table 9.6). The component described as “All” refers to the fact that
the hazards relate to all the parts of the water services i.e. water resources, water
network and water treatment.
9.2.6 Stages of the lifecycle
The climate effects are identified as the 20 scenarios stated in UKCP09. These were
used as the stages of the lifecycle for the register of climate change hazards (Table
9.7).
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Table 9.7 The 20 scenarios used as the stages of the lifecycle for the register of
climate change adaptation hazards (CCRA, 2012)
Season description Time frame Emissions
Drier summers 2050 Medium
Drier summers 2050 High
Drier summers 2080 Medium
Drier summers 2080 High
Extreme higher temperatures 2050 Medium
Extreme higher temperatures 2050 High
Extreme higher temperatures 2080 Medium
Extreme higher temperatures 2080 High
Warmer summers 2050 Medium
Warmer summers 2050 High
Warmer summers 2080 Medium
Warmer summers 2080 High
Warmer winters 2050 Medium
Warmer winters 2050 High
Warmer winters 2080 Medium
Warmer winters 2080 High
Wetter winters 2050 Medium
Wetter winters 2050 High
Wetter winters 2080 Medium
Wetter winters 2080 High
The definition for emissions used in the CCRA report refers to the projected levels of
greenhouse gases and other aerosols. The IPCC special report on emission
scenarios (IPCC, 2000) is the basis of the UKCP09 projections which puts forward
three emissions scenarios for greenhouse gases; (1). high, (2).medium and (3).low.
The RA used only the medium and high levels of emissions in the CCRA.
9.2.7 Generic Classification
The hazards designated as threats were classified using the generic classifications
of economic, environmental, health and safety, legal, regulatory societal and
technical as set out in Section 6.2.2.3.
9.2.8 Prioritisation of risks
The initial number of risks in the water services register was 52. These risks were
categorised by the RA as threats, opportunities or neutral where neutral was neither
a threat nor an opportunity. The objective of this research is the identification of
hazards, therefore only those risks categorised as threats were included in the
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generic register of hazards. As a result the post prioritisation of the generic register
of hazards comprised of 45 hazards.
9.2.9 Structure of the register of hazards
The review of the base data in the CCRA required the structure of the template for
the register of generic hazards (Section 6.3.2) to be adapted to include the 20 stages
of the lifecycle listed in Section 9.2.6. An example of the structure is presented in
Figure 9-4.
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Figure 9-4 Showing hazard Identification number, location of component, and stage of lifecycle sections of the generic






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































Climate Driver : Increased Winter precipitation
1 2 Borehole pumping
stations
Yes Yes Yes Yes
2 5 River abstraction Yes Yes Yes Yes
3 6 River abstraction Yes Yes Yes Yes
Climate Driver : Increased Winter Mean Temperature
4 9 River abstraction Yes Yes Yes Yes
5 10 Reservoirs Yes Yes Yes Yes





Yes Yes Yes Yes
279
This amended structure allowed each of the climate scenarios to be represented and
the hazard to be characterised taking account of the scenario, component, generic
risk classification and hazard identification. The collation of the twenty options on the
same spread sheet allowed patterns and trends to be identified.
9.2.10 Risk description
The risk description for the climate change register was taken from the climate
change impact descriptions in the RA CCRA. No amendments were made as these
have been verified by experts from the Reporting Authority.
9.2.11 Hazard identification
The hazard identification descriptors were the result of a synthesis of the
consequences and comments made by the RA experts and presented in the CCRA
report. Figure 9-5 shows the structure of the generic hazard register excluding the 20
stages of the lifecycle.
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Figure 9-5 Section of the hazard register showing the component, classification risk description and hazard identification
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The resulting generic register was reviewed by water scientists to confirm that the
application of the descriptors was correct and the resulting methodology for the
identified hazards was acceptable. After the register of generic hazards was agreed
the method, as stated in Section 6.4 was applied to produce the cross-disciplinary
hazards of interface, causation and accumulation.
9.2.12 Generic hazard classification
The generic classification of each of the 45 individual risks designated as threats
was classified according to the method in Section 6.2. The assignment of hazard
categories and hazard types involved applying the respective climate impacts,
consequences and comments provided by RA in the CCRA register to each risk. The
resulting classification is provided in Table 9.8.
Table 9.8 The generic hazard classification with respective hazard categories and
hazard types for and RA of a water subsidiary
Generic hazard
classification















Soil moisture deficit Ground stability








Breaking river abstraction daily
licence










Maintenance of pressure levels
Treatment process Efficiency of treatment process andworks
Treatment capacity Water quality and quantity
Distribution network Network integrity
Pipeline integrity Over pumping
Soil moisture deficit Ground stability
Supply Increased compensation releases
Infrastructure integrity Over pumping
The classification of the risks in the CCRA highlighted the fact that there were no
identified legal or societal generic risks reported or identified for the water business
unit. The resulting generic register of hazards was compiled and a summary of the
register excluding the stages of the lifecycle provided in Table 9.9. The complete
register can be found in Appendix V.
Table 9.9 Summary of the register of hazards as compiled from the CCRA excluding














































































n Increased pollution of aquifer due
to leaching which impairs raw
water quality
Increased leaching of



























ng Increased risk of flooding due to
silt movement caused by high
river base flows











































































ng Increased risk of flooding of river
intakes and water treatment
works due to high river levels
Flooding of river inlets
and water treatment
works.







































































Reduced water reserves available


























































demand places stress on
maintaining pressure levels










































Risk of bacteriological failure



























































































Drying of wetland areas and small





































in greater regulation pressures
and practices
Lower river flows and






































required due to lower river flows,
this will also reduce deployable
output and the company will be


















ly Company is unable to meet its





























s Increased compensation releases
required from raw water
reservoirs impacted by site
specific licence conditions which
requiring releases (or increased
releases) to be made once the
river reaches a particular level











































s Further reductions in river
abstraction licences and pressure







































































Breaking annual and 5 year
licence requiring identification
and access to alternative sources.
































































































Increased impact on costs
incurred as a result of changing
treatment processes and
developing new treatment works.
Higher evaporation and
lower river levels leads





















































































ls Higher than anticipated demand
results in more areas at risk of
failing pressure reference level




























































Impaired water quality, reduction
in the volume that can be
abstracted and treated at any one
time and reducing the volumes
that can be output into supply.







































y Creates additional operational
stress on the treatment works
and process required to reach the

































Localised problems in the
distribution system due to
increased pressures from extra




































ty Localised problems in the
distribution system due to bursts
causing DG2 (pressure) and DG3
(loss of supply) issues. SMD driven
failures are generally dramatic -
complete failure of the main.
Instability of ground
movement resulting
from lack of moisture



























d Correlation between SMD and
domestic demand. When SDM is
equal or greater than 60mm there
is an increase in domestic demand
and this creates localised supply
































































































Risk of bacteriological failure







































s Abstraction may need to be
reduced to protect sensitive rivers
and streams due to regulatory
pressure.











































n Less water to abstract from rivers,
further reductions possible



































required due to lower river flows,
this will also reduce deployable
output and the company will be


























Low reservoir levels, crossing

































s Increased compensation releases
required from raw water
reservoirs impacted by site
specific licence conditions which
requiring releases (or increased
releases) to be made once the
river reaches a particular level











































s Further reductions in river
abstraction licences and pressure
























































































































al Lower river levels leads to less

































Impact on company strategy due





























ng Pipelines integrity compromised
due to over pumping as a result of
increased demand.
Infrastructure cannot




































Instability of ground movement
resulting from lack of moisture






























Correlation between SMD and
domestic demand. When SDM is
equal or greater than 60mm there
is an increase in domestic demand
and this creates localised supply











































Risk to individual licences, cost to
company is fines for licence and








































ce Risk to individual licences, cost to
company is fines for licence and









































y Impact on company strategy.
Requires improved dry weather
event response planning and re-





































































































Peak demand places stress on
maintaining pressure levels








































Localised problems in the
distribution system due to
increased pressures from extra
pumping in the network.
Pipelines integrity
compromised due to
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Potential higher average demand
places stress on maintaining
pressure levels currently. All
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9.3 Identification and documentation of subsidiary register
The 45 hazards designated as threats were filtered by stage of the lifecycle. This
resulted in 20 subsidiary registers. Analysis of the subsidiary registers found no
difference between the climate effects for the emission levels of high and medium, or
between the years 2050 and 2080. As a result only five subsidiary registers were
produced, one for each descriptor of the lifecycle. The description of these
parameters as stages of the lifecycle would not seem appropriate as they do not
provide details which actually relate to a stage in the lifecycle; instead they relate to
a specific climate effect and within the climate effect there is the same impact,
description and hazard identification. The following are the climate effects that were
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used to apply the novel method to produce the dimensions of interface, causation
and accumulation:
1. Drier summers;
2. Extreme higher temperatures;
3. Warmer summers;
4. Warmer winters; and
5. Wetter winters.
Table 9.10 shows that there may be a direct relationship between the UKCP09 and
the climate drivers.




UKCP09 derived descriptor Climate drivers
A Drier summers Decreased summer precipitation
B Extreme higher temperatures Summer maximum daily temperature
C Warmer summers Increased summer mean
temperature
D Warmer winters Increased winter mean temperature
E Wetter winters Increased winter precipitation
When filtering the stages of the climate effects, all the hazards for the specific
climate driver were found to be the same, confirming that irrespective of the year or
level of emission the corresponding impact was the same. Additional synthesis of the
subsidiary registers resulted in identifying the components where hazards have been
identified as occurring with respect to the specific climate effect/ stage of lifecycle
(Table 9.11).
By identifying the components that comprise each stage of the lifecycle where
hazards have been identified, it was possible to ascertain hazards which were
common to components. It was also possible to recognise hazards that transverse
the water business unit for the different climate scenarios.
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Table 9.11 Matrix of chain components that comprise the subsidiary registers Components which are excluded from the specific
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9.3.1 Synthesis of subsidiary register
For each subsidiary register of climate effects, the individual hazards were
identified and the resulting risk ID numbers for the original generic register were
used in Table 9.12. The full register for each of the five subsidiary registers can
be found in Appendix W.
Table 9.12 The generic hazard ID that comprise the five subsidiary registers and
climate scenarios for a water subsidiary used for the identification of dimensions




Regulatory 32 33 36 37 38
Technical 34 35 41










Regulatory 15 16 19 20 21 22
Technical 17 23 24 25 26 27 28 29
Generic hazards Subsidiary register D (Warmer winters)
Economic 12
Environmental 9 10
Health and safety 14 31 52 49
Regulatory
Technical 13 51
Generic hazards Subsidiary register E (Wetter winters)
Economic





The shaded areas on the table highlight the absence of generic hazards
identified in the CCRA register. There are no identified health and safety
hazards for the warmer summers, extreme higher temperatures, wetter winters
and drier summers subsidiary registers. The CCRA register suggests that
warmer winters would not result in a regulatory hazard, and a wetter winter
would not have any technical, economic, health and safety or regulatory
hazards. The area that the RA covers has had flooding events during the
summer season but the CCRA has only identified environmental hazards from
wetter winters, which suggests that the CCRA was not complete or only subject
to environmental hazards resulting from wetter winters as no environmental
hazards are identified for any other scenarios (drier summers and extreme
higher temperature). However, later in 2012, a newspaper report for this RA
stated:
“This year’s extremes in weather and the immediate distress caused by
widespread flooding in many areas covered by RA will be the main concerns for
many of its customers” (Kavanagh, 2012)
This quote shows that after the CCRA report, the impact of flooding from wetter
summers and wetter winters were an issue for customers even if it was not
captured in the CCRA report. The register did not identify any societal hazards
and additionally there is no scenario for a wetter summer. The risks associated
with flooding may be seen as manageable as at present these impacts are
partially managed by insurance. This may not be the position in the long-term. A
more precautionary approach to hazard identification in the future stages of the
lifecycle should be taken as the same resources may not be available to
mitigate hazards in the future. The subsidiary registers identified gaps in the
identification of hazards for the five scenarios and the need for additional
mitigation and further investigation. Once the generic hazards for the subsidiary
registers were compiled and reviewed the method for the identification of the
dimensions of interface, causation and accumulation could be derived.
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9.4 Interface hazard register
9.4.1 Method of interface hazard identification
The first stage of compiling the interface hazards required the identification of
those hazards that comprise the subsidiary registers (Table 9.12). The
requirements for the identification of interface hazards (Section 6.4.1) were
applied to each subsidiary register. The resulting synthesis of hazards in the
climate scenarios produced 163 hazards. A summarised breakdown of the
additional interface hazards are presented in Table 9.13. The complete register
of interface hazards can be found in Appendix X.
Table 9.13 The number of interface hazards for each climate scenario for a water
subsidiary
Climate scenario/Subsidiary register Number of hazards
A. Drier summers 51
B. Extreme higher temperatures 8
C. Warmer summers 76
D. Warmer winters 28
E. Wetter winters 0
TOTAL 163
Applying the method (Section 6.4.1) to subsidiary registers highlighted that
interface hazards cannot be obtained from the three environmental hazards in
subsidiary register E which relates to wetter winters (Table 9.14) as they are
from the same generic classification.
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Table 9.14 The three hazard that comprise the subsidiary register E (wetter
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ng Increased risk of flooding due to
silt movement caused by high
river base flows


























ng Increased risk of flooding of
river intakes and water
treatment works due to high
river levels
Flooding of river inlets
and water treatment
works.
The initial interface hazards which result from the subsidiary registers cannot be
synthesised further as the hazards are specific to the stage of the lifecycle. The
hazards do not cross over to other subsidiary registers, and these are not
related to stages of the lifecycle but are related to different climate scenarios
The subsidiary registers for this case study can be found in Appendix X.
It would not be prudent at this stage to enforce the maximum number of
hazards for the interface register to 50 as each scenario is unique. It cannot be
assumed that there is sufficient knowledge of the scenarios to enforce the
exclusion of hazards from the synthesised interface register at present.
9.4.2 Results of Interface identification
The application of the method identified cross-disciplinary hazards which are
evidenced in the individual climate scenario register.
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The drier summer scenario interface hazards were comprised of a combination
of economic, environmental, technical and regulatory hazards where 25 out of
the 51 interface hazards have a regulatory interface. Interface hazards in this
scenario are a combination of reduced river flow, insufficient infrastructure
capacity, and pressure on ecological flow indicators, increased compensation
releases and increased soil moisture deficiency (SMD) leading to instability,
breaching economic level of leakage, increased demand on infrastructure.
These hazard combinations may have a causal relationship, for example lower
river flows, and ground water depletion (ID100) with groundwater depletion and
lack of infrastructure capacity (ID102).
Extreme higher temperatures show that the respective interface hazards are the
result of the calibration of demands to meet the licence requirements, labour
shortages, and stress on the infrastructure and pipeline integrity as evidenced in
the register (Appendix X “extreme).
296
9.5 Causation hazard register
9.5.1 Method of hazard identification
A causation hazard for climate change adaptation considers whether the
individual hazards in the subsidiary registers relating to the five climate effects,
can result in a subsequent and different hazard. The full result of the causation
hazards can be found in Appendix Y and a summary is provided in Table 9.15.
Table 9.15 The number of causation hazards resulting from the initial hazards in























9.5.2 Results of causation identification
The causation registers identified cross-disciplinary hazards through the 206
hazards that comprise the chains of causation. The causation results in Table
9.15 highlight the fact that the RA is either familiar with or more able to manage
wetter weather than drier weather as more hazards result from drier weather
and increasing temperature compared to wetter winters. Apart from flooding,
wetter weather provides additional water the resource which the RA requires
recharging aquifers and reservoirs so that it can sell water as a product. This
only becomes a significant issue when there is flooding or extreme cold.
The causation register (Appendix Y) for the water business unit shows that, with
respect to climate change, none of the hazards identified would result, in the
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immediate failure of the business unit. Only ten hazards out of 45 would result
in the organisation failing to be a going concern across all the climate drivers.
These ten hazards are highlighted in bold. Additionally these failures occurred
at the fifth or sixth chain of causation giving ample time for corrective action
(Appendix Y).
9.6 Accumulation register
9.6.1 Method of accumulation identification
Type 1 portfolio - phase of the lifecycle accumulation hazard
The accumulation type 1 portfolio refers to hazards which occur during the
same stage of the lifecycle. There are no type 1 portfolios for this particular
climate change risk assessment. This is because the risks were not compiled
with any difference between the stages of the lifecycle for 2050 and 2080.
Instead the subsidiary registers were a portfolio of hazards that relate to a
specific climatic effect (Table 9.1) and these are presented as Type1 portfolios
for climate change in the absence of accurate characterisation of risks or
hazards for the periods of 2050 and 2080 (Appendix.Z.1)
Table 9.16 The type 1 accumulation hazards for climate effects for a water
subsidiary
Portfolio- Type 1 subsidiary registers Number of hazards inthe scenarios
Accumulation
portfolio
A Drier summers 12 1
B Extreme higher temperatures 5 1
C Warmer summers 16 1
D Warmer winters 9 1
E Wetter winters 3 n/a
Total 45 4
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Type 2 portfolio - transversal accumulation hazards
The method used to compile the hazards did not accommodate hazards that
would traverse all stages of the lifecycle. The identified hazards occurred within
the specific climate effect scenarios. As a result the hazards in the register were
specific to the climatic conditions. The method used to identify climate change
hazards did not identify any hazards which may arise during the transition from
drier summers and wetter winters or drier summers and extreme higher
temperatures. There was one identified parameter “All” which comprised of 3
hazards which could be said to be transversal (Table 9.17).
Table 9.17 The three chain components classified as 'All' in the risk assessment
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The issue is that the hazards are specific to climate scenarios. However for two
of the hazards the risk description is the same and across the three hazards
they are similar.
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Type 3 portfolio - component accumulation hazards
There were 13 components within Asset Level 3 (Table 9.6). The descriptions
for the components were not consistent and in some cases incorporated other
components. The first column in Table 9.18 gives the descriptor used in the
base data whilst the second column provides a descriptor for the grouping of
components. A filter was applied to each of the component groups and results
in a potential accumulation portfolio for each component (Table 9.18).
Table 9.18 The number of hazards which make up each accumulation portfolio
per component for a water business unit.
Components Number of hazards that
comprise the















Raw water reservoirs, service
reservoirs, water treatment works
Reservoirs 6
All All 3
Water treatment plant Water treatmentplant 1
Total 45
The objective of applying this method was to establish whether the method can
be applied to a climate change adaptation risk assessment. Simply grouping the
hazards by component is not appropriate as this does not provide details of the
relationship between the components and the concentration of risk in respect of
the climate scenario. Further analysis taking into account: 1. the climate
scenario; 2. the components, 3. generic hazard, and 4. the number of generic
hazards within a. component and climate scenario was carried out and the
consolidated results are presented in Table 9.19 (Appendix Z.2).
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The results show that none of the grouped components (Table 9.18) had
hazards for every generic hazard classification for the climate effect scenarios.
The table does not include climate scenarios where there are no generic
hazards identified for the component. The largest number of identified hazards
was identified as the booster and distribution components and these were
concentrated in two generic hazards; health and safety, and technical hazards.
The components and scenarios with more than one generic hazard were the
reservoirs in the warmer summers scenario and abstractions for the drier
summer climate scenario.
The data provided in the RA CCRA does not suggest that the treatment plant
component with one generic technical hazard fulfils the requirements of a type 3
accumulation hazard. The component “All” only included the economic hazards
and did not apply to extreme higher temperatures or wetter winters. Although
there are three economic hazards within the component “All”, they related to
three different climate effects. One hazard might have a catastrophic impact but
it does not fulfil the requirements of an accumulation hazard, which are that
there are a number of generic hazards.
The component groupings in Table 9.19 are made up of shaded areas which
represent accumulation components, The un-shaded areas are not applicable
as they comprise hazards from the same generic classification or insufficient in
number. The final column which is headed Accumulation has a Y where there is
an accumulation hazard and N when there is not an accumulation hazard.
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Table 9.19 Results of the component groupings, generic hazards and climate
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There were no identified hazards for the following components, and climate
scenarios: boreholes in warmer winters, reservoir in extreme higher
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temperatures, all in extreme higher temperatures, treatment plant in extreme
higher temperatures, drier summers, warmer winters and wetter winters (Table
9.19).
From the identified and reported risks in the water services CCRA report and
Table 9.19 there are three accumulation type 3 hazards for three different
components. The components include;
 booster and distribution component hazard based on the number of
hazards;
 the reservoir component for warmer summers; and
 the abstractions component for the drier summer climate scenario.
9.6.2 Results of the identification of accumulation hazards
The three methods of identifying accumulation hazard produced seven
accumulation hazards (Figure 9-6).
.
Figure 9-6 The number and composition of the different accumulation hazard
portfolios for case study 3 for a water business unit
The identification of the seven accumulation hazards provided portfolios of
hazards where cross-disciplinary interaction of hazards can occur. The different

















9.7 Problems issues and developments of hazard identification
using a climate change risk assessment
The tabulation of parameters in Table 9.19 shows that there is a lack of
identified and reported health and safety hazards resulting from climate
impacts. The CCRA shows that, with respect to the abstraction component,
drier summers and warmer winters have an economic impact; however no
economic impact was identified for the extreme higher temperatures scenario
across all components. This does not seem correct as extreme higher
temperatures would result in a greater reduction of water and therefore greater
costs and reduced revenue. Additionally there were no economic or regulatory
hazards reported in the risk assessment for the, boosters and distribution,
component.
The generic risks (Section 9.2.7) identified in the CCRA did not include societal
or legal hazards such as product liability, bodily injury, disease or reputational
exposures. The report discussed dependencies such as, the regulators energy
suppliers, information technology, telecommunications and other suppliers.
Interdependencies such as local authorities and land managers were also
referred to in the report. There was no evidence of either dependencies or
interdependencies in the CCRA register. This may be evidence of the difficulties
faced when including aspects which have dimensional attributes in the current
register structure. It may also be a symptom of the focus of the CCRA report on
impact to infrastructure. However the impact to the infrastructure has additional
impacts such as societal hazards when water quality is poor or there is no
water.
The rationale for the inclusion of the lifecycle parameters in the model was to
provide a means of relating the hazard to a stage in the lifecycle of a project.
The inclusion of the lifecycle is critical to the production of the subsidiary
registers as each subsidiary register refers to a stage of the lifecycle. The
importance of the lifecycle is highlighted when applying the method to the
climate change risk assessment (see Section 9.2.3) when, although the
descriptors had different time periods, there were no differences in the
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characteristics of the hazards for the time periods, 2050 and 2080. As a result,
although the objective was to identify the impact of climate for the specific years
of 2050 and 2080, this was not achieved. Instead the result was the
identification of the general impact of particular climate scenarios. It would have
been possible to use the lifecycle parameter if the base data was complete and
time specific results were available.
The identification of risks resulting from specific climate effects was the
essential objective for the risk assessment. It is difficult to see how this was
achieved when the lifecycle parameters were the same and the climatic
scenarios were focused on two seasons; winter and summer. Additionally, there
were no comments or identified hazards included in the register during the
transition of these weather exposures. This is evidenced by the lack of
transversal hazards in the accumulation dimension. One hazard not identified
was the issue of calibrating the infrastructure across the extremes of weather.
The application of the model highlighted the need for a review of the base data
to ensure that it was accurate and the descriptors used here appropriate and
correctly applied for the purpose for which the register was created. For this
case study the objective was to identify and communicate the risks/ hazards
that would result from the application of climate scenarios set out by UKCP09.
The process of applying the model highlighted shortcomings, such as the
absence of non-technical hazards resulting from climate change in the register.
This is illustrated by inconsistent impacts with respect to the economic impacts
for extreme high temperatures and a lack of societal impacts, when clearly there
are societal and reputational risks with dealing with extremes of weather
highlighted in Section 9.3.1. There were no legal hazards identified such as
product liability bodily injury or disease. Additionally there were no transversal
hazards and no scenarios showing continuous extremes of weather, with
respect to temperature and precipitation from winter to summer. In fact a silo
approach to the seasons, emission and weather was taken, which fails to take
into account the impact of one season on another. Interdependency and
dependency were not included in the register but were included in the report.
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These were concerned with the supply chain and not with cross-disciplinary
hazard identification and relationships.
A major shortcoming was the lack of consensus in the method applied to data
capture and presentation of the initial data in the CCRA. It is crucial that climate
scenarios for infrastructure in one geographic region are uniformly applied so
that stakeholders, regulators and government can acquire the data they need to
plan for the future climate change adaptation requirements.
The resulting application of this method highlights the possibility that the RA
may not have the data required in a form that can easily be communicated or
that the data may not currently exist. With respect to the time periods of 2050
and 2080, the reasons that there is not perceived to be any difference in the 30
year timeframe maybe due to this time period not being consider a long enough
time period for a difference to occur. Secondly, the scenarios with respect to
temperature and emissions and precipitation do not result in a different impact
or the data does not exist to extrapolate into the future.
The application of the method highlighted the need for the auditing of risk
registers to ensure that they are fit for purpose. The result of the method
showed that there were additional hazards which were not identified in the
CCRA register but were contained in the cross discipline hazards of interface,
causation and accumulation.
9.8 Validation of climate change adaptation case study results
The validation of the climate change adaptation case study took the following
steps. Firstly, the validation of the methods used to derive the generic register
of hazards was achieved by internal validation by an academic expert from the
water sector and by maintaining an audit trail during the synthesis of the data.
Secondly, the validation of the synthesis of data to identify and document the
dimensions of interface, causation and accumulation hazards incorporated a
review of the generic register of hazards and dimensions during a meeting with
the RA.
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A second level of validation was achieved from this meeting with two experts
with knowledge of the production of the climate change risk assessment report
and the operations of the RA. The meeting took the same structure as that of
the closed landfill, focusing on the identification of hazards for the four
dimensions (Appendix BB1).
9.8.1 Generic hazard identification and prioritisation
The experts were asked if the rationale for prioritising the hazards using the
descriptor of threat was plausible and they confirmed this to be acceptable.
When asked to confirm the generic descriptors, the experts stated that the
generic descriptors used were one way of using the data. Although the societal
data was not included in the register, the experts thought that this should be
included. The experts were shown the component descriptors and agreed with
the component descriptors. They also agreed with the lifecycle parameters
which were applied by using the climate change scenarios in UKCP09. The
experts stated that the resulting generic register of climate change hazards
(Appendix V) was a fair translation of the hazards presented in RA CCRA
report.
9.8.2 Interface dimension
The methodology for the identification of interface hazards was explained to the
experts and they were shown the results of the application of the method in the
form of a register of interface hazards. The experts stated that they may
consider these types of hazards but they were not captured in the register. The
interface hazards were feasible and the experts said that they would use this
methodology, but would take a corporate approach to verification.
The experts also stated that the merit of using this method of hazard
identification was taking existing risks and examining their relationship rather
than investigating increasing severity to establish impact. It facilitates the
identification of synergies and conflict, and helps to manage the downside risk.
The main practical constraints with using this method is the resource required to
synthesis the data and the need for brevity of reporting.
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9.8.3 Causation hazard
The explanation of the identification of causation hazards and the resulting
production of subsidiary registers using the climate effects were presented to
the RA experts who stated that they saw the methodology as feasible and
aiding mitigation, although the process was time consuming. The experts stated
that they would use this method in the assessment and management of risk.
They stated that the merits of this method were that it prompted a full
understanding of chains of causation. The experts stated that a potential
problem was the fact that different people would have a different view of the
next steps and there would need to be a means of normalising these chains of
causation.
9.8.4 Accumulation hazard
The different method of identifying accumulation portfolios was explained and
the results of the different registers presented to the experts. The experts did
not foresee any issues with the methodology and confirmed that accumulation
hazards were feasible. The experts said that they would use the method but
might amend the grouping of the components. They suggested a split between
infrastructure and non-infrastructure as the current focus was on infrastructure.
They suggested that a problem might be the concept of an overall risk/ hazard
which is a novel approach to hazards type.
When shown the resulting number of hazards per dimension (Appendix AA) for
the climate change assessment register they confirmed that the figures made




The application of the enhanced method applied to the closed landfill as
presented in Figure 9-7 was successfully applied to the climate change risk
assessment report for RA.
Figure 9-7 Method for the cross-disciplinary identification of hazards
The application highlighted shortcomings in the base data and the absence of
consistency in the production of a comprehensive register for all the business
units of this utility company. The use of the subsidiary register and lifecycle
parameters set context to the identification of hazards in a multidimensional
world and quickly identified inconsistencies in the base data. The application
also successfully presented the resulting identified hazards for each dimension
in a register of hazards.
The next stage of this research is to establish if the method developed was
novel, adds to existing knowledge and meets the objectives set out in Section
















During the last twenty years there has been a greater emphasis on risk
quantification and risk-based management rather than hazard based
management (Fairman et al., 1998). The world has evolved from the
identification of hazards within generic silos to a world where hazards are
intertwined and manifest themselves through interconnectivity and dependency
which proliferates in complex systems. Hazards have no respect for the generic
silos used to historically identify and manage hazards and risks. A move
towards hazard identification is required to identify currently unidentified
hazards which result from the increased complexity of hazard and risk
relationships. Allan and Yin (2010) introduce the connectivity of risks as a third
dimension and simply translate qualitative characteristics into quantitative terms
which are then used to rate the connectivity of the risk. Fundamentally this view
does not recognise the metamorphosis of risks and the creation of new hazards
from connectivity. It is adding to the quantitative characterisation of the existing
risks in the risk register.
The focus of this research project was on the qualitative cross-disciplinary
identification of hazards and development of a method which incorporates a
proactive and multidimensional approach, by the introduction of the dimensions
of interface, causation and accumulation. The method evidences the identified
cross-disciplinary hazards in a compendium of registers which allows the
classification and characterisation of hazards according to stage of the lifecycle.
Many methods focus on the quantification of risk to support risk-based
management. As a result it is unlikely that the current top down methods of
identification identify all the emerging hazards that result from interconnectivity,
dependency and new technologies. As the initiating hazard has to have been
identified, and characterised prior to the start of the risk identification process,
uncharacterised hazards remain unidentified. Aven (2012c) states that there is
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a need to focus on the foundation issues within risk assessment, including
robust hazard identification.
10.1.1 Cross- disciplinary identification
The generic disciplines (e.g. health and safety, legal, environmental and
economic) have different methods for identifying and assessing risks and
hazards which are a function of their needs (Aven, 2012a) and this is illustrated
by their different approaches to hazard and risk. For example Maher (2007)
states that the legal profession identifies risk ex post as opposed to the majority
of disciplines that identify risk ex ante (Section 2.4.4). This was supported by
the responses from the generic experts (Chapter 5).
The methods for the identification of new and emerging risks that result from
cross-disciplinary relationships, such as connectivity and dependency, have not
developed as these risks and hazard have evolved. There is no formal structure
for the inclusion of cross-discipline hazard identification in whole system risk
management frameworks such as; ISO31000, ERM or project management
(Section 2.6.5). Although technological risks can result in health and
environmental exposures, there is a lack of prescribed communication across
the disciplines in both commerce and academia on risks and hazards (Löfstedt
and Perri, 2008). Cross-disciplinary hazard identification is exceptional.
10.1.2 Tools and methods
The tools and method used for risk and hazard identification commence with a
focus on existing known and identified failure (Section 2). Evidence of this is the
fact that the following methods: FTA, ETA, FMEA, HAZOP, HAZID were used in
the DyPASI methodology when applied to CCS, which clearly states that the
approach to hazard identification was a top-down approach (Wilday et al.,
2012a). In many cases the results of these methods are used as a basis for
expert elicitations, which are focused on a generic expert identification meeting
where existing frameworks are based on, prioritisation using top down identified
risks and existing known failure focused scenarios. Examples of this include the
decommissioning of the first nuclear reactor in Korea (Jeong et al., 2008).
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There are a plethora of tools and methods used to identify hazards (Section 2.5)
which would seem to indicate that no one tool or method is able to satisfy
identification of all the numerous types of hazards. The underlying philosophy
for hazard identification is failure focused, based on pre-existing and known
failures. If we always start with a known event or failure it is unlikely that new
failures would be identified, or new hazards highlighted, as only known hazards
identified in the existing generic silos using existing tools are likely to be
identified (Section 2.5.5).
10.1.3 Risk identification or risk analysis
The fact that hazard identification is not consistently given an agreed position in
risk management frameworks across the disciplines leads to different levels of
identification, and different hazards and risks being identified (Aven, 2011). For
example if hazard identification was the initial stage it would include all
characterised hazards, irrespective of whether they can be quantified.
Alternatively if hazard identification is part of quantitative risk analysis it is likely
that only those hazards which have a tendency towards quantification will be
identified.
Conceptual thinking could be considered for the identification of cross-
disciplinary hazards as it does not require quantification (Section 6.1.1).
However the objective of this research is not the development of a conceptual
model but an applied model. The focus on qualitative attributes was taken so as
not to exclude those hazards that cannot be quantified from inclusion in the
initial identification and documentation of the dimensions.
When the focus is on the quantitative analysis of hazards it is possible that the
object of analysis, the identified register of hazards may not be correct or
complete as hazards are excluded from identification This will impact the quality
and robustness of the resulting portfolio of identified risks which is evidenced in
the water company case study (Section 9.2.2) where different climate effects
were used to produce the risk registers for the different business units and in
the CCS decommissioning portfolio which did not include any decommissioning
specific risks (Section 7.2).
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10.1.4 Whole system risk management
Whole system risk management frameworks and methods have been
developed in an attempt to bring together multiple disciplines and processes
and have contributed to the development and application of frameworks such as
ERM (Section 2.6.3). However the ERM methodology does not provide an
integrated approach to risk identification (Beasley et al, 2010a).
The immaturity of ERM may be due to silo identification and aggregation of the
original risks by generic experts as opposed to the inclusion of cross-
disciplinary hazard identification. Integrated identification or assessment is not
embedded in the ERM process. Although the ERM process is presented as
including multiple dimensions in a cube, the component parts are presented in
silos and aggregated. Transversal identification is not evidenced in the ERM
process as the focus is on root cause events and intermediate events that result
in a known risk event (Beasley et al, 2010b).
Figure 10-1 The ERM root cause approach to risk events (Beasley et al., 2010b)
This is similar to the failure focus of the tools and methods used to identify
hazards and risks (Section 10.1.4) where the interactions of identified hazards
are not taken into account. The focus is on a known failure and the causes and
impacts of that known failure as illustrated in Figure 10-1. The approach taken
to establish a root cause does take into account timing but this is in terms of the
staging of the risk event/ failure and not the lifecycle of the hazards or their
interactions. Although the COSO survey stated that ERM is immature in its
development it is recognised as the preferred frameworks for risk professionals
(Verbano and Venturini, 2011) and is the framework that respondents suggest
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should be accommodated in the development of any method for hazard
identification (Section 5.3.11).
Another whole system generic framework for hazard identification is found in
project management (Section 2.6.2) which incorporates risk identification but is
reactive and does not accommodate integrated hazard identification (Carter and
Smith, 2006). Frameworks such as LCA (Section 2.6.4) are important
supporting tools for hazard and risk identification but do not provide a solution
for hazard identification (Wilday et al., 2011).
10.1.5 Documentation
The main methods of documenting hazards and risks are in a register, log or
report (Section 3.5). Risk registers accommodate one characteristic at a time
and there is no facility to link the characterisation of risks/ hazards to illustrate
interconnectivity or dependency. Whilst Allen and Yin (2010) have introduced
the strategic risk register system (SSRS), this does not facilitate identification of
all the potential relationships between risks. The SSSR’s reliance on
quantification of risk means that, as a result, assumptions on aggregation of the
probability of risk are made rather than the identification of emerging hazards or
cross-disciplinary hazards. This indicates that robust hazard characterisation
followed by quantification of risks would be preferable.
The gap in the identification of hazards is highlighted by reactive identification in
silos that are perpetuated in new whole system frameworks and apply
identification in generic silos using “top down” failure-focused methods and tools
that identify already known hazards. A method for the identification of hazards
across generic disciplines which focuses on characterisation in preference to
quantification is required to accommodate the different dimensions of hazards
that result from cross discipline relationships. Although Lambert et al. (2001)
introduced Hierarchical Holographic Modelling (HHM) to identify hazards as a
source of risk by decomposition of the functions of a system there has not been
any significant development in the methods for characterisation of the source of
risks.
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The initial review of the prior art (in Chapters 2 and 3) considered the suitability
of the current methods for the identification of hazards across multiple
disciplines, and concluded that neither a method nor tools exist to identify
hazards or risks across multiple disciplines. What was required was a method
whose objective was the identification of cross discipline hazards where
identified hazards are defined as risk sources and failure scenarios (Lambert et
al., 2001).
10.2 Risk register structure for generic identification
A risk register structure was chosen as the preferred repository for the
characterisation and evidencing of identified hazards (Section 5.3). Obtained
results confirmed that risk registers are widely used and are the preferred
structure used by risk practitioners for documenting identified risks (Drummond,
2011; Section 3.1).
When asked what methods were used to identify the dimensions of hazards, the
risk register was only used with respect to interface risks and was not used for
accumulation and causation (Section 5.3.6). This contradicted the response
respondents gave when asked to state which methods of documentation were
used (Section 5.3.9). Table 5.25 shows that a risk register was predominantly
used to document interface and causation hazards, however no respondents
stated that it was the mode used for accumulation hazards. The results of the
survey show that the risk register was supplemented equally by meetings of the
risk committee, the generic risk committee and risk reports. None of these are
publically accessible and this creates an issue with respect to verifying these
outputs using the case studies. Accumulation was predominately evidenced in a
risk report and supplemented meetings of both the risk committee and generic
risk committee (Section 5.3.9).
The lack of inclusion of the dimensions may be due to the fact that these
hazards are difficult to characterise in the traditional linear structure of a risk
register. This is evidenced in the initial register template for the transportation
module of CCS (Section 6.2.2) and the lack of identifiable documented
evidence of these dimensions in the risk register for the CCS case study
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(Section 7.3.1) and the water utility company (Section 9.3.1). This highlights a
gap in knowledge not only with identification but also with evidence in a register
of hazards or risks. Risk registers are widely seen as repositories which
evidence that risks have been identified and therefore the normal assumption is
made that they are being managed (Drummond, 2011; Section 5.2.5).
The initial results (Section 5.4) showed a need for the identification of hazards
across the generic disciplines and that the dimensions of interface, causation
and accumulation hazards should be identified as a potential solution to this
gap. This is based on the fact that these dimensions are recognised as
requiring identification and in some cases experts and survey respondents state
that they are identified. However they cannot state the method used to identify
the dimensions and the dimensions are not evidenced in a register (Section
5.4).
10.3 Characterisation of dimensions
Previous attempts at the inclusion of dimensions have included adding an
additional quantitative characterisation to the identified risk in the risk register
(Farret, 2010) and not the development of interrelationships between the
individual risks that comprise the portfolio of risks, for example the aggregation
of probabilities in ERM and the allocation of probabilities to interconnectivity in
SSRS. The dimensions of interface, causation and accumulation were
developed from analogues in a variety of sectors as explained in (Section 3.3)
and propose to identify some of the different interrelationships between
hazards.
10.3.1 The characterisation of generic hazards
A review of the identification of risk within generic frameworks in Section 2.4.6
identified that silo hazard and risk identification does not facilitate the multi-
disciplinary approach required to identify hazards in a multidimensional world.
The initial identification of risks commences with the characterisation of
hazards; the source of risk (Aven, 2012b). As risks are identified in generic silos
the generic risk classification was established as the initial step in the
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characterisation of a hazard and is defined in Section 3.3.1 as a predefined
classification of risks which are associated with a specific widely accepted
generic disciplines, such as environmental, legal, financial, health and safety.
10.3.2 Interface dimension
In this research there are two types of interface hazards: generic interface
hazards (Level I) and system interface hazards (Level II) (Section 3.3.2).
Although there has been much discussion in the literature of risk and hazards at
the interface of systems, processes and human interaction, interface hazard
identification has not been formally included as an accepted dimension of
hazard identification (Section 3.2.2). The inclusion of the interaction of two
hazards from a portfolio of hazards has not been properly recognised as a
potential hazard by the risk community and therefore not identified or included
in a register of hazards. A contributing factor may be that the interface
dimension was not seen as capable of inclusion in the standard risk register
structure, alternatively it may be documented in reports which are not publically
available and so remain unknown.
When generic experts were asked if they identified interface risks three out of
four experts stated that they identified this dimension but were not able to state
a specific method for identification (Section 5.2.4). The results from the survey
show that the methods used to identify interface hazards were predominately
qualitative and included scenario, reviews and workshops (Section 5.3.6). No
quantitative techniques were suggested by either experts or respondents to the
web survey.
Many of the results from the web survey (Section 5.3) for the two different types
of interface hazards were the same and it was decided that it would be
preferable to focus on one category. An additional consideration was lack of
public access to the data required for the systems interface hazards. The risk
registers do not provide the additional information needed to produce the
register of interface II risks, as a result this dimension was excluded from the
research and instead focused on the interaction of the interface hazard that
result from two generic risks.
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The development of the method for interface hazards commenced with a robust
portfolio of generic risks and this was achieved by generic classification and
characterisation, as discussed in Sections 6.3 and10.3. The second stage of
development required the objective matching of generic hazards into couplings.
This was achieved by filtering the hazards by generic classification and phase
of lifecycle. The result was a portfolio of hazards which can occur at the same
phase of the lifecycle known as subsidiary registers (Section 6.3.4). By filtering
within the phases of the lifecycle by generic classification assumptions were
applied to the method used to produce generic couplings (Section 6.4.1).
The analysis of the generic register of hazards resulted in a register of cross-
disciplinary hazards which included all the risks or hazard in the original register
in its formulation. This initial iteration of the interface hazards responded to the
gap identified in Section 2.7.5 highlighting a need for a method to identify cross-
disciplinary hazards. However the application to the CCS case study (Section
7.6.2) found a number of couplings were duplicated across the different stages
of the lifecycle and the method was enhanced to include the most frequently
occurring couplings across all phases of the lifecycle. The result was a register
of 41 interface hazards which were previously unidentified.
10.3.3 Causation dimension
Causation is widely used in the medical, legal profession and by insurers as
discussed in Section 3.3.3. It is defined as a hazard which is dependent on a
prior hazard occurring (Section 3.4.3). If the prior hazard does not occur then
causation will not take place (Dekkers and Rikkert, 2006). There was
recognition that this dimension of hazard identification should be carried out and
a number of methods used to identify this dimension of risk were identified
(Section 5.3.5). The preferred methods were mainly formal methods or
qualitative methods (Section 5.3.6). It is interesting to note that neither the ‘root
cause’ nor the ‘domino effect’ was suggested by any respondents as a method.
With respect to risk assessment methods, the preferred methods from the web
survey were the application of existing generic risk assessment frameworks,
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expert elicitation and best guess (Section 5.3.8). There was no specific method
used for causation identification.
The documentation of causation was accommodated across a number of
methods and tools; the preferred method was for the specific inclusion in the
risk register (Section 5.3.9) although it was not used as a qualitative method for
the identification of causation hazards (Section 5.3.6). It was not possible from
the case studies to identify causation hazards or hazards which had been
identified as having causation relationships in the risk registers as these were
not structured to show this relationship (Appendices I and Y). As a result it is
difficult to see how causation relationships could be communicated to investors,
regulators or the steward of a company from the risk register. The number of
different media used to communicate causation risks and hazards suggest that,
although widely applied, the risk register is used in combination with other
methods to document and communicate the identification of causation hazards
(Section 5.3.9).It is likely that many different methods and tools will have to be
used as neither a specific tool nor method currently meets the requirements of
the risk community to identify causation hazards.
10.3.4 Accumulation dimension
An accumulation hazard is defined as a number of hazards which occur within a
short period of time and the resulting cumulative impact is significant
(Section.3.3.4). Accumulation risk is proactively used in the insurance industry
by insurers who are pursuing a balanced and diversified risk portfolio (Section
3.4.4). The reason for including this dimension in the method for cross-
disciplinary hazard identification is to recognise that accumulation does not just
occur for insurers but for every entity, whether private, public or corporate.
Recent literature recognises the interconnectivity of hazards and the fact that
the precise order of interconnectivity is unknown so it is prudent to identify all
hazards in the accumulation portfolio (Allan and Yin, 2010). Complexity science
attempts to quantify connectivity in systems, but this focus is on pre-existing
individually identified hazards whereas an accumulation hazard recognises a
portfolio of hazards as a single hazard. The identification of the accumulation
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hazard is precautionary as it provides details of all the hazards for a specific
parameter whether a component or a stage of the lifecycle.
The accumulation dimension was identified by some experts and respondents
to the web survey (Section 5.3.5), but there was no consensus on a specific
method. Only the formal processes of ‘Swiss cheese’ and ‘features events and
processes were reported as being used for the identification of accumulation
risks. The main methods used were qualitative methods such as scenario,
reviews workshops and expert judgement. Quantitative techniques were also
used (Section 5.3.6). With respect to risk assessment, the most popular
methods used to assess accumulation risks were best guess, project
management risk framework, and expert elicitation. The accumulation hazard
was the only dimension which zero respondents used a risk register to
document the risk (Section 5.3.9). This risk was presented in reports and
discussed at risk meetings. It is likely that accumulation risks were excluded
from a register because they did not fit the traditional one line for a hazard in the
tabular structure of a register.
10.4 New and emerging risks
Experts and respondents surveyed in this research had confidence in the
methods currently used (Section 5.3.4) and believed that the methods that they
use are adequate for the identification of new and emerging risks (Figure 5-7).
This may be due to the fact that respondents are not aware that it is possible for
the current methods to be improved. Additionally there was no consensus with
respect to the methods of identification and many people chose not to respond.
The non-responses could be evidence that;
 Respondents were not aware of methods of identification for the
respective dimensions or recognise that they used them for this;
 They did not identify the dimension or recognise its description;
 Risk managers and experts felt that they could not state that the risks are
not identified so assume that they are but do not know how;
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 Respondents may not be involved in the identification of risks just in the
consolidation of risk data and therefore not qualified to answer the
questions;
 Respondents may also assume these dimensions were identified within
the generic silos; and
 With respect to the level 1 interface and level II interface hazards,
respondents may not recognise these hazards.
Due to the anonymity of the respondents it was not possible to establish what
the reason was for non-response. This could be addressed by repeating the
survey conducting a face to face survey or changing the question to a closed
response.
Whilst, respondents did not formally identify these dimensions in their risk
registers, they believe that they are included. The survey was sent out to
professional risk management associations (Section 4.7.2). A reason for this
response may be that risk and hazards are emotive subjects, and risk
managers may be perceived as not doing their job if they do not say that they
have identified the dimensions of interface, causation and accumulation and are
confident that the current methods enable the identification of new and
emerging risks.
10.5 Main findings from the expert elicitations and web survey
results
The results of the web survey and the expert interviews found that the
dimensions were viable, feasible and required (Section 5.4). When respondents
were asked what method was used to integrate different risk management
frameworks the largest response (40%) stated that this was achieved by the risk
management being embedded into the ERM framework (Section 5.3.11).
The result of these findings found there was a need for a method to facilitate the
identification of hazards across the generic disciplines as there is no consensus
as to the method used or the mode of documentation. A method for the
identification of hazards across multiple disciplines was developed as outlined
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in Chapter 6 and developed by application to the three case studies in Chapters
7, 8 and 9, (Figure 10-2).
Figure 10-2 Outline of method for cross-disciplinary hazard identification
10.6 Cross case study analysis
The three case studies were chosen as the mode of research to test the method
for the identification of the dimensions, interface, causation and accumulation.
Case study (1) the initial pilot case study, was a study of a consortium for a
CCS project (Chapter 7). CCS was chosen as an example of a new technology
and value chain with emerging risks (Wilday et al., 2011a). This case study
demonstrated that the method could transform the data in the existing risk
register and produce a generic register of hazards for use as base data prior to
synthesis of the dimensions. From this base data it was possible to identify the
dimensions of interface, causation, and accumulation and to document these in
a register
Case study (2), a closed landfill, was chosen to test the ability of the method to
be applied when a risk register was not available (Chapter 8). In this case the
initial register of hazards needed to be completed and the results of the initial
identification of hazards, method and register were validated.
Case study (3) applied the method to climate change adaptation risk
assessment. This was chosen to test the flexibility of the method to apply to a














there was no previous structure for documentation (Chapter 9). It was possible
to use the method to produce a register of generic hazards using the data in the
report. Additionally the dimensions were identified and documented in a
register.
Success of the method was evidenced by the application of the method,
identification of cross-disciplinary hazards within the dimensions and the
evidencing of the dimensions in a register. Challenges that arose in the case
studies resulted in amendments and enhancements to the method.
10.6.1 Integrity of the base data
All three case studies required the application of the method to an existing risk
register and the importance of the integrity of this base data was found to be
critical to the robustness of the resulting identification of dimensions. A common
issue with the integrity of the base data occurred when the risk registers were
the result of a combination of three units (Chapter 9) or three separate
companies (Chapter 7); the consolidated result had fundamental
inconsistencies identified in the application of the method. As a result it cannot
be assumed that the registers produced for tenders or government requests are
correct. The registers should be audited to ensure that they are fit for purpose.
The translation of the risk registers into the generic register template facilitated
an audit of the base data in all case studies.
10.6.2 Generic classification
The initial generic classifications used in the CCS transportation register
resulted in financial risk being removed and included within economic risk;
regulatory risk was added to distinguish between legal risks and regulatory risks
and societal risks, were added as a generic classification as there were a
number of reputational risks in the CCS case study. The result was a portfolio of
generic classifications which included economic, environmental, health and
safety, legal, regulatory, societal and technical risks / hazards. The generic




Prioritisation took place after the classification and characterisation of hazards
took place in case study (2). Prioritisation was applied using different metrics in
the three case studies. Firstly the objective was the identification of hazards
which have a negative impact. In case study (1) the risks were already
prioritised and the portfolio used in this research was the top 50 risks. In case
study (2), the hazards identified were prioritised as high medium and low based
on impact criteria (Section 8.3.5.). The register prior to prioritisation was verified
by a landfill risk expert and the method of prioritisation and resulting register
post prioritisation was verified by the aftercare landfill expert. With respect to
case study (3,) the original register characterised risks as threats, neutral and
opportunities. Applying the objective that the focus was on hazards which had a
negative impact, only those risks designated as threat were used in the
application of the model on case study (3). Prioritisation of the initial data is
required as part of the preparation of the data to be used to produce the generic
register and synthesis of the dimensions.
10.6.4 Chain component
The chain component as defined (Section 6.2) were different for each of the
case studies as this descriptor was found to be context and process specific.
This is evidenced in case study (1) where the geographical location required a
division divided between onshore and offshore components (Table 7.6 and 7.7).
Registers produced on a component basis highlighted components which had
few identified risks for example the stability component in case study (2) and the
water treatment plant in case study (3). The inclusion of the chain component
was possible, applicable and of value to the characterisation of hazards in the
three case studies. The chain component descriptor when filtered is able to
establish concentrations of hazard by components. It also facilitates the
identification hazards which follow the sequence of a process. The addition of
the chain component is a good addition to this method because it provides
details of the concentration of hazards in different parts of the process, system
or project. It facilitates the identification of components that may be vulnerable
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to generic hazards. Coupled with the lifecycle descriptor it is possible to
establish the time of greatest exposure in the lifecycle.
10.6.5 Lifecycle
The lifecycle parameter was important in providing context to the timing of
hazard occurrence and highlighted errors where hazards were unlikely or
absent. This phase of the lifecycle was critical to the identification of the
subsidiary register and the accumulation hazards. The three cases studies were
able to incorporate the application of the lifecycle descriptor. In each case the
descriptor was unique to the context of the case study.
In all case studies the lifecycle parameter proved to be an important factor in
producing an accurate register of hazards. For the landfill case study time was
important due to the financial constraints of the indemnity and the unknown
period of time that aftercare would be require. In the case of the climate change
case study, Defra wish to obtain an indication of how reporting authorities would
be able to deal with the hazards that result from climate change over periods of
30 years. The RA in case study (3) provided the same information for the two
scenarios and this was realised by the application of the lifecycle parameter.
The application of time as a critical factor is highlighted in case study (1) where
CO2 storage is required for 1000 years. This establishes that the parameter of
time in a register is critical when evaluating CCS projects (Farret et al., 2010;
Wilday et al., 2011a). The CCS case study and the climate change case study
both seem to have difficulty in providing robust data on the hazards that occur
into the future. It would seem that these inconsistencies may be lost in the linear
registers of risk but highlighted in the cross-disciplinary hazard identification.
10.6.6 Characterisation
The characterisation of the hazards included the risk descriptors and hazard
identification. The three case studies provided evidence that the risk description
details were able to be completed with or without an existing risk register. The
risk descriptions for case study (2) which did not have an existing risk register
were obtained from a mixture of the site visits and quarterly review. As stated
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earlier for all the case studies the details for the hazard identification descriptor
were obtained by responding to the question ”what is the source of the risk?”
10.6.7 Subsidiary register
The subsidiary registers formulated from the decomposition of the consolidated
register and creation of portfolios of hazards for each stage of the lifecycle. The
method and the resulting register proved to be flexible enough to accommodate
the data provided and the intent of the register.
The value of the subsidiary register is realised by the fact that they provide a
pool of real hazards that occur at the same stage of the lifecycle. These
hazards are not fictional or based on probability, they have been independently
identified and not the result of brainstorming. Knowing the hazards are at the
same stage of the lifecycle allows analysis of possible interactions between
hazards at the same phase of the lifecycle and across the stages of the
lifecycle. It also highlights basic errors, with respect to time and the applicability
of hazards, that are said to apply across the lifecycle in the original risk
registers. For both case studies (1) and (3), basic errors were identified in the
base data as a result of the introduction of time in the form of the lifecycle
parameter and the creation of the subsidiary registers. In both cases this is a
concern as it goes to the heart of the purpose of producing the register.
The subsidiary registers provide a pool of individual hazards which have been
verified by experts and considered relevant and valid for the initial registers.
Additionally these hazards are presented in the relevant lifecycle register.
Knowing which hazards are at the same phase of the lifecycle allows analysis of
possible interactions between hazards in the same phase of the lifecycle and
across the phases of the lifecycle.
10.7 Application of the dimensions
The methods used to identify the dimensions were outlined initially in Section 6
and developed during the application of case study (1), which was the pilot case
study, and subsequent case studies.
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10.7.1 Interface
The identification of the interface dimension required the systematic coupling of
generic risks. As the aim of this research was to look at the identification of
hazards across multiple disciplines, couplings were only combined with hazards
from different generic classifications (Section 6.4.1). This process was reliant on
the robustness of the base data. The interface results were based on the
frequency of occurrence across the maximum phases of the lifecycle and
excluded less frequently occurring couplings. This highlighted those hazards
that occurred across the phases of the lifecycle and did not focus on the
frequency of a hazard actually happening. As a result it is an objective method
of coupling and prioritising interface hazards. The resulting method from case
study (1) was successfully applied to the closed landfill data in case study (2)
and resulted in an interface register of 43 hazards (Section 8.6).The method
was also applied to case study (3) and there were no issues with the
application. The method resulted in the identification of four registers of
interface hazard; as the four climate scenario could not be combined into one
register. The total number of interface hazards across the climate scenarios
was 163 couplings (Section 9.4). The method has to accommodate the
objective of the hazard identification process which was to establish what the
risk and hazards were for specific climatic scenarios. The results would not be
credible if the different climatic scenarios were consolidated, the weather
related to different seasons and a decision would need to be made to choose
the mixture of seasons to comprise a year. This could be done but that was not
the objective of the initial CCRA report.
The initial method for interface hazard identification (set out in section 6.4.1)
stated that the focus should be on those hazards that occur most frequently
across the phases of the lifecycle; however consideration should be given to the
inclusion of the residuals. The rationale being that the prioritisation of hazards
means that it is possible to examine those hazards which are ranked as high,
and include those in the interface register. As a result a further development for
this dimension would be to examine the impact of the residuals ranked as high
on the resulting interface register.
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10.7.2 Causation
The identification of causation hazards initially commenced with three modes of
identification: generic register; lifecycle register and transversal register (which
includes all of the hazards that occur across the phases of the lifecycle). The
generic register was quicker to process but it was not able to place the hazards
in context of the phase of lifecycle. As a result this option was not pursued and
the lifecycle in the form of the subsidiary registers were used as the base data
for the identification of causation hazards. The lifecycle was critical to causation
identification as it placed the individual hazards in a portfolio of hazards which
relate to the same stage of the lifecycle. Without this context it is not possible to
see errors or to accurately identify potential hazards and chains of causation.
Transversal hazards were identified and highlighted on the subsidiary /lifecycle
registers. This action highlighted hazards which would reoccur during multiple
phases of the lifecycle and therefore hazard relationships that should be
addressed for management to minimise impact during the lifecycle.
The process of identifying subsequent hazards highlighted the need to establish
the point at which the subsequent hazard may be realised i.e. “the tipping point”
(Gladstone, 2008). This is an area for further research and should be linked to
the risk tolerance of the entity for which the hazards are being identified and
register compiled. The identification of the subsequent hazards is open to bias
as they are dependent on the experience and judgement of the person
assessing the hazards. These should be validated by an individual who was not
involved in the synthesis of the data but has sufficient knowledge of the process
and context. This was achieved in this research project by expert review for
case studies 2 and 3.
The rationale for stopping the chain of causation was that the hazard would be
resolved either because the action was part of normal operations or that the
result was that the project or entity was no longer a going concern (section
6.4.2). The method developed by application to case study (1) resulted in no
further amendments when applied to case study 2 and 3 as the method was
successfully applied. A comparison of the number of causation hazards
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identified by case study in Table 10.1 illustrates that there was variation
between the case studies. The rationale for the difference may be the result of
the uncertainty inherent in the organisations, process and the time period of the
activities at risk. There is uncertainty in the technology of the CCS value chain,
its operations and the regulatory, economic and societal impacts. Additionally
the time period over which this proposition has to contain CO2 safely and
economically is vast and fraught with uncertainty and the cost implications of
the value chain do not provide a commercially viable business model. As a
result there are more potential financial impacts which have to be resolved with
a negative revenue stream. This is the same position for the closed landfill
which has a fixed indemnity with an infinite period of aftercare. On the other
hand the water company is operating an activity which is producing revenue on
a number of sites and has options to manage its exposures. Because it is
revenue generating it is able to resolve issues before they threaten the
business, employees or the environment as a result the chains of causation can
be reduced from “a threat to going concern” to “business as usual”.
Table 10.1Comparison of identified causation hazards by case study
Case study 1 Case study 2 Case study 3
Number of generic
hazards 50 49 45
Number of
causation hazards 463 452 206
10.7.3 Accumulation
Although the concept of accumulation is applied in the reinsurance and
insurance sectors, it is a novel approach to hazard identification outside this
sector. This approach does not consider an individual hazard but a portfolio of
hazards which could occur at the same time or within a short period of time.
Three different types of accumulation hazards were defined: stage of lifecycle,
transversal and components (Section 6.4.3 and Section 7.3.5). The method was
applied to the three case studies with no changes required to the initial method.
Case study (1) highlighted a problem with the use of the component “whole
system issues”. This designation resulted in errors highlighted in the
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decommissioning register/ phase of lifecycle where all the hazards that
comprise the subsidiary register were whole system and was not applicable to
this phase of the lifecycle.
10.8 Value of results
This method highlights cross-disciplinary hazards within an existing risk register
by the introduction of the dimensions of interface, causation and accumulation.
The method is able, through the use of descriptors such as the lifecycle and the
subsidiary registers, to identify inconsistencies. As a result it provides a tool for
the auditing of risk registers. It is of value to the risk community as it is a
proactive structured method for the identification of hazards across disciplines.
The landfill experts suggested that this method could be included within the
requirement for a risk assessment for new waste management facilities (Section
8.10.2). In addition it could be used as an early warning system for projects as
illustrated in the decommissioning subsidiary register of hazards (Section 7.9.2).
Company directors and officers have an obligation to ensure that they are
aware of the risks of the entity for which they are acting as steward and to
mitigate those risks as appropriate. The method allows directors and officers to
have more comprehensive information on the hazards which they are
managing. The method also tests the robustness of the existing risk register
and supports the requirement of corporate governance.
This method provides an alternative to linear top-down identification which is the
main approach to the identification of hazards (Section 2.5) as it introduces
multiple dimensions to hazard identification. It complements the existing generic
frameworks by encouraging proactive and robust hazard identification through
the implementation of the identification of the dimensions. This should ensure a
more comprehensive characterisation thereby facilitating improved risk
identification and quantification. Integration of this method into existing risk
management frameworks should enhance the existing frameworks.
The method facilitates asset protection with the inclusion of the component
descriptors and facilitates multidimensional hazard identification within
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components and across the process. Inclusion of transversal hazards in the
interface, causation and accumulation registers facilitates the identification of
hotspots as identified in Chapters 7, 8 and 9.
The prior art found that risk registers did not accommodate the different
dimensions of risks or hazards (Section 3.9) and depended on expert
knowledge albeit with formal checklists and similar processes. This method
included the development of a register template (Section 6.5.) which provides
comprehensive hazard characterisation and accommodates the generic,
interface, causation and accumulation dimensions in a single file. This responds
to the lack of a central repository for the documentation of all the dimensions of
hazards and risks which was identified as absent in the web survey (Section
5.3.9).
10.9 Issues with the method
10.9.1 Base data integrity
The method is dependent on complete and correct risk registers. The need for
robust quality data is highlighted by the errors and omissions identified in the
base data for case study (1) (Chapter 7) and case study (3) (Chapter 9). These
errors and omissions were identified by the translation of the base data into the
generic template and the subsidiary registers which were lifecycle focused.
Case study (2) illustrated that it was possible to produce a generic register for
an entity where a risk register did not exist. In order to produce the generic
register access to risk data was required as well as knowledge of the
operations, process, industry sector and regulations.
10.9.2 Accommodating multidimensional results
The identification of the dimensions could not be easily synthesised without the
mutual development of the register (Section 6.2.2). It was difficult to explain the
hazard relationships and the dimensions beyond one or two generic hazards as
the approach required a completely new way of identifying hazards, for example
as: couplings, a portfolio, and chains of causation. The approach of multiple
relationships was at odds with the linear approach of singular hazards identified
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from one generic family of hazards (Section 3.4). It also required spatially
translating the different types of hazard combinations into a document which
was recognisable but accommodated dimensions of hazards which had not
previously been accommodated in a risk register (Section 3.1). The landfill
expert stated that this method was so different that initially it may be difficult for
the logic to be followed by the layman (Section 8.10). Although the method has
been progressively simplified in the process of its application to the three case
studies further simplification is required.
10.9.3 Complexity
The method was produced by hand and documented which was time
consuming. The decision to apply the method by hand, made it possible to see
what was happening to the data and to exclude possible errors which were
software specific. The amount of time taken to synthesise the data would need
to be reduced if it were to be considered for commercial application. This is
especially true of the identification of interface hazards in the CCS case study
where few of the first iteration remained in the final register. Development in the
method reduced this time further, but further improvement would be required for
commercial application. Additionally the hazards that were discarded based on
lack of frequency should be reviewed as there may be hazards which are not
frequently occurring but could result in a significant impact (Section 8.6.2).
10.9.4 The use of general components
The use of general component terms such as ‘all’ or ‘whole system’ which cover
the entire system, process or entity should be used sparingly as they can create
inconsistencies and errors. This was illustrated in the decommissioning
subsidiary register and in the transversal component registers for case study
(1), where the ‘whole system’ component was used to provide a response but
not always a correct response.
10.9.5 Integration into existing risk management
The method was structured so that it could be included in the whole system
frameworks and the generic frameworks, outlined in (Section 2.6). This was
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difficult to accommodate as hazard identification and risk identification took
place in different parts of the framework, additionally some frameworks were
prescriptive and others open to wide interpretation. Attempting to amend the
risk management frameworks was outside the scope of this research project
which was focused on making sure the identification of hazards could be
integrated into any framework.
10.9.6 Proportionality
It is important that in line with the pursuit of better regulation and risk
management proportionality is taken into account when applying this method
(Hampton, 2005). The case studies used to test and develop the method were
all concerned with the identification of hazards in infrastructure at different
stages of development; CCS at the project design stage, the water business
was at the operational stage and the landfill at the aftercare stage. These three
case studies involve entities managing strategic infrastructure and so the time
and resources required to identify the cross-disciplinary hazards by the
application of the dimensions would be acceptable as there is the potential for
significant negative impact. Additionally the activities carried out by the
respective case studies are regulated by a number of different entities and so a
comprehensive register of hazards would have additional benefits, which would
include providing a comprehensive register of hazards for each component or
phase of lifecycle. However, the allocation of resource and time to this level of
hazard identification may not be acceptable to a small and medium enterprise
which has commercial and social value but is not complex, of strategic
importance, or likely to have a significant negative environmental or health and
safety impact. As a result the application of this method should be proportionate
and relevant to the size, potential impact of the activities and strategic impact of
the project, infrastructure or entity.
Furthermore this method may be of greater value when a better understanding
of the associated hazards of emerging technologies is required and where there
are limited analogues for example in the case of CCS (Chapter 7). The benefits
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arise as it is proactive in its approach to hazard identification, reproducible and
provides an audit trail.
10.9.7 Validity of all options
There were issues with validating the case studies for example the personnel
who were involved in the identification of risks and compiling the risk register for
the CCS case study (1) were disbanded in 2012 when it was decided that the
first competition would not result in a project and that a new competition would
commence. As the objective of the case study (1) was to establish whether the
dimensions could be identified from the initial risk register this was acceptable
as it was possible to obtain validation of the results for the application of the
method to case study (2) and case study (3).
10.10 Summary
The methods and tools used to identify hazards and risks have a top-down
approach to hazard identification and this method provides an alternative and
complementary approach. The dimensions, generic, interface, causation and
accumulation were defined and a critical evaluation of their application to the
identification of hazards undertaken. A robust and auditable risk register method
for the identification and documentation of hazards across multiple disciplines
has been developed to identify cross-disciplinary hazards. The method has
been applied to three case studies and it has shown that the method identifies
additional hazards from the dimensions of interface, causation and
accumulation not previously identified or documented in a register of hazards.
The method has a unique approach to hazard identification which utilises the
lifecycle by introduction of subsidiary register. This makes a significant
contribution to the identification, characterisation and documentation of
interconnecting and cross-disciplinary hazard
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11 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
11.1 Project context and drivers
The rapid increase in population, globalisation and the speed of technological
development from concept to operation has resulted in the development of
complex interconnected multidisciplinary systems with risk and hazards which
are identified in generic silos. Historically hazards were identified within their
generic disciplines with methods and tools which took a linear approach to
identification. These tools and methods for generic silo hazard and risk
identification are not capable of identifying hazards and risks in a
multidimensional world where the attributes of interconnectivity, dependency
and complexity result in cross-disciplinary relationships and unidentified
hazards. This research presents the development of a new method for the
identification of cross-disciplinary hazards.
Hazard identification is in transition with new approaches trying to capture the
complexity with the inclusion of time, and dependency. There are gaps in
current knowledge for example: data for integrated frameworks relies on the
identification of hazards in generic silos for risk management. The tools for
hazard identification predominately commence with a known failure followed by
the identification of known outcomes and impacts. There is also a top down
approach to risk management based on a list of prioritised hazards which result
from generic silo identification. Additionally, when scenario analysis is carried
out it is not documented in a register. Risk registers are predominately a list of
risks focusing on quantification rather than the identification and
characterisation of potential hazards.
The aim of this research project was to identify and investigate (using case
studies) why robust and encompassing hazard identification does not occur,
particularly in areas where multiple fields overlap and to design a framework
that will address these deficiencies, within the following specific objectives:
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 Critically evaluate current approaches to hazard identification and risk
management to identify their suitability for the identification of hazards
in an interconnected world;
 Define the dimensions of generic, interface, causation and
accumulation risk and critically evaluate their application to the
identification of hazards; and
 Develop and evaluate a method for the identification and
documentation of multidimensional attributes of hazards.
11.1.1 Implication of findings
Review of the prior art established that the methods and tools used to identify
hazards as well as the current risk management frameworks were not able to
accommodate the identification of hazards across disciplines. This was due to
the silo focus of generic risk management, the fact that whole systems risk
management frameworks were still fundamentally based on silo based
identification, and there was a move away from the characterisation of hazards
to quantification of risks when the world had changed from simple silo linearity
to complexity (Johnson, 2006). The critical evaluation of the methods for hazard
identification found the methods and tool for identification did not accommodate
complexity and have not developed to include interconnectivity; multiple risk
relationships across a number of disciplines which result in hazards with
multiple dimensions.
The introduction of the dimensions of generic, interface, causation and
accumulation were found to add value to the identification of hazards as they
were able to facilitate additional multidimensional relationships between risks
and the resulting hazards. It was possible to develop a method for
multidimensional hazard identification incorporating the dimensions. The
application of the method to complex infrastructure projects at different stages
of the lifecycle and from a wide range of operations shows that the method is
feasible, practical and flexible.
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11.1.2 Scientific achievements
The identification of hazards through the lens of the dimensions of generic,
interface, causation and accumulation brings structure to the identification of
hazards across disciplines. The method accommodates interconnectivity
through the different hazard relationships; couplings in interface hazards, chains
of causation and portfolio relationships in accumulation. The method returns to
the fundamentals of risk by focusing on qualitative characterisation of hazards
prior to quantification of hazards in risk identification. This facilitates complexity
by recognising the multidimensional attributes of hazards rather than focusing
on the results of quantifying existing identified risks.
The new method challenges the top-down approach to hazard identification
from a plethora of tools and methods. It also provides an alternative solution
which enhances current approaches to hazard identification across the
disciplines.
11.2 Addition to knowledge
11.2.1 Identification
The move away from hazard identification to risk quantification needs to be
redressed in light of the changing complexity of our world as quantification in
preference to characterisation does not lead to robust hazard identification.
Aven (2012c) states there is a need to return to the fundamentals of risk. This
research project shows that unidentified hazards are present within an existing
portfolio of risks evidenced in a risk register. As a result of cross-disciplinary
hazard identification these hazards have been identified. The tools for
identification need to accommodate the changing complexity of our world. Silo
generic hazard identification is not adequate for cross discipline identification as
evidenced in this research by the results of case studies1, 2 and 3 as hazards
are not linear but have multidimensional attributes.
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11.2.2 Dimensions
Confirmation that the dimensions of interface, causation and accumulation can
be identified provides additional knowledge about the interrelationships between
hazards and risks. The method contributes to the discussion on the evolution of
a hazard to a risk and the development from a linear to multidimensional
construct. The method identifies hazards that were previously not identified and
adds to the knowledge of interconnectivity and complexity science.
Interconnectivity is accommodated by recognition of the three different hazard
relationships interface, causation and accumulation.
11.2.3 Complexity and connectivity
The acceptance that the dimensions of hazards exist and are evidenced in a
register provides additional knowledge to our understanding of the identification
of hazards and risk within complex systems. Addition to complexity science is
provided by the application of a structured method identifying different hazard
relationship as a result of the application of dimensions and evidencing in a
register.
11.2.4 Emerging risk identification
The application of the method to the CCS case study and climate change
adaptation are evidence of a method which is proactive in its identification of
hazards across time, lifecycle, components, and generic disciplines. As it is not
a top-down method the initial identification does not exclude hazards based on
known failures but provides a pool of hazards for prioritisation and risk
management. As a result it provides a pool of real hazards from which emerging
hazards and risks are identified.
11.3 Practical application
The method adds additional steps to the current identification of hazards prior to
quantification and provides an alternative to top down hazard identification. The
method enhances hazard identification within existing risk management
frameworks, providing realistic scenarios for cross-disciplinary hazard
339
identification. This method supports the requirement for directors and officers to
identify and manage the risks of their organisation so as to comply with
corporate governance requirements. It contributes to providing a
comprehensive register of identified hazards and an audit trail for the decision
making that results in the prioritisation of hazards for mitigation.
The method, by the application of the dimensions and inclusion of the
descriptors, lifecycle and chain component, is able to highlight the concentration
of hazards at the different phases of the lifecycle and within the various
components of a process, value chain, project and commercial or public entity.
The resulting method provides funders and regulators with an indication of
hazards over the lifecycle of a project, infrastructure, value chain or service.
This offers a proactive and realistic view of the potential legacy liabilities which
they may actually knowing or unknowingly retain.
The application of the method to the three case studies included the analysis of
existing risk registers as part of the process of identifying the cross-disciplinary
hazards. This resulted in testing the robustness of risk registers and the
highlighting of inconsistencies. As a result the method could be applied to risk
registers submitted for funding, permitting and in response to government
requests to establish if they are a fair reflection of the hazards and risks which
should be identified. This practical application was also suggested by the expert
who validated the results of case study 2 for the permitting of new infrastructure
as the inclusion of the lifecycle allows proactive management of hazards and
risks.
11.4 Future work
This research has contributed to knowledge surrounding the identification of
hazards and risks in a multidimensional world and has also highlighted gaps in
knowledge that may benefit from further research in the future.
This study introduced the interface dimension to cross-disciplinary hazard
identification. There were two aspects to the interface dimension; interface level
I and interface level II. Interface level I requires additional research into those
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residual hazards with a high ranking and which do not traverse all the phases of
the lifecycle. Additionally the investigation should establish what impact the
inclusion of these hazards make on the existing portfolio.
The development of a method to identify cross-discipline hazards at the
interface of modules of a value chain (Interface II) should be investigated. This
will add another dimension to the existing suite it will require access to sensitive
information but it will have practical application to new value chains and will
enhance the identification of risk in complexity. This method will require an
understanding of the supply chains, types of interface relationships and hazards
that occur at interfaces. A workshop could be used to understand the formal
and informal systems that may result from interactions at the interface of value
chains. The objective would be to understand the context, issues and risks of
interface management, The CCS value chain could be used as the subject for
this research. Key individuals who were involved in the first CCS FEED study
should be approached via a structured questionnaire focusing initially on the
separate interfaces in the CCS value chain such as the interface between
capture and transportation.
Another area of further research is the examination of chains of causation.
There is a need to test using historical claims data the actual behaviour of these
chains and the different options that may exist from one generic hazard tipping
point to establish whether there are any common sequences of chains. This
research will require actuarial input and the use of quantitative models. It should
be possible to test to see if there are any trends. Claims experts should be
approached to verify the chains of causation
The method produces a significant number of additional hazards specifically for
the interface I and causation dimensions. It is necessary to reduce the number
of interface hazards without diluting the importance of identifying the interface I
cross disciplinary hazards. Additionally it is imperative that the relationship
identified from the results of the case studies between the context of the case
study, the identification of hazards and the resulting register of hazards is
incorporated in any proposed method for the reduction in the number of
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hazards. The frequency of occurrence should not be the sole basis for inclusion
in the register. Hazards that occur less frequently could have catastrophic
consequences and these should not be excluded. As a result further research
should consider the application of the method to additional case studies focused
on the systematic reduction of the number of hazards. This could include the
increased use of expert elicitation based on an acceptable logic for the specific
case study, resulting in the development of a protocol for the staged reduction
in number of interface I hazards to a manageable size that will allow risk
professionals to focus on those cross-disciplinary hazards that require urgent
mitigation.
Additionally, for interface I hazards, research should be carried out to establish
the significant hazard relationships for the specific context of the subject of the
register. These should be carried out by incorporating the use of expert
knowledge and an agreed table of criteria for prioritisation which is specific to
the context of the subject for which the register is being compiled. Separately,
for causation hazards, research should look to establish common trends in the
sequence of chains of causation which will help to reduce the number of
causation hazards when represented as single chains rather than single
hazards. This research would also benefit from the outcome of the proposed
research on claims behaviour and chains of causation suggested earlier in this
section.
The method should be tested on a live project which facilitates access to real
data so that a better understand of the practical implications of application can
be obtained. Additionally there is a need to measure the costs and benefits of
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